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FOREWORD 
 
In many developed and developing countries there has been a move toward 
increased reliance on Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure 
development. This involves an engagement with, or participation of, private 
companies and the public sector in the financing and provision of 
infrastructure. In most countries these PPP arrangements have been aimed at 
overcoming broad public sector constraints in relation to either a lack of 
public capital; and/or a lack of public sector capacity, resources and 
specialised expertise to develop, manage, and operate infrastructure assets. 
Public Private Partnerships are now commonly used to accelerate economic 
growth, development and infrastructure delivery and to achieve quality 
service delivery and good governance.  The spectrum of nature and types of 
public private partnerships (PPPs) are overwhelming, making a definition of 
a PPP difficult. In addition, there have been tremendous developments in the 
use of PPP in many countries that has made it increasingly important to 
understand these practices.  
 
Given the changing economic, social and political environment, coupled with 
globalisation and budgetary constraints, PPP has become unavoidable and 
indeed desirable in many countries worldwide. The need for PPP in many 
countries has been exacerbated by the public sector‘s recognition of the vital 
role of modern infrastructure in economic growth.   
 
PPPs are now accepted as an important avenue for funding major public 
sector infrastructure projects.  PPPs are joint ventures in which business and 
government co-operate, each applying its strengths to develop a project more 
quickly and more efficiently than government could accomplish on its own.  
The private sector may be responsible for the designing, financing, 
constructing, owning and/or operating the entire project. The private sector 
may want to be assured that the public-private partnership structure is 
designed to provide competitive rates of return commensurate with a 
financial rate of return that they could earn on alternative projects of 
comparable risk. 
 
This doctoral workshop provides an opportunity to explore on-going research 
across diverse issues of PPP. The research presentations will facilitate 
discussions on aspects of research methodological approaches, data 
collection and analysis, perceived research outcomes and contributions to the 
body of knowledge, which, while focused on PPP, will also interface with 
related knowledge domains in procurement and performance.   
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Nine papers are presented in the workshop proceedings. Three of the papers 
deal with elemental issues of PPPs such as safety, risk and value for money. 
Three other papers present the need for PPP implementation in Nigeria for 
transport projects, housing projects and for construction craft careers. The 
final three papers talk about mechanisms in dealing with core issues of PPPs 
such as public services reformed agendas, underinvestment in PPPs and 
performance.  Likewise, all the papers present a wide range of issues 
surrounding PPPs.  
 
Finally, we are indebted to the organising committee and scientific 
committee in making is this workshop a success. The refereeing provided by 
the scientific committee was pertinent and useful, which helped authors to 
sharpen their papers.  
 
Akintola Akintoye and Champika Liyanage 
University of Central Lancashire 
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THE PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVE: WHY 
VALUE FOR MONEY REMAINS ELUSIVE 
 
Andrew Arewa and  Peter Farrell 
 
Department of the Built Environment and Engineering,  
University of Bolton, Bolton. BL3 5AB 
 
Email: aa1gta@bolton.ac.uk 
It is argued that governments alone are not able to procure the volume of 
infrastructure required to establish and maintain sustainable communities. 
PFI is used as a tool to develop projects that would otherwise not come to 
fruition. It seems to be promoted by political parties in power, but criticised 
by those in opposition. The continuing debate is about value for money, 
and whilst attempts are made to measure this facet, definitive judgments 
seem elusive. High bidding costs, including legal and consultancy fees are 
deterrents to the use of PFI. Evidence suggests that PFI provides greater 
cost and time predictability than other procurement routes. Whilst there are 
many flagship examples of resounding success, there are also some high 
profile failures. This study is based on a literature review. It assesses key 
facets of the PFI process, such as value for money and governments' 
addiction to the PFI ethos. There is an appraisal of competing views in an 
international context, and a review of whether some types of projects are 
more suited to PFI than others. The paper forms part of an ongoing PhD 
study to appraise investment in health and safety in a variety of 
procurement routes. 
Key words: PFI, procurement, value for money. 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) to deliver infrastructure in the 
UK has come to stay because governments alone cannot provide the needed 
volume of infrastructure. PFI is a major project delivery method that is in 
vogue. It seems to be promoted by politicians in power and a debate about 
value for money appears to be ongoing. 
 
According to Barrie and Mitchell (2011: 6) PFI has proven to be an effective 
vehicle for the transfer of delivery and operation risk to the private sector. In 
addition, recent project audits conducted by the National Audit Office (NAO 
2010a: 3-7) have demonstrated that PFI projects have much greater certainty 
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of timely delivery, increased customer focus and success in transferring risk 
associated with the cost of construction and operation. The UK Treasury 
Select Committee (2011: 58) stated that ‗for too long PFI has been the only 
game in town‘ meaning governments are addicted to the use of PFI contracts. 
Perhaps, this addiction is necessitated by the need to integrate ‗build-operate, 
maintain and transfer‘ concepts and the ‗debt‘ off balance sheet ethos. 
 
The PFI model has earned itself a firm place in the public procurement 
toolkit based on the evidence of successful delivery (Marique 2011: 2 and 
Barrie and Mitchell 2011: 3-4).  The Confederation of British Industry (CBI 
2011) asserted that ‗PFI has enabled a great number of infrastructure/projects 
to be delivered that, otherwise would not have been possible using traditional 
procurement methods‘. The CBI report further claimed that ‗between 2000 
and 2010, over 500 PFI projects reached financial close and over 120 
hospitals were built‘. In terms of future opportunities, Infrastructure UK 
(2011) stated that an ‗estimated £200 billion of investment is required over 
the next five years and, with public finances under pressure, it is of 
paramount importance that private finance can be leveraged to fund new 
projects‘.   
 
However, the use of PFI to deliver needed infrastructure, has been fiercely 
criticised. The criticisms appear to come mainly from those in opposition 
political parties and trade unions. The major issue is that the initiative is not 
providing value for money, coupled with its inflexibility and unclear 
processes involved in contracts (Triggle 2010). In addition, the British 
Medical Association (BMA 2011: 4) stated that ‗the structure of PFI makes it 
difficult to evaluate risk‘. Pearson (2009) and Gardiner (2010) claimed that, 
in the UK, £245 billion has been spent on UK infrastructure using PFI 
between the years 1997 to 2010. Comparatively UNISON (2010: 4) and the 
UK Treasury Select Committee (2011: 29-32) further averred that, cost 
estimates are more expensive, than if infrastructure were to be procured using 
alternative traditional procurement means. Monbiot (2010) referring to 
excessive profit made by PFI contractors in an article titled ‗The UK‘s 
Odious Debts‘ asserted that, ‗as the new public spending data released by the 
government show, a £267 billion bill has been both ring-fenced and index-
linked to offset PFI debts.  
 
Recently Globalise Resistance (GR 2011) claimed that one notable case 
where a PFI contract failed to provide value for money is the M25 motorway 
widening project in London. A review of the project shows that £50 million 
of the capital cost was spent on consultancy, out of the original proposed cost 
of £660m (Gardiner 2010). The main reason given for this astonishing cost is 
that, the deal was done during 2008/09 economic meltdown; as a result, 
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banks were taking a risk-averse view. It could be argued that, the 
construction of the M25 was not in any way more risky at that stage than in 
the period of consultations. Furthermore, the NAO (2010) asserted that, the 
eighteen months‘ delay in preparing and finalising the widening of the 
procurement arrangement meant the contract was late in May 2009 at the 
height of credit crisis, which led to net present costs of £3.4 billion. 
 
Despite stern criticism about PFI not providing value for money, its use as a 
form of project delivery is on the increase (UK Treasury Select Committee 
2011: 40-46). Perhaps, PFI has become an easy vehicle used to provide 
needed infrastructure, and a tool used by governments/politicians to boost 
political image. According to the BMA (2011: 3) ‗a powerful motivation for 
Government's approval of PFI over the years is that, it enables the Treasury 
to borrow money without the debt appearing on the public balance sheet‘. In 
contrast, Stewart (2011: 27) argues that ‗the reason for the Treasury‘s 
comparative zeal for PFI has less to do with taking debt off the government 
balance sheet‘ but has everything to do with transferring of operational and 
financial risk to the private sector. Stewart (2011) further emphasised that a 
good example of how wrong traditional public projects can go is the 
Edinburgh Tram project which was originally estimated to cost £375m but 
has risen to £770m plus hefty additional interest costs, with a revised 
completion target from 2011 to 2014. Regardless of the circumstances 
surrounding PFI, some other countries like Australia and Canada have fully 
embedded PFI into government procurement portfolios (HM Treasury 2009 
and Love et al 2008). Thus, PFI as a form of procurement has had a lengthy 
and somewhat chequered history (Miller et al 2009 and Morledge et al 2006), 
principally due to the number of parties attempting to exploit the concept in a 
rather cynical way (Morledge et al 2006 and Uher 1999).  
 
Apparently, not all PFI projects fall short of not providing value for money 
(KPMG 2011, Pollack 2000 and 2011: 4-5). The CBI (2011: 6) argues that 
‗PFI is suitable for large projects, which justify the comprehensive 
commissioning process that is typical of this model. It is less likely, to be 
appropriate for projects with a capital value under £30 million‘.  There are 
lists of various projects where PFI has been confirmed to provide great value 
for money. For instance, the NAO (2010a: 8) claimed that, most of the PFI 
contracts for hospitals investigated recently show that, they were well 
managed and provided good value for money. In terms of satisfaction derived 
from using PFI facilities, NAO (2010a) stated that ‗…low level of periodic 
payments and high levels of satisfaction indicate they are currently 
achieving/providing value for money....‘. 
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The much ado about PFI not providing value for money seems to concentrate 
on the capital cost of PFI projects with little or no considerations for other 
value propositions such as satisfaction, efficiency and effectiveness of 
facilities. Newville et al (2007) asserted that, the value concerns for projects 
are predicated on three components: construction cost, operation/maintenance 
cost and operational benefit/revenues of such projects. Furthermore, a study 
by McKee et al (2006) which examined cost effectiveness of PFI projects in 
relation to construction costs reveals that PFI projects provide real value for 
money. Conversely, the recent UK Treasury Select Committee (2011: 35) 
claimed that, PFI projects are 'poor value for money'. Also, UK Local 
Government Lawyers (UKLGL 2011: 1-2) referring to the UK House of 
Commons Public Accounts Committee (2009) stated that, investigation of 76 
operational PFI hospitals in England and more than 13,000 homes shows 
that, there is ‗no clear evidence on whether PFI offers value for money‘. 
 
In terms of maintenance and performance of PFI projects after construction, 
Van and Koppenjan (2001), Newville et al (2007: 2) and Khanom (2009) all 
agreed that, PFI projects (facilities) perform satisfactorily after construction. 
Their findings were based on the fact that, PFI contracts compel contractors 
(private consortiums) not only to build infrastructure but maintain it during 
the concession period as well, before handing it back to the principle partner. 
With such an arrangement, it is therefore in the interest of the private 
consortium to strike a balance between spending money upfront for a strong 
and healthy infrastructure, and to spend money later on intensive 
maintenance of infrastructure during the concession period. In addition, 
Barrie and Mitchell (2011: 1) opined that, PFI can be extremely effective for 
the delivery of services.  
 
LITERATURE 
That PFI may not be considered a form of construction procurement has 
generated strong debate in recent time. Hitherto, is still not clear, though its 
use as a form of construction project delivery method seems indispensable 
(Hodge and Greve 2007: 545 - 558, Khanom, 2009 and UK Treasury Select 
Committee, 2011: 35). The evolution that engulfs procurement practice in the 
construction industry in the past fifty years is believed to be driven by 
construction clients. These clients (government) from time immemorial have 
always found a way to ensure their demands in terms of infrastructure 
development are met (Murdoch and Hughes, 2008: 96-110).  
 
Appiah et al (2010: 3) and Turner (1998: 9) asserted that, the ever changing 
needs and characteristics of clients have made practitioners in the 
construction field to develop various ways of getting projects done to suit 
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individual client. It has been established that, the way a project is procured 
dictates its success, as well as the value for money of such projects (Bennett 
and Grice 1990, Morledge, et al 2006). This has also influenced the view of 
researchers as to what procurement of a project actually entails, which has 
made the topics ‗construction procurement‘ and ‗PFI‘ complex and difficult 
to understand (Hughes et al, 2006). Although, it is comparatively hard to 
determine what entails a successful project or what parameters makes up 
value for money in projects, client satisfaction is increasingly seen by all 
concerned as a measure for project success. Arguably, client satisfaction is 
another contextual issue that is hard to elucidate.  
 
One intriguing aspect of PPP and PFI is that, both are used as tools for 
managing construction projects. Perhaps governments is exploring and 
looking for means of transferring risk, at the same time providing 
infrastructure to the public, without having to pay huge amount initially, for 
the facility. The dominant theme about PPP and PFI are; they both provide a 
novel approach to delivering goods and services to citizens, and the novelty 
being the mode of managing and governing (Hodge and Greve 2007: 545-
558. ). This implies that politic is highly associated with both. One definition 
of PPP which gives it a clear distinction from PFI is provided by Van Ham 
and Koppenjan (2001: 598) which identified PPP as ‗cooperation of some 
sort of durability between public and private actors in which they jointly 
develop products and services and share risks, costs, and resources which are 
connected with these products through an institutional lens'. PPP is more like 
a partnering arrangement in that, the parties involved have to bear parts of the 
project risks. Klijn and Teisman (2000 and 2005) and Khanom (2009) 
asserted that, the spirit of ―win-win‖ is evident in PPPs compared to PFI. In 
addition, the UK Commission for Public Private Partnerships (2001) 
described PPPs as ‗sustainable cooperation between public and private actors 
in which joints and/or services are developed and wherein risks, costs and 
profits are shared‘. Arguably, the focus on co-operation in PPP which may 
not be found in PFI is to ameliorate the many problems that arise from the 
often highly competitive and adversarial practices within the construction 
industry especially in PFI contract (Klijn and Teisman 2000/2005 and 
Salamon 1995). Though the differences between PFI and PPP may not be too 
clear, Table 1 attempts to draw a clear distinction between them. 
 
According to Takim and Akintoye (2002: 552) ‗It is difficult to give an 
unequivocal verdict on the success or failure of a project, as some criteria are 
successfully met while others are not.‘ Likewise, benchmarking value for 
money in PFI projects can be ambiguous and extremely complicated if all 
parameters are not studied carefully. Moreover, different views of 
stakeholders in the development of construction (PFI projects) may explain 
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the reason why the theme value for money remains elusive. The overall 
objective for developing a robust benchmarking framework for PFI projects 
vis-à-vis value for money concern should take into account client 
satisfaction, project cost, risk transfer and performance of facilities. 
 
Table 1:  differences between PPP and PFI adapted from Salamon (1995), Van Ham and 
Koppenjan (2001) and  Klijn and Teisman (2000 and 2005)  
                        
              PFI                    PPP 
Financial contribution prior to PFI 
project are purely private sector  
business 
In terms of capital: there is usually an 
arrangement on a percentage ratio amount to 
be contributed by both parties, say on a 
percentage of 51% to 49% public to private 
sector contribution. 
Collaboration is minimal private 
sector rule is more pronounced 
because they are in charge 
Collaboration is a common feature and is 
clearly noticed 
In terms of value for money:  
controversial  and difficult to define  
In terms of value for money: there is less 
argument when it comes to VFM 
In terms of overall project cost: 
ggenerally believed to be expensive 
Project cost is mutually agreed upon because 
win-win is the name of the game.  
Origin of PFI: arguably criticism of 
traditional forms of procurement 
gave birth to PFI 
Origin of PPP: arguably criticism and reforms 
to PFI gave birth to PPP 
Risk: financial risks are usually 
shared on agreed percentage 
Financial risk is usually private sector 
business 
Concession period span between 25 
- 30 years. 
Concession periods vary considerably 
depending on agreement 
 
Authoritative sources such as Fryer (2004: 291-299), Hughes et al (2006) and 
Eriksson et al (2008) have argued that, it is not only inefficiencies and cost of 
projects on the parts of traditional procurement methods that have brought 
about changes noticed in today‘s construction procurement. In line with this 
argument Miller et al (2009) asserted that emerging market drivers such as, 
climate change policies, infrastructure investment, sustainable communities 
programs, economic and political reasons may be behind the sporadic 
changes witnessed in construction procurement in recent times.  Therefore it 
may be argued that, the drive for PFI in recent years is propelled by 
Governments' obligation to investment on needed infrastructure, though 
economic and political reasons is probably a contributing factor. 
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According to Andrew Tyrie, the chairman of the House of Commons 
Treasury Select Committee (2011), ‗PFI means getting something now and 
paying later‘. Fundamentally, PFI is an initiative which helps in procuring 
basic infrastructure by providing finances and in most cases design, 
construction and maintenance under an agreed concession period (HM 
Treasury 2009 and Morledge et al 2006).  Basically, the underlying principle 
behind PFI is to ensure that, risk is transferred from the public to the private 
sectors ‗to take advantage of private sector management skills, incentivised 
by having private finance at risk‘ (HM Treasury 2000).  
 
Since the use of PFI in the early 1990s in the UK, the initiative has received 
overwhelming patronage by governments all over the world. The link of PFI 
to partnering is one aspect of construction management that has generated 
robust debate in recent times. Thus far, the use of PFI as a form of partnering 
has had a protracted and to some extent plaid history, (Miller et al 2009), 
mainly due to the number of parties attempting to take advantage of the 
concept (Lonsdale 2011, Morledge et al 2006 and Uher 1999).  
 
The shortcoming against PFI schemes is not peculiar to the UK alone; in 
Canada and Australia Sanger and Crawley (2009) asserted that PFI projects 
are five times more expensive to procure when compared to other traditional 
options. In Canada, a school project at the Université de Québec à Montréal 
failed; it doubled in cost to the public from C$200 million to C$400 million. 
Also, the west coast highways B.C. Sea-to-Sky Highway cost the taxpayers 
$220 million more than, if it were financed and operated publicly (Sanger 
and Crawley 2009). In Australia, Miller et al (2009) claimed that, PFI 
projects formed 6 to 10% of public (government) total investment in the 
years 2006 to 2007.  Their findings revealed that, PFI projects have a cost 
variant that is four times higher in New South Wales of Australia and five 
times higher in the Victoria region of the country. Compared to alternative 
procurement methods Miller et al (2009: 17) further stated that, whether this 
mode of project delivery represents value for money is still a subject of 
debate.   
 
Arguably, evidence suggests that, some types of public service projects such 
as schools, roads and prisons may be more suitable for PFI scheme than 
others (Pollack 2000 and House of Commons Committee, 2001). The basis 
for justifying this suggestion is anchored on the fact that, there is no 
demarcation of core and supplementary services compared to hospital 
projects. This simply enables PFI contractors to do design, build and carry 
out maintenance without being tied to rigorous hospital and health service 
bureaucratic bottlenecks. However, GR (2011) has a contrary view by 
arguing that, it is not the nature of project that matters but the cost 
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formulation and justification of PFI projects. GR (2011) further argued that, 
PFI does not represent value for money because it involves higher set-up 
costs, higher borrowing costs coupled with expensive legal processes 
involved in getting PFI contracts signed. It is often argued that, the 
employment of consultants to oversee PFI contract negotiations and initial 
pre-contract running costs has the tendency of escalating PFI contract cost, 
up to the turn of 7-15% of total PFI contract value (UNISON 2001, 2003, 
2010 and Gardiner 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, using initial construction project cost as sole criteria for 
judging PFI projects against value for money may not be sufficient. It is 
imperative to know that, two inherent costs types are bound to arise under 
PFI contracts, if the issue of value for money is to be critically considered; 
the cost/risk of construction and the cost/risk of running/maintaining 
facilities. Regardless of the kind of cost incurred in PFI contracts, the NAO 
(2010b) report claimed that, there is a guaranteed kind of satisfaction 
(assured maintenance) derived from the use of PFI projects per se after the 
construction stage. Therefore, PFI can be said to represent value for money 
under guaranteed maintenance arrangements. In considering PFI projects 
against value for money, construction cost should not be the only parameters 
used. Improvement Network UK (INUK 2010) argued that issue of PFI 
projects with regards to value for money should be anchored on the balance 
between economy (cost), efficiency and effectiveness. Thus, PFI value for 
money can be expressed as: 
 
                     Total cost (construction/maintenance cost) of PFI projects 
                     Satisfaction derived from the use of PFI projects 
                   Adapted from INUK (2010) and Morledge et al (2006) 
 
Moreover, previous studies shows that, PFI projects are deemed to have 
greater certainty in the delivery within budget, on time and within specified 
quality as such, providing value for money  (C and AG 2003: 4-7, HC-
Committee on Public Accounts 2003 and CBI 2011: 5). However, one 
argument that, can be easily sustained when it comes to value for money is 
that, risks are easily allocated to those that are best able to manage them. The 
process of risk transfer, from public to private sector acts as an essential 
explanation that PFI does provide value for money.  
 
It could be alleged that, PFI projects are merely a political tool in the hands 
of politicians. The use of PFI by governments all over the world, particularly 
promoted by politicians to provide needed infrastructure, appears to cause 
difficulties in defining and ascertaining whether PFI provides genuine value 
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for money. Thelwell (2011) and L Express Media (LEM, 2011) in 
conjunction with UK Channel 4 News (2011) claimed that, the truth about 
PFI projects with regard to value for money will remain completely elusive in 
as much as, politicians continue to play politics with PFI projects. Based on 
this observation, LEM (2011) and Channel 4 News (2011) further asserted 
that, ‗George Osborne, the UK present chancellor, is pressing ahead with PFI 
projects on a multi-billion-pound scale despite having dismissed the 
infrastructure funding mechanism as ‗discredited‘ when he was in 
opposition....‘. The research further revealed that the present Conservative 
Government lead by UK Prime Minister, David Cameron has signed 61 PFI 
contracts within one year in office.  This would seem to illustrate that, 
opposition political parties seems to carry the banner of PFI not providing 
value for money.  
 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS  
The literature identifies that, there is considerable debate as to whether PFI 
contracts/projects provide value for money. The UK Treasury Select 
Committee (2011: 35-37, 56) asserted that PFI may have delivered many new 
hospitals and homes which might otherwise not have been delivered, but 
there is no clear evidence whether PFI is any better or worse value for money 
than other procurement routes. Whilst, attempts are made to measure this 
facet, the use of PFI as a form of project delivery method by governments 
appears to be on the increase (Monbiot 2010). Perhaps, the UK government is 
addicted to the use of PFI (Thelwell 2011, UK Treasury Select Committee 
2011 and Duffield et al 2008). Moreover, the use of PFI contracts by 
politicians as a political tool to provide infrastructures in order to fulfil 
political manifestoes seem to contribute to addictiveness and the elusiveness 
of PFI not providing value for money. The literature highlights high bidding 
cost, including legal and consultancy fees as limitations to the use of PFI. 
There are indications suggesting that PFI contracts in hospitals provide good 
value for money. Also, the literature seems to recognise that, if well 
practised, PFI contracts have the potential to enhance delivery of needed 
infrastructure required to achieve sustainable communities. 
 
Due to some constraints, this study was unable to cover all social and 
economic problems that are currently bedevilling PFI contracts. There is need 
for further studies to examine other socio-economic hindrances, especially 
evaluating if PFI debts are to be on or off balance sheets. Other possible areas 
that need examining are investment and commitment to health and safety by 
PFI contractors. 
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PFI contracts have the potential to provide needed infrastructure in a 
sustainable way if well implemented. Timely project delivery, assured quality 
and guaranteed maintenance ethos constitute what make PFI contracts 
suitable for sustainable communities. However, what appears to make some 
PFI contracts not sustainable is the cost formulation of footing such projects. 
Thus, restructuring PFI financial arrangements especially risk allocation, 
throughout PFI project life cycles is essential. 
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Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly implemented to circumvent 
budgetary constraints, and to encourage efficiency and quality in the 
provision of public infrastructure in order to reach social welfare. One of 
the ways of reaching the latter objective is by the introduction of 
performance based standards tied to bonuses and penalties to reward or 
punish the performance of the contractor. This paper focuses on the 
implementation of safety based incentives in PPPs in such a way that the 
better the safety outcome the greater larger will be the economic reward to 
the contractor. The main aim of this paper is to identify whether the 
incentives to improve road safety in PPPs are ultimately effective in 
improving safety ratios in Spain. To that end, Poisson and negative 
binomial regression models have been applied using information of 
motorways of the Spanish network of 2006. The findings indicate that even 
though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not much 
controllable by the contractor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic 
and the percentage of heavy vehicles, the implementation of safety 
incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, 
injuries and accidents. 
Keywords: Pubic Private Partnerships, performance based standards, road 
safety, incentives, motorway concession contract.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most common ways of implementing PPPs in managing 
infrastructure is through the concession approach, which consists basically in 
transferring final design, construction, maintenance, and operation of the 
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infrastructure to a private consortium, in exchange for which that consortium 
receives the right to charge a fee to the user or to the government on behalf of 
the user, for a period of time contractually agreed in advance (Vassallo and 
Gallego 2005).  
 
One of the key aspects of PPPs is to encourage the private sector to manage 
and operate the infrastructure in the best way. To that end, in the last few 
years, PPPs are evolving from mere demand-based contracts (when the 
revenues of the contractor are related to the traffic demand) to performance-
based contracts referred to different aspects such as availability, congestion, 
state of the pavement, safety, and so on.  Consequently, the revenues of the 
contractor tend to depend more and more to the quality of the services rather 
than on traffic demand (Harding et al 2010).  
 
Two reasons lie behind this trend. First, PPP contractors can manage better 
the service performance they offer than the traffic flows in the infrastructure. 
And second, by encouraging the PPP contractors to provide a better service, 
by aligning the social and the private benefits, they will end up producing a 
more efficient outcome for society.  
 
Traditionally, most of the infrastructure management contracts, including 
PPPs, had not introduced explicit incentives to improve quality. However, 
nowadays most PPP contracts are encouraging the introduction of incentives 
to foster the contractor to provide an optimal quality level. In this way, the 
contracts incorporate a set of standards that the contractor must fulfill. If the 
contractor fails to comply with these requirements, the public authority will 
penalize the contractor or even rescind the contract. There are two ways of 
rewarding or penalizing the contractor: incentives related to the extension of 
the deadline of the project, and incentives related to increase the fee to be 
paid to the PPP contractor.  
 
This approach has moved many countries to introduce performance based 
indicators tied to bonuses and penalties in their PPP contracts. Some 
countries such as United Kingdom, Finland, Portugal and Spain have 
introduced these kind of incentives. 
 
The aim of this paper is to identify whether the incentives to improve road 
safety in PPPs are ultimately effective in improving safety ratios with an 
empirical analysis for the case of Spain. The results show that there are more 
fatalities, injuries and accidents on road segments without incentives when 
they are compared with other segments with incentives.  
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The authors have not found any empirical study about safety incentives 
offered to the PPP contractors.  
 
ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCES IN THE INTRODUCTION 
OF ROAD SAFETY INCENTIVES IN EUROPE 
Europe is the world‘s region with the greater tradition of incorporating 
performance-based incentives in PPPs. There are few countries with PPP 
roads that introduce positive incentives based on explicit road safety 
indicators. These countries where this was done, it became a normal practice 
and the latest PPP contracts continue to introduce and improve these 
incentives. This happens in Spain, Finland, Hungary, Norway, Portugal and 
United Kingdom. Italy introduced price-caps tied to road safety indicators in 
such a way that the concessionaire is allow to set higher tolls if the safety 
ratios are better. In Ireland, PPP road contracts include some road safety 
indicators but they do not provide bonuses. In other countries, like Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Belgium, there are new and sophisticated PPP contracts, 
but they do not have positive incentives based on explicit road safety 
indicators. 
 
The design of the road safety indicators is quite heterogeneous across 
different countries. There are differences both in the variable adopted to 
measure the outcome and in the final formula employed. Most of the PPPs 
include number of injuries, number of fatalities or a combination of number 
of light accidents, serious accidents and fatal accidents to build the indicator.  
 
On the other hand, including the exposure to the risk (expressed by traffic) is 
a generalized practice. Very often, the initial accident data is divided by the 
annual traffic, usually measured in terms of millions or billions of vehicles-
kilometers. E18 road (Muurla–Lohja) in Finland, the M6 road in Hungary, 
several PPPs in Portugal (the IP-4, for instance) and the latest PPP roads 
awarded in Spain use this methodology. The advantage of introducing the 
exposure to the risk (traffic) explicitly is that distortions in road safety results 
are reduced. 
 
With the same aim, in many other PPP contracts the assessment of the 
indicator is done by comparing similar roads, in terms of traffic, number of 
carriageways, etc. With this methodology it is possible to control the global 
evolution of casualties by many factors, most of them not manageable by the 
road operator. Some road contracts where the indicator is set in this way are 
E-18 road (Grimstad – Kristiansand) in Norway, the latest PPP roads 
awarded in the United Kingdom (for example, A1 & M25) and some PPP 
roads in Spain (like the M-407 motorway).  
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Regarding the way of rewarding or penalizing the contractor, it was identified 
two trends: incentives related to the extension of the deadline of the project, 
and incentives related to increase the fee to be paid to the PPP contractor.  
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF MOTORWAYS IN SPAIN 
Spain has extensive experience in managing and financing motorways 
through public-private-partnerships (PPPs). Most of the PPPs have been put 
into effect through concession contracts that have a long tradition in Spanish 
administrative law. Most of the motorway concessions awarded in Spain 
have been toll motorways. However, in the last few years, there was a large 
increase in the number of other PPP approaches, such as shadow-toll or 
performance-based contracts. 
 
Three different periods regarding the implementation of motorway 
concessions in Spain can be identified: from 1967 to 1975, from 1976 to 
1995, and from 1996 to the present. Between 1967 and 1975, 2,042 km of toll 
motorways were granted by the central government of Spain. The results of 
the implementation of concession contracts in Spain during this period were 
rather controversial. On the one hand, motorway concessions achieved the 
goal of providing the country with a modern motorway network at a time 
when the public budget of Spain was not sufficient to afford such a huge cost. 
On the other hand, the guarantees made by the government to facilitate 
concessions‘ funding over time became very costly for the country (Izquierdo 
and Vassallo 2004). 
 
The second stage of motorway concessions is from 1976 to 1995. In this 
period, no motorway concessions were awarded. There were several reasons 
for this. First, the two petroleum crises in the 1970s destabilized the Spanish 
economy. Second, after Franco‘s death, the political atmosphere in Spain was 
uncertain. Third, and most important, the Socialist government, which took 
office in 1982 and remained until 1996, was politically opposed to promoting 
private concessions as a means to finance motorways. Instead, the socialist 
government opted for modernizing the Spanish road network by widening 
and upgrading the most important roads, turning them into dual-roadway fast 
lanes. These free motorways were called ―autovías”.   
 
The term ―autovías‖ was used in Spain for identifying any free motorway 
with physically separated lanes in each direction. The first autovías in Spain 
were built by doubling lanes out of single carriageways. The design standards 
of these motorways (known as first generation autovías) had design standards 
well below those of the toll motorways. 
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Since 2000, the quality standards in the construction of autovías improved 
notably to make comparable with toll motorways. These are called second 
generation autovías. There is no technical difference between second 
generation autovías and toll motorways. The first generation autovías and 
second generation autovías were built, funded and managed by the Spanish 
government. None of the public motorways (autovías) has economic 
incentives to improve road safety though the government is committed to 
building and maintaining the autovías with socially expected quality 
standards.  
 
The third stage began in 1996 and continues into the present. In 1996, the 
conservative Popular Party took office in Spain. The need to contain Spain‘s 
public deficit was the most difficult challenge facing the new government. 
This was the main reason why the new government decided to implement 
once again the policy of offering concessions so as to encourage the 
participation of the private sector in financing new transportation 
infrastructure. From 1996 to now, 1,003 kilometers of new toll motorway 
concessions have been awarded by the central government of Spain through 
this approach. Another novelty of the period since 1996 is that not only the 
Spanish central government, but also the regional and even the local 
governments have started using the concession approach to implement both 
toll and shadow-toll motorways.  
 
Most of the PPPs implemented in the last stage include a provision to extend 
the contract duration up to four years if several performance-based indicators 
tied to quality aspects like queuing in toll plazas, congestion, state of the 
pavement, safety, and satisfaction of the users are ultimately fulfilled. Other 
PPP‘s awarded recently in Spain also include incentives in terms of annual 
bonuses to be incorporated to the periodic fee paid by the government to the 
contactor.  
 
Regarding safety, the PPP contractor can be granted an extension of the 
contract if safety indicators remain below an accident benchmark for similar 
roads. To that propose the government measures in a yearly basis the Risk 
Index (RI) and Mortality Index (MI) of the motorways and compare it with 
other motorways with similar characteristics in terms of alignment and traffic 
flow. 
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MODELS THAT EXPLAIN ROAD SAFETY: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
This paper analyzes whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPPs 
are effective. The statistical models most commonly used to explain the 
relationship between motor vehicle accidents and a set of predictor variables 
are the Poisson and NB regression models (Miaou and Lum 1993; Noland 
and Oh 2004; Chang 2005; Caliendo et al 2007). 
 
From an empirical stand-point, the relationship between accident frequency 
and traffic flows can be found in Jovanis and Chang (1986), Abdel-Aty and 
Essam Radwan (2000) and Persaud et al (2000); and the relationship between 
accident rate and traffic flow can be found in Vitaliano and Held (1991) and 
Hauer and Bamfo (1997). The relationship between accident frequency or 
accident rate and traffic flows show a great variation in theirs results.  
 
Jovanis and Chang (1986), Abdel-Aty and Essam Radwan (2000) and 
Persaud et al (2000) point out that accident frequency increases with Average 
Annual Daily Traffic (AADT). On the other hand, Vitaliano and Held (1991) 
cannot detect any significant increase in the accident rate when AADT 
increases. According to Hauer and Bamfo (1997) the accident rate even 
decreases with an increasing AADT.  
 
Few studies have analyzed the effect of heterogeneous flows, and specifically 
the effect that the presence of heavy good vehicles (HGVs) in the traffic flow 
has on accidents. Hiselius (2004) analyzed the relationship between accident 
frequency and traffic flow in four different road types according to speed 
limit and road width in two conditions: homogenous and heterogeneous 
traffic. The results show that the expected number of accidents increases less 
than proportionally with the traffic flow, in the homogenous case. For the 
heterogeneous case, the expected number of accidents decreases with 
increasing number of trucks. According to Arenas et al (2009), the expected 
number of accident increases with the addition of one vehicle in AADT, and 
increases with one additional HGV when comparing high capacity roads to 
single carriageway roads.  
 
Other studies have been carried out to establish relationships between 
accidents and the frequency of intersections (Ivan and O‘Mara 1997), 
environmental factor (Fridstrøm et al 1995; Shankar et al 1995; Chang 2005; 
Caliendo et al 2007), geometric infrastructure characteristics (Hauer, 2004; 
Chang, 2005), number of lanes (Milton and Mannering, 1998; Noland and 
Oh, 2004), and speed limits (Fridstrøm et al., 1995; Ossiander and 
Cummings, 2002). In this paper, Poisson and negative binomial (NB) 
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regression models were applied to know the relationship between safety 
incentives and road safety in Spain. This paper focuses on variables related to 
traffic flow, infrastructure characteristics (intersections), road operation  and 
incentives given to the PPP contractors. The authors have not found any 
empirical study about safety incentives offered to the PPP contractors.  
 
DATA FOR THE CASE OF SPAIN 
The models that were calibrated in this paper cover the year 2006. We chose 
this year because it is the most recent year where a complete database is 
available. 
 
The data used for the empirical model came from two different sources: 
police-reported accident data supplied by the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(Ministerio del Interior, 2006) and traffic data supplied by the Ministry of 
Public Works (Ministerio de Fomento, 2006). Using these databases it was 
necessary to build the final database combining both accident data and traffic 
data. The population for the models were made up of road stretches of the 
Spanish high-capacity network both PPP motorways (toll motorways) and 
public motorways (autovías).  
 
Some exogenous variables that may potentially influence safety and do not 
depend on the concessionaire‘s ability to manage the road were selected. 
These are: continuous variables such as (1) Average annual daily traffic 
(AADT), (2) Percentage of heavy goods vehicles (%HGV) and (3) Number 
of intersections for each stretch (INT) and two selected variables that may 
explain any relation between PPPs and accidents, (4) Road operation (RO) 
and (5) Incentives (INC). Furthermore, in order to fit the model it was 
considered the vehicle exposure (vk). It was measured in millions of vehicle-
kilometers as vkj = 365 lj AADTj/10
6
, where AADTj and lj are respectively 
the average annual daily traffic and length (km) of road section j obtained 
from traffic database. 
 
The number of intersections for each stretch (INT) introduced as discrete 
value with 2 levels (it takes 1 for stretches with at least 1 intersection and it 
takes 0 otherwise) was obtained from the Geographic Information System 
(GIS), the analyses was performed using ArcGis 9.2. Each stretch of the 
sample was analyzed using the GIS application to count the number of 
intersections. 
 
Data for Road operation (RO), introduced in models as categorical variable, 
was obtained from the Traffic map 2006 (Ministry of Public Works). The 
roadway segmentation is defined by the Ministry of Public Works (Ministerio 
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de Fomento, 2006b), which can be for the case of the Spanish high capacity 
network: second generation autovías (AV), first generation autovías (1AV) 
or toll motorways (TM). TH are PPPs, AV and 1AV are public motorways. 
 
To know which segments had road safety incentives (INC) it was analyzed 
each concession contract in force in 2006. The first Spanish concession 
contract awarded with implementation of road safety incentives was in 2002. 
All of the contracts from 2002 to 2006 were analyzed. INC is a discrete 
variable with 2 levels (it takes 1 for stretches with safety incentives and it 
takes 0 otherwise).  
 
For this study, the dependent variables are the fatal, injury and accident rates. 
1,042 road segments were extracted out of a total of 6,293 from the 2006 
traffic map, after selection criteria based on complete information for traffic 
flow and infrastructure variables. It was considered stretches with and 
without accidents to avoid selection bias. The study includes PPPs (toll 
motorways) and public motorways (first and second generation autovías). For 
this study was considered only stretches of the Spanish Interurban Road State 
Network. The final data base represents 62% of the total Spanish high-
capacity network. The total number of segments (with and without accidents) 
and the length by road operation are presented in Table 1.    
 
Table 1. Road segment data 
 
Road operation Segments Length 
(Km) 
Nº % 
with 
accidents 
without 
accidents 
Total  with 
accidents 
without 
accidents 
Total  
AV 275 287  562     26.39 27.54 53.93 3,790.46 
1AV 43 266  309 4.13 25.53 29.66 2,285.02 
TM 60 111  171 5.76 10.65 16.41 1,372.24 
Total 378  664 1,042 36.28 63.72 100 7,447.72 
 
The descriptive statistics are represented in Table 2. The descriptive statistics 
indicate that the mean traffic intensity (AADT) is higher on 1AV than AV 
and TM. The low traffic intensity in TM could be explained because the users 
pay tolls. 
 
There is more heavy good vehicles traffic in public motorways (AV and 
1AV) than PPPs (TM). The range and the standard deviation in AV and 1AV 
are higher than TM, which indicates more heterogeneity in traffic flow.   
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics by road operation and total. Year 2006 
 
Variables Road operation Mean S.D. Range Minimum Maximum 
AADT AV 23,686.04 21,875.96 139,040.00 1,270.00 140,310.00 
1AV 35,735.05 34,262.09 186,365.00 5,135.00 191,500.00 
TM 16,508.43 12,950.00 58,093.00 1,094.00 59,187.00 
Total 26,080.92 26,046.31 190,406.00 1,094.00 191,500.00 
%HGV AV 18.53 10.12 72.40 2.80 75.20 
1AV 23.37 8.95 48.10 4.60 52.70 
TM 10.35 5.39 32.60 1.50 34.10 
Total 18.63 10.08 73.70 1.50 75.20 
INT AV 
2.08 1.21 8.00 0.00 8.00 
1AV 
2.38 1.59 12.00 0.00 12.00 
TM 
1.54 0.70 3.00 0.00 3.00 
Total 2.08 1.29 12.00 0.00 12.00 
vk AV 52.28 56.22 451.28 0.42 451.70 
1AV 79.25 70.65 355.89 3.13 359.02 
TM 42.51 42.91 250.19 0.48 250.67 
Total 58.68 60.60 451.28 0.42 451.70 
 
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Poisson and NB regressions were applied to determine the relationship 
between fatalities, injuries and accidents and traffic variables, number of 
intersections for each stretch, road operation and road safety incentives 
offered to the concessionaire. In this work the response variables are number 
of fatalities, injuries and accidents. 
 
The Poisson overdispersion parameter indicates that the data may be 
overdispersed. When Pearson's chi-square divided by the degrees of freedom 
is greater than 1, the data may be overdispersed, otherwise the data may be 
underdispersed. All Poisson models presented Value/df greater than 1, 
therefore it was necessary to test the NB as an alternative model, which 
enables the variance of the dependent variable to differ from its mean. 
 
The accident rate of the   segment (    is defined as the expected number of 
accidents ( [  ]) per million-vehicle km. Therefore the regression model is 
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then expressed as  [  ]       , using the log-link function to relate the 
response to the linear predictor.  
 
The general expression for the estimated model is: 
 
 [   ]̂     (  ̂  ∑  ̂ 
 
   
     ̂      ) 
 
With the restriction  ̂    
The accident rate is expressed as:  ̂   
 [   ]
̂
   
 
                                                                                                                              
 
Table 3 summarizes the estimated NB regressions. Each column refers to a 
model with the endogenous variables and every row to exogenous variables. 
There is an estimated parameters for each variable. The significance of 
coefficients was checked using Wald statistic (in bracket), which rejects the 
null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero with a level of 95% confidence.  
Different goodness-of-fit statistics were used to select the model such as 
deviance, log-likelihood and Pearson chi-square statistics. Other measures 
were also evaluated such as Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 
1974) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978). 
 
A criterion for variables inclusion was used by testing the likelihood ratio 
(LR). In addition, the correlation coefficient between them was prevented. 
 
After analyzing Table 3, it could highlight the following results: 
 
1. Log(AADT) is statistically significant for the fatality, injury and accident 
rates. The coefficient signs are negative for all models (fatalities, injuries and 
accidents), suggesting that a greater AADT is associated with lower rates for 
fatalities, injuries and accidents. This result confirms the hypothesis proposed 
by Vitaliano and Held (1991) and Hauer and Bamfo (1997) that accident 
rates decrease when AADT increases.  
 
2. Log(%HGV) was found to be statistically significant for injury and 
accident models. The coefficient signs are negative for all models. This 
means that the larger the percentage of heavy good vehicles the smaller the 
injury and accident rates. This could be related to the speed reduction that 
heavy vehicles impose to light vehicles on the traffic flow. This result is in 
line with Hiselius (2004), if this analysis was in terms of number of 
accidents.  
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3. INC variable showed the expected negative sign, suggesting that 
establishing incentives in the PPP contracts is associated with lower rates for 
fatalities, injuries and accidents. The coefficient signs do not change in all 
models. This variable was found to be statistically significant for injury and 
accident models.    
 
4. The INT (intersection) variable showed the expected positive signs 
suggesting that the increased number of intersections is associated with the 
increased level of fatalities, injuries and accidents. There are more fatalities, 
injuries and accidents in stretches with at least one intersection than stretches 
without intersections. However, this variable was found to be statistically 
insignificant.  
 
The main reason for the insignificance of INT in the models could be that the 
kind of roads used for the analysis does not have at grade intersections which 
are those that most affect road safety. The Spanish high capacity network 
only has grade-separated intersections. These types of intersections reduce 
the accident potential due to vertical separation of traffic. This result is in line 
with the findings of Ivan and O‘Mara (1997).  
 
5. RO indicates that there is a differentiated behavior among toll motorways, 
second generation autovías and first generation autovías.  
 
Toll motorways (TM) showed the expected negative sign in all models 
suggesting that there are fewer fatalities, injuries and accidents in toll 
motorways compared to AV, which is the reference class. In other words, toll 
motorways managed and operated by the private sector turn out to be safer 
that free motorways managed and operated by the public sector. 
 
The only odd result that was found in the analysis is that the variable 1AV 
has an unexpected negative sign suggesting that 1AV has fewer fatalities, 
injuries and accidents compared to AV. This result is strange because, as 
mentioned earlier in this paper, first generation autovías (1AV) have poorer 
design standards than second generation autovías (AV). The main reason for 
that is that first generation autovías are among the busiest motorways in 
Spain in terms of traffic so the AADT in these motorways is often close to 
their capacity and consequently the speed of the flow is lower, which 
improves safety ratios. 
 
The expressions of fatality, injury and accident rates for different road 
operations can be determined by the parameters estimated in Table 2. As one 
example, the equations of toll motorways by segment (j) in specific scenarios 
are:  
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Toll motorways segments with incentives – without intersection: 
  ̂         (    
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        (    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅              
Toll motorways segments with incentives – at least 1 intersection:  
 ̂         (    
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        (    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅              
Toll motorways segments without incentives – without intersection: 
 ̂         (    
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        (    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅              
 
Toll motorways segments without incentives – at least 1 intersection: 
 ̂         (    
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        (    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅              
 
Table 3. Negative binomial regression models for fatalitites, injuries and accidents 
 
Variables  
Measureme
nt level   
FATALITIE
S 
INJURIE
S 
ACCIDENT
S 
Intercept     0.936 0.334 -0.677
 
    (0.403) (0.269) (0.947) 
Log(AADT) S 
  
-0.700a -0.157a -0.106b 
(37.977) (10.016) (4.031) 
Log(%HGV) S 
  
-0.084 -0.470a -0.507a 
(0.236) (37.863) (37.781) 
INC  C 
stretch with 
incentives 
-0.818 -0.676c -0.943b 
(0.552) (2.670) (3.946) 
INT  S   0.817 0.125
 0.167 
(2.360) (0.629) (0.880) 
ROAD 
OPERATION 
C 
TM -0.461 -0.398
a -0.351a 
(2.954) (11.809) (7.562) 
1AV -0.511
b -0.405a -0.423a 
(6.545) (23.900) (22.610) 
Log(vk) S   1 1 1 
Deviance (Dp)   579.862 2,562.148 1,933.346 
Pearson Chi-Square (X2)    1,669.727 4,202.451 2,784.678 
Log Likelihood   -486.091 -2,462.047 -1,978.212 
AIC   986.183 4,938.093 3,970.424 
BIC   1,021.121 4,973.032 4,005.362 
Overdispersion parameter (k)    1.546 3.891 2.578 
Measure level: Scale (S), Categorical (C) 
a 
p<0.01 
b
 p<0.05 
c
p<0.10 
 
From these expressions it can observe clearly that the incentives given to the 
concessionaires have a positive impact on reducing accident rates. For 
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stretches without intersection, the number of accidents per 1 million vehicle-
kilometers is about 2.66 times higher in toll motorways without incentives 
compared to toll motorways with incentives. And, for stretches with at least 1 
intersection, the number of accidents per 1 million vehicle-kilometers is 
about 2.55 times higher in toll motorways without incentives compared to toll 
motorways with incentives. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The most important result from this research is that safety-based incentives in 
PPPs is an effective measure to manage motorways. In other words, there are 
more fatalities, injuries and accidents on motorways segments without 
incentives than on motorways segments with incentives.  
 
The INC variable was found to be statistically significant in the injury and 
accident model. However, if incentives have an impact on road accidents, 
they have an impact on fatalities as well, because of the negative sign in fatal 
models. If incentives given to the concessionaires avoid accidents, they avoid 
fatalities which are a consequence of accidents. The results indicate that 
incentives have an influence on road safety. 
 
This paper has paved the way for new topics that undoubtedly would require 
further research. First, the analysis of the size of the economic incentive set 
up in the PPP contract on the ultimate improvement of safety ratios is a 
crucial aspect. Second, it would be useful to analyze the evolution of safety 
performance over the years in PPP motorways with safety-based incentives. 
Third, a cross-cutting comparison of the different types of incentives 
(incentives related to the deadline of the project vs incentives related to 
payments) would be of the greatest interest.  
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The Public-Private Partnership (PPP) method has become a favoured 
approach for delivering public infrastructure projects. PPP arrangements, in 
which the revenues are derived directly from the end users, are now widely 
used for the procurement of economic projects.  The success of this kind of 
project depends heavily on the volume of demand for the service on offer, 
which places demand risk at the top of the project‘s risk list. Few studies 
have addressed the area of demand risk; pointing to the need for further 
investigation. This paper aims to identify the main factors which affect 
demand for those services provided by PPP projects. Based on broad case 
study literature, the paper identifies a number of qualitative and 
quantitative factors. 
Keywords: Demand risk, financially free-standing projects, PPP. 
INTRODUCTION 
Governments' willingness to decrease borrowing and spending, as well as the 
awareness that private sector can supply assets and services at lower costs 
and in a more efficient way, have resulted in the introduction of various 
forms of Public private partnership (PPP). The PPP procurement route has 
been increasingly employed to deliver many large scale and capital-intensive 
public infrastructure projects such as toll roads, ports, stadia, power stations, 
water utilities, etc. Unlike social projects (hospitals and schools) in which the 
private sector is to recover its initial investment by getting performance-
based payments from the authorities, PPP economic projects allow the 
private sector operator to recover its capital investment from the revenue 
produced by charging the end users. These kinds of projects can be defined as 
financially free-standing; Chiu and Bosher (2005) argue that this method of 
financing is particularly favoured by the public sector for contracting water 
and wastewater services, as it allows a radical change to the sector without 
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relinquishing facility ownership. Indeed, as a result of transferring the tariff 
collection process in this kind of project to the private sector, the demand risk 
is also borne by the private sector. 
 
Demand in economic projects is not easy to appraise as it requires several 
quantitative and qualitative factors to be taken into account. These factors 
may be non-specific to the project, such as capacity of the user to pay. 
However, if these factors and other project-specific factors are ignored, risk is 
increased; especially in terms of revenues, as they would then be estimated 
according to an incorrect and unreliable demand forecast. Hence, a 
systematic way in which to make the project financially viable while, at the 
same time, addressing public concerns and interests is to identify all the main 
factors that affect demand at an early stage in the project's lifecycle. 
 
Previous studies on risk management in PPP projects have classified risk in 
terms of categories such as: site acquisition risk, design risk, construction 
risk, demand risk, political risk, operation risk, financial risk and force 
majeure risk. Despite the wide scope of the studies into risk categories in 
general, only a few attempts have focused on demand risk. An example of 
this is the study by Cabral and Junior (2010), which used real options theory 
as a tool to mitigate demand risk in PPP for football stadia. Another study 
was that of Li and Ren (2009), who adopted Bayesian techniques to provide a 
method for allocating demand risk in PPP projects, this approach 
concentrated on how to assign risk management responsibility between the 
public client and the private partners.  
 
This paper will identify the main factors affecting the demand in PPP 
infrastructure facilities, as the recommended first stage of demand risk 
management procedure for PPP infrastructure projects. It will first review 
financially free-standing PPP projects. The demand risk in these kinds of 
projects will then be introduced as one of the main risks that can impact on 
project viability. The paper also discusses the quantitative and qualitative 
factors that are likely to affect the demand for infrastructure projects. 
 
PPP FINANCIALLY FREE-STANDING 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 
The notion of charging the public for using infrastructure facilities (e.g. toll 
roads) is not new (Hensher and Puckett 2005). However, recently these kinds 
of projects have become popular in many countries and are diverse; tunnels, 
bridges, highways, power station, water station and many other types of 
infrastructure facilities are in the hands of PPP developers. It can be argued 
that the raison d'etre of these kinds of PPP schemes is to compensate for the 
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inadequacies and weaknesses in existing infrastructure projects on the public' 
(users') expense. Choi et al., (2010) stated that the excessive demand for new 
water facilities was the reason behind the dramatic increase in instances of 
the PPP approach for the purpose of delivering water facilities throughout 
China. 
 
Financially free-standing PPP schemes include the task of constructing 
necessary modern facilities in specific regions in more efficient and fast ways 
than those  traditionally available. To achieve this, the private sector borrows 
the capital investment necessary to build and operate new assets. This 
investment is intended to be reimbursed by the revenue collected from the fee 
charged to the end user over a predetermined period. Thus, toll/tariff rate and 
concession duration are the most significant provisions of the concession 
contract, affecting cash flow calculated based on demand-related returns and 
facility expenditures. However, as these facilities are self-financing projects, 
they have to achieve a balance between the public interest and the price being 
charged for the utility. Therefore, it is recommended that a reasonable tariff 
policy should be set to balance the investment recovery for the private sector 
whilst protecting public interest. 
 
Even though these financially free-standing projects can be considered 
attractive investments for the private sector, the financiers and other project 
parties‘ exposure to demand risk can significantly reduce their attractiveness. 
Ward and Sussman (2006) consider that demand or traffic in a toll road PPP 
project is the main risk factor which is, most often, not easy to assess. In 
addition, Chiu and Bosher (2005) argue that the demand risk in the water 
provision service is a main concern for the service provider (private sector), 
where users are charged on the basis of water usage. Locke (2010) argues 
that demand as related to an infrastructure project is not easy to assess; 
nevertheless, at the same time, financiers keep asking for robust demand 
forecasts. Thus, it can be argued that poor assessment of the demand risk can 
constitute a real threat for PPP contract partners. 
 
DEMAND RISK IN PPP PROJETCS 
Employing PPP procurement as a way to deliver infrastructure projects has 
placed demand risk at the top of the risks list. Norton Rose international legal 
practice conducted a survey in 2006, in which they gathered responses from 
stakeholders in economic PPP projects in five Asian countries. The results 
showed that demand risk is the most critical risk facing the project partners, 
regardless of the country or the sector (Norton Rose 2006). Demand volume 
in the case of PPPs is the most significant factor in determining the project's 
future cash flow and, consequently, the features of the debt service 
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repayment. Hence, the demand volume is the principal determinant of project 
viability. It can be argued that transferring the responsibility of financing 
such large facilities to the private sector in addition to the uncertainty about 
demand are the primary reasons behind the engagement of the public sector 
in these long-lasting concession contracts. 
 
For the kind of PPP projects in which the fares paid by end users are the main 
source of revenue, the demand risk is entirely allocated to the private sector 
operator. However, in many cases the government prefers to share this risk 
with the concessionaire by providing minimum revenue guarantees, paying 
availability fees (to allow the private sector to recover capital investment and 
operational expenses as in the UK) and issuing capital grants (Menzies and 
Perrott 2010).  However, these kinds of guarantees may result in transferring 
the risk back to the public sector in the case of the project falling into 
distress. 
 
Variations in demand volume have been observed in many infrastructure 
projects. Bain (2002) explored 32 toll road projects all worldwide, including 
bridges, highways and tunnels. The study illustrated that actual traffic volume 
for 28 projects was below projections. This core sample was then extended to 
include 104 international PPP toll road projects in 2005. The main results 
regarding the discrepancy between actual and forecasted traffic volume did 
not change. The range of ratios of actual/forecast is between 86% below 
predicted and 51% above predicted volume (Bain 2009). Based on these 
findings Bain (2009) concluded that the majority of studies related to traffic 
forecast in the case of toll projects tend to be optimistic. 
 
Projects in the railway sector, such as the Sydney Airport Link Line 
(Australia), Skytrain project (Bangkok, Thailand), STAR and PUTRA project 
(Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) are examples where out-turn demand was largely 
under projections. For example, the Skytrain in Bangkok recorded only one-
quarter of the predicted demand in its first year of operations (150,000 user 
per day compared with an estimated 600,000–700,000) (Halcrow Group 
2004). 
 
Based on the statistics and case studies outlined above, it is apparent that the 
demand in a specific project is unstable, having the potential to be 
inconsistent with that forecasted. Demand can slow down or increase during 
the concession period in a way that can seriously affect the project‘s 
revenues. In PPP projects, when the demand is under predicted the private 
sector will not be able to gain the expected benefits and may even not be able 
to recover its investment. In this case, it is often the government which will 
bear the final responsibility for this risk and be required to compensate the 
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private sector for the low demand for the project. This is typically based on 
any contract arrangements such as: a guaranteed minimum usage for the 
facility or a minimum return on investment. Conversely, in the case of 
inordinate demand performance, the project would generate strong 
profitability which could far outperform that predicted. Thus, the project 
company would then be able to recover all of its investments before the end 
of the concession period. However in this case, the public would continue to 
be charged for using the facility during the full concession period, which 
could represent a compromise of public interests. 
 
Viegas (2010) suggested that the considerable level of difficulty associated 
with monitoring the demand in transport projects has caused serious 
problems in respect of many contracts, forming a key reason for 
renegotiations at the operation stage. Choi et al., (2010) reported that the bulk 
water supply contract of Shenyang Public utility in China was terminated 
because actual demand was under that predicted. Therefore, managing 
demand risk should consider the dynamism of demand during the entire 
operation period and employ an efficient mechanism for demand forecasting 
in order to strike a balance between public and private partners‘ interests.  
 
The research from which this paper is derived considers aims to develop a 
dynamic model to identify demand risk in economic PPP projects. The 
proposed model will help to simulate the effects of different factors on 
demand risk. This will help the project partners to make the right decision on 
actions related to concession periods or toll rates. The proposed model is first 
required to identify the main factors that influence the demand for a specific 
facility, which is the main purpose of this paper. These factors can differ in 
nature; they may be either qualitative or quantitative. These factors can also 
be correlated. The next section will define and discuss the main factors 
influencing demand in financially free-standing PPP infrastructure projects.  
 
FACTORS AFFECTING DEMAND IN FINANCIALLY 
FREE-STANDING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 
Due to the complexity of the contracting arrangements and the operations of 
financially free-standing PPP projects, the wider literature discussing these 
projects has shown that there are many factors which can explain why 
demand volume typically departs from that projected. Based on intensive 
case-study literature on PPP in toll road, water utility, railway and stadium 
sectors, the authors have identified the main factors which affect the demand 
for financially free-standing projects, which will be discussed in the 
following sections. 
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Capacity of customers to pay tariff (User wealth or income)  
It is important for the success of any self-financing infrastructure project to 
take into consideration whether the public can afford the user fee or not. 
While the fee charged for receiving the service made available by most of 
these projects may not be expensive for those in wealthier sections of society, 
it can form a significant proportion of the expenditure of those on low 
incomes. For example, Bansoll and Kelly (2005) suggest that introducing a 
user fee on the roads will form a real barrier to low income people driving; 
this has a consequent effect on service demand. Edward (1996) related the 
demand risk in the Chinese water market to the purchasing power of users to 
pay the proposed water toll over the period of the PPP contract. The work 
showed that risk can become more serious if the assumption regarding 
consumer‘s income is overly optimistic (Edward 1996). 
 
Public acceptance for the project  
Bain (2002) argues that the public acceptance of a new toll road is 
significantly affected by tolling culture.  In countries with previous 
experiences of PPP toll roads, it can be observed that it is comparatively 
easier to introduce a new PPP toll road, than in those which have only 
recently adopted a toll structure. To increase public acceptance, people 
should be given the chance to take part in shaping the project by participating 
in evaluating and assessing the scheme‘s proposal. In addition, public opinion 
regarding setting an appropriate tariff should be gauged by consulting the 
community representative and conducting public debates, for example. 
Ignorance of public views regarding the project design and tariff level is 
likely to anger the community causing it to exercise pressure on the 
government leading to cancellation of the project (Bain 2002). Hence, the 
extent of public consultation carried out in the case of a new project prior to 
the signing of a contract can play a significant role in increasing the level of 
public acceptability. Miranda (2007) argued that concession contracts need to 
be reformed to include more transparency and to involve public participation 
(Cited in Viegas 2010).  Therefore, governments need to avoid being reticent 
on the subject of forming project proposals and imposing user fees in 
concession contracts. In recent years, many governments have developed 
mechanisms to allow the public to be involved in scheme forming and tariff 
imposition. In Chile, for example, the process of imposing or adjusting water 
prices began one year before the tariff was enforced. This process included 
disclosing to the public all the criteria taken into consideration in defining the 
tariff formulas (Calvo and Cariola 2004). However, it can be argued that 
although public involvement in the planning process may incur additional 
costs due to the need for design change and tariff amendments, the gain of 
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having less community disruption in the subsequent stages can, more often 
than not, outweigh this cost.  
 
Willingness to pay  
Edward (1996) argues that in addition to the capacity to pay, the public must 
also exhibit the willingness to pay for the treated water. Bain (2009) has 
stated that uncertainty over the user willingness to pay toll, especially when 
those tolls are higher than average, is one of the major drivers of demand 
risk. Thus, the impact of this factor on facility demand should not be 
underestimated. Hensher and Puckett (2005) reported that in Edinburgh (UK) 
74% of the residents voted against introducing a congestion charge scheme 
similar to that applied in London and this led to Edinburgh City Council 
cancelling its plans regarding the scheme. This reflects how important it is to 
consider the factor of public willingness to pay early in the feasibility study 
stage of the project. Ignorance of this can later lead to termination of the 
whole contract, or much lower than expected revenues being generated. 
However; public perceptions towards using facilities and paying user fees 
depends, to a large extent, on the benefits gained from utilising the facilities.  
In a toll road project, for example, it is important to understand that the 
public willingness to pay tolls depends first on a time saving benefit.  
 
To gain public support and increase their willingness to pay a tariff, 
provisions should be made in the service for options including subsidies 
and/or discounts for using the service, or different fees for off-peak hours or 
weekends and for any other social welfare in general.  
 
Economic growth of the facility area 
The economic growth of the facility area can cause both optimistic and 
pessimistic forecasts. When economic growth is high, forecasters tend to 
overestimate demand, which can lead to excessive costs and subsequent 
failure. On the other hand, decision makers might underestimate the 
economic growth, which can lead to very low projections for the project 
demand. Hence, economic growth in the facility area should be properly 
investigated to avoid any adverse consequences during the operational stage.  
All too often, the downturn in the economy and the local recession due to 
troubles in economic vitality can cause changes in demand volume. Niles and 
Nelson (2001) argued that changes to the economic mix, in the structure of 
some industries and in the levels of economic and social wealth nationally 
and regionally can lead to other reasons for demand discrepancy occurring.  
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Bain (2009) suggested, based on the technical report information of many 
international toll road projects, that the downturn in the economy is one of 
the main drivers behind variance in actual and forecast demand. However, the 
evidence shows a strong relationship between economic growth and 
behaviour.  
 
Based on this, a reliable evaluation of the proactive performance of the 
economy in the future is a serious requirement for obtaining a more accurate 
demand forecast. 
 
Competition from alternative facilities 
Since the benefits from financially free-standing facilities basically relies on 
the service demand, building a new facility or rehabilitating an existing one 
can seriously diminish the viability of a project. It is important to recognise 
and understand how existing facilities can influence a suggested project 
during its entire operations stage. However, this is challenging in PPP 
contracts due to their protracted duration (30 years and more) which makes 
the required forecast scope extremely long (Bain 2009). The existence of 
alternative facilities can increase the complexity of the demand estimation. In 
toll road projects, for example, this competition could be based on the same 
model, e.g. a toll road PPP asset with a parallel toll-free road, or from 
different models, e.g. a toll road with a railway project or ferries in the case 
of bridges for example. In either case, it is vital for the project partners to 
consider the market expansion both in a feasibility study and later in the 
project re-evaluation process. 
 
Amount of user fee 
The public typically choose the cheapest alternative where one is available. 
Therefore, to guarantee a constant demand for a project the tariff should be 
set at a reasonable level. The expensive construction cost and the private 
sector's desire to speed up repayment of the debt and gain high profits are the 
main reasons behind imposing high tariffs. Lemos (2004) argued that in some 
cases, the private sector's excessive expectations of return on their investment 
(for example 21%-25%) leads to the imposition of a high user fee, which as a 
consequence causes low project demand. Bain (2002) considered setting the 
toll price to be the real challenge for decision makers. Bain's study suggested 
that this price should not be excessively high because of its strong 
relationship to the public willingness to pay. 
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Evidence shows that a very high tariff is off putting to potential users. In the 
UK, the public outcry against the high tariff for the Manchester Metrolink 
project has led to termination of the concession (Menzies and Perrott 2010). 
On the other hand, it should be noted that tariff level should not be set too 
low as the revenue from the toll must be adequate to cover construction and 
operation costs. Choi et al., (2010) argued that the high water price in China 
is one of the key risk factors for private investor in the Chinese water sector. 
However, they argue that those prices were set relatively low, disregarding 
the initial investment and desired profit by the private sector. While cheap 
fees can increase demand, they may also form a barrier to private sector 
involvement, due to the decreased likelihood of an acceptable profit being 
returned in view of the limited capacity of the facility. 
 
Bailing or toll collection method  
The way in which the concessionaire intends to collect the tariff can also 
have an impact on project demand. Attention should be paid to selecting the 
most suitable method for toll collection early in the project's lifecycle.  In the 
case of toll road facilities, manual tollbooths have been used for decades. 
However, due to the fast technological development and limited processing 
capability of human beings, the tendency of most toll collection points 
nowadays is towards automated systems. Hence, electronic toll collection 
technology has been introduced in many countries. Bonsall and Kelly (2005) 
argue that automatic toll collection was one of the factors fostering and 
supporting the increasing use of toll road. In addition, introducing a new 
method (transit smart cards) to pay for multiple forms of transport, as in the 
case of rail line projects such as: London‘s Oyster Card and Singapore Ez-
link system, adds value to the project, increases public convenience and 
meets project demand (Menzies and Perrott 2010).  
 
Population growth in the facility area 
This is one of the main factors affecting the future demand for the project 
concerned. Chiu and Bosher (2005) stated that the current and predicted 
population of a region represents the principle driver for demand in the water 
market. In 2002, Veolia‘s water company was obliged to close some of its 
facilities near Chengdu (China) when it faced hard financial problems due to 
severe decrease in water demand. This downsized demand performance was 
attributed partly to the overestimation of population growth in the project 
area. 
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Availability of supporting facilities 
When assessing the demand for a specific project, it is essential to evaluate 
the kind of supporting facilities which may affect the demand for the main 
project. Menzies (2010) argues that when designing the urban railways, the 
links available from other modes of transportation should be considered. 
Absence or shortage of supportive facilities, with which to ease access to the 
system like buses, taxis and park and ride, can contribute to a decline in 
demand. In the Bangkok Sky train project, for example, demand noticeably 
increased following the introduction of a feeder bus services to address the 
poor demand performance when the project was first in operation (Halcrow 
Group, 2004; Menzies, 2010). Moreover, in the case of stadia projects, 
existence of commercial and other welfare facilities surrounding the stadium 
area enhances the attendance numbers and, at the same time, the project's 
viability. Cabral and Junior (2010) argued that developing a shopping centre 
as a part of the stadium investment would be likely to improve demand and 
encourage the private sector to invest. 
 
In addition to these factors which are common between many economic 
infrastructure projects, there are several project-specific factors which depend 
on the nature of the project. Examples of these factors include the specific 
characteristics of the facility, the value of time saving in transportation 
projects and the sports-team's performance in stadium projects.  
 
MODELLING THE FACTORS 
Understanding the aforementioned factors and the interactions between them 
can lead to a more accurate and credible demand estimation. Despite the 
efforts spent on demand forecast, it remains a challenging issue. Many 
researchers have attributed the reasons for poor forecasting on modelling 
techniques that only consider some of the affecting factors. Niles and Nelson 
(2001) mentioned that although the mobility and dynamism of the urban 
system is noticeable, decision makers still utilise closed and static models for 
producing demand projections for transportation projects. They emphasise 
the necessity of embracing other techniques that consider the risk (and 
uncertainty) resulting from the variance in demand emerging from the urban 
system's complexity and mobility. In addition, Jong et al., (2007) have stated 
that most traffic forecast models for transport projects ignore the correlations 
between the variables. Therefore, more reliable and realistic estimates of 
future demand over the concession period require the user to employ a more 
advanced tool, which can take into consideration different quantitative and 
qualitative variables and consider the relationships among those variables to 
reduce the demand risk associated with PPP projects. One initial proposal is 
to use System Dynamics as the modelling tool. SD will allow us to capture 
41 
 
the dynamic interactions between the variables and does not suffer from 
problems of auto correlation. This research aims to develop a demand risk 
identification model that will consider the complexity and dynamicity of the 
identified factors and also explain how these factors can influence demand 
related behaviour. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The PPP procurement route has increasingly been employed to develop 
infrastructure projects; as a result many arrangements using this method have 
emerged. Financially free-standing projects in which the revenues are 
collected directly from the end users are prevailed in the economic 
infrastructure sector. This method of project financing implies that the 
success of the project greatly depends on service demand volume. Therefore, 
these kinds of projects can be described as extremely sensitive to demand 
risk. Many of these financially free-standing projects may not become 
financially viable, as a result of being founded on an inaccurate or unreliable 
demand forecast. This research aims to model the effect of demand variation 
on the viability of financially free-standing PPP projects. Demand in the case 
of infrastructure projects is difficult to assess because it requires 
consideration of multiple qualitative and quantitative factors. This paper has 
identified the main factors affecting demand and concludes that these factors 
and the relationships between them should be considered when modelling the 
effects on concession period and project cash flow.  
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‗Public-private partnership‘ (PPP), also referred to as ‗private sector 
participation‘ (PSP) or 'privatization'; is a term that depicts a form of joint 
venture between the public and private sectors.  PPP initiatives allocate 
tasks, responsibilities, and risks among the partners in the best possible 
way. The public partners in a PPP arrangement are government agencies 
such as ministries, departments, state-owned enterprises etc; while the 
private partners can be local and international business investors with 
technical or financial expertise relevant to the project in question.  The 
Nigerian nation as a developing country has a lot of potentials for 
construction related PPP initiatives. In order to ensure the success of the 
PPP approach to projects procurement, the construction sector in Nigeria 
needs to device means of recruiting and training the youths to acquire 
construction related crafts skills with the view to meeting the sector‘s need 
for competent craftsmen both quantitatively and qualitatively.  This study 
is an aspect of an on-going PhD research study, and it examines the 
problems militating against the interests of the youths in acquiring 
construction related crafts skills in Nigeria; with the view to proffering 
possible strategies for the motivation and mobilization of youths for 
construction crafts training and thus meet the crafts skills need of the sector 
to effectively fulfil its obligations under PPP contractual arrangements.  
Primary data for the study was collected through questionnaire and 
interviews, findings from the questionnaire survey identified amongst 
others; the lack of adequate guidance and counselling as to the importance 
and relevance of crafts skills as profitable careers as a major reason the 
youth are not showing interest in acquiring construction related skills with 
84.8% agreement; a mean score of 4.1889; median score 4*; and Crammers 
V value =.22.  Other identified reasons include: the lack of adequate forum 
for mobilising youth for crafts skills acquisition with 79.8% agreement, 
mean score 4.1185, median 4*; V=.17; and poor remuneration for 
construction site workers with 78.7% agreement and mean score 4.0517; 
median score of 4*; Crammers V=.24.  Findings from interview enquiry 
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also underscored these points along with poor image problem, and too-
much emphasis on secular education at the expense of vocation education 
as factors working against youths' interest in choosing crafts as careers.  
The study recommends the pursuit of effective guidance and counselling 
among the youths and adequately promoting VTE as strategies for 
effectively motivating the youth generation as panacea for successful 
implementation of construction related PPP initiatives in Nigeria. 
Key words: Construction sector, Crafts, Skills shortages, Training, Youths.   
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of public-private partnership (PPP) describes an array of possible 
relationships established among public and private sectors for the primary 
purpose of execution of infrastructural projects and other services (Li and 
Akintoye 2003; Anvuur and Kumaraswamy 2006). Effective PPPs takes 
cognizance of the collective roles of both the public and the private entities in the 
achievement of developmental projects and other tasks that form the object of 
the partnership, including appropriate allocation and management of risks 
inherent in the contractual arrangements (Zou et al 2008; Ibrahim et al 2006).  
On the one hand, the contribution of the government in a PPP venture may take 
the form of financing or funding, provision of social responsibility, public 
sensitization and awareness and provision of relevant supports towards the 
success of the project.  The private sector on the other hand utilizes its 
managerial and commercial acumen and relevant innovations to execute the 
project and run the facilities profitably and efficiently.  The private partner in the 
venture, depending on the contractual arrangement, contributes part of the 
investment capital. In order to effectively play its role, the onus is on the private 
partner to mobilize the appropriate and competent skilled workforce to execute 
and run the business.  The major crux of the PPP idea is to bring together the 
public and private sector organizations in mutual benefit (Trafford and Proctor, 
2006).  Nigeria as a developing economy needs a lot of affordable housing to 
meet the requirement of the teaming and yet growing population, and one of the 
common approaches that has emerged in the management of such projects in the 
recent past is the public-private partnership; which is a move toward 
privatization of public services (Li and Akintoye 2003).   
 
Securing and sustaining the interests of the youth generation in acquiring 
construction related crafts-skills in Nigeria has been a daunting problem (Salami 
2011; Awogbenle and Iwuamadi 2010; Omoruyi and Osunde 2004) which if not 
adequately addressed; will aggravate crafts skills shortages and in-turns militate 
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against the success of PPP initiations in the sector. The construction sector is a 
large entity with diverse specialities which together make major contribution to 
national economic activity (Oyegoke et al 2009).  The various stages or 
processes of work in the sector ranges from site preparation, including 
demolition, through general construction or ‗new builds‘, and repair or 
maintenance of both residential and non-residential buildings and civil 
engineering works; such as (roads, highways, airfields, harbours, utility works) 
and which constitute most of the PPP projects. The PPP approach has been 
increasingly used for the procurement of large-scale infrastructures such as 
power plants, tunnels, roads, railways and bridges in different parts of the world 
(Akintoye el al 2005; Zou et al 2008).  HM Treasury (2000) informs that PPPs 
arrangement come in different variations and forms and can be used to describe 
different types of ventures which include: the introduction of private sector 
ownership into state-owned businesses, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and 
selling of government services into wider markets. 
 
The construction process also involves different trades such as bricklaying, 
concreting, carpentry, joinery, welding and fabrication, painting, glazing, and 
plumbing amongst others. The industry is a labour-intensive sector, and its 
output relies heavily on the availability of the required trades' people for the 
particular project (Oyegoke et al 2009). CIOB (2009) submits that the 
construction industry has a long history of skill shortages which can be viewed 
as a reflection on economic and societal stability. The construction sector as one 
of the major development drivers in the economy of any nation cannot afford to 
treat the challenges of crafts skilled shortages with levity or impunity.  
 
In order for the Nigerian construction industry to effectively tackle the challenge 
of craft skills shortages, and accomplish its objectives, discharge its obligations 
and profitably and successfully participate in PPP contracts; it is imperative for 
the sector to develop a dynamic and effective strategy of harnessing available 
human resources by mobilizing the youth population and re-directing their focus 
towards choosing construction related crafts as careers instead of scavenging for 
‗white-collar‘ professions which are insufficient and difficult to come by in most 
cases.  Youths play a significant role in economics activities in developing 
countries (Joel-Osebo 2004), even in developed economies, the role of the youth 
population in national economic development cannot be undermined or relegated 
to the background.  However, in Nigeria, myriads of youths remain without 
employable skills and unemployed (Salami 2011; Awogbenle and Iwuamadi 
2010; Omoruyi and Osunde 2004); while their youthful zest remains untapped.  
Nigeria as a developing country and the most populated black African nation 
with an estimated population of nearly 150 million people (CIA 2011), need PPP 
project approach for development of public housing, schools, hospitals and 
infrastructural facilities.  According to CIA (2011) estimate, the youth 
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population constitute over half of the total population.  Despite this pool of 
active and vibrant human resources, crafts skills shortage persists in the 
construction sector and much has not been accomplished in the area of 
channelling the useful resource to contributing to overall economic development 
of the nation.     
 
This paper sets out to identify the factors militating against the interests of the 
Nigerian youth population in acquiring construction related crafts skills, with the 
view to determining the strategies for effectively securing and sustaining their 
interests in choosing and getting trained to acquire employable skills in 
construction crafts. The ultimate goal of the study is reducing the crafts skills 
shortage and improving the sector‘s chances to favourably perform in PPP 
contracts.  
 
The study emanates from ongoing PhD Research work which aims at 
formulating a framework targeted at improving the strategies for the training and 
development of construction related craftsmen in the Nigerian construction 
sector. 
 
THE NEED FOR SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF 
COMPETENT SKILLED CRAFT WORKFORCE IN 
SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF PPP PROJECTS 
Construction related craftspeople play primary and prominent roles both in new 
builds and in the running and maintenance operations throughout the life cycle of 
the construction industry‘s products. Since this is the crux of PPP ventures, then, 
for a successful implementation of PPP related projects in any nation and in 
Nigeria in particular, there in need for the training of creams of competent crafts 
workforce with the view to raising sufficient numbers to meet the skilled crafts 
manpower need and improve the prospects of PPP projects approach. 
Insufficient number as well as incompetence of the available crafts workforce in 
the sector will hinder the delivery of 'value for money' (VFM) which is a major 
goal of any PPP initiative (Cheung et al 2009; Li et al 2005).   
 
The skills of all the role-players in an industry determine the quality of its 
products.   In the building and construction industry, semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers form a large part of the labour supply and they perform various tasks, 
which eventually determine the quality of products (Awe et al 2011).  
 
The development of a skilled labour force in a nation makes for important 
contribution to national development; such competent skilled workforce would 
be able to apply science and technology in the transformation of raw materials 
into goods and services.  Oyegoke et al (2009) argues that skills have been one 
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of the most important issues in the construction sector because construction 
methods are largely traditional and primitive; consequently labour intensive.   A 
well trained, capable, seasoned and knowledgeable skilled workforce is therefore 
the secret to national development, successful implementation of PPP projects 
and overall economic progress of any nation. 
 
Skilled workers and technicians enhance the quality and efficiency of product 
development, usage, production and maintenance and they supervise, train and 
develop new hands and workers with lesser skills.  Gann and Senker (1998) 
noted that high quality skills are essential for achieving performance 
improvements, and this has implication for PPP projects delivery.  A nation's 
commitment to technical and vocational training is a decisive factor determining 
the competitive strength and level of development of its economy (Lugujjo and 
Manyindo 1993).   
 
CONSTRUCTION SECTOR'S SKILLED CRAFTS 
LABOUR NEED 
There has never been such a period in history when the diversification of craft 
occupations has increased the challenges of skilled workforce need of building 
and construction sector; because as self employment continues to rise, 
competition is becoming tougher, contract times are shorter, profit margins are 
smaller and specialization and fragmentation of various trades is increasing; and 
right now, it is very difficult to find key skilled people such as bricklayers, 
carpenters, plasterers and electricians etc (Dennis 2007; CPA 2004; TCE 2007).  
The challenge of skills shortages is not limited to the Nigeria construction 
industry but is been experienced in other nations around the globe (Mackenzie et 
al, 2000; Dainty et al, 2005).  The Construction sector, like any other aspect of 
industrial development, is experiencing severe and prolonged shortages of 
'human power', particularly in the crafts categories, not just in terms of quantity 
of workers but the quality of workforce is also a noticeable factor (COOA 2005; 
Connor 2006; McCausland 2006).  The CIOB (2008) observed that every sector 
of the construction industry is experiencing some labour shortage.  Skills 
shortages problem is one of the most serious threats to the economic health of 
many nations around the globe and can derail the prospects of PPP projects if not 
properly addressed.  Shortage of skilled labour affects schedules and costs, this 
consequently derail or critically delay important projects (COAA, 2005; Ireland 
2007); and can put at risk the economic benefits that PPP projects are designed 
to generate.  The shortage of skilled labour is one of the most pressing issues 
today and is already having serious implications for both business and the 
economy. (Connor, 2006; McCausland 2006).     
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Since the successful performance of the industry is dependent on the availability 
of competent skilled trades‘ people, it is very necessary to identify and 
adequately address reasons militating against the interests of new entrants 
especially the youth population into the various crafts trades in the industry.  
This is imperative because Nigeria as a developing nation needs a lot of PPP 
approach for the procurement the needed infrastructural facilities and have to 
device means of recruiting new entrants from among the youth population for 
training.  This will enhance the sector‘s performance and put the industry on a 
good pedestal to deliver as expected under the PPP contractual arrangements.  
 
FACTORS MILITATING AGAINST YOUTHS' INTEREST 
IN ACQUIRING CONSTRUCTION RELATED SKILLS 
The lack of interest in acquisition of construction related crafts skills among the 
Nigerian youths is evidently contributing to crafts skills shortages in the 
construction sector both in terms of quality and quantity.  Some of the relevant 
factors working against the interest of new entrants into construction crafts 
careers and which consequently aggravates crafts skills shortages in the sector 
have been found amongst others to include: lack of effective career guidance and 
counselling services (Durosaro and Adeoye, 2007; Durosaro et al, 2009); which 
evidently hinders Nigerian youths from considering crafts skills acquisition as 
viable and profitable careers, too much emphasis on secular education at the 
expense of vocational education (VE), low wages (Salami, 2011; Awe et al, 
2010), poor image of construction related crafts career (Green et al, 2004; Dainty 
et al, 2007; Ness, 2009; Salami,2011), absence of a clear career path (Salami 
2011; Awe et al 2009), poor funding of the practical aspects of vocational 
education resulting in poorly equipped training workshops (Umar, 2005; 
Ugwuja, 2010; Odusami and Ene 2011), lack of encouragement and motivation 
from the political class and government hierarchy for the youth to take to crafts 
as careers (Salami, 2011; Awe et al, 2010). 
 
METHODS 
The methods adopted for the study include both primary and secondary research.  
The primary research adopted the quantitative and the qualitative approach, 
while the secondary reviewed relevant literature.  Data collection for the study 
took the form of questionnaires survey and qualitative interview enquiries. For 
the purpose of exploring respondents' perception with regards to a wide range of 
relevant issues on the research focus; semi structured questionnaire with Likert 
scale format, designed around opinion statements, with propositions based on 
relevant issues emanating from literature and the preliminary (pilot) survey was 
adopted.  It comprises a series of statements or items focusing on certain issues 
or themes to which the respondents were asked to indicate level of agreement to 
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the various propositions, scales 1-5 was used for all the variables in the 
questionnaire. 500 questionnaires were administered among the various groups 
targeted for the study, a total of 282 (56.4%) 'valid' questionnaires returned by 
the respondents were used for data analysis.  Statistical analysis was performed 
using the Predictive Analysis Software (PASW Statistics) version 18.0. 
 
The 7 participants for the qualitative interview research were purposively 
selected to cut across various strata of stakeholders who could volunteer 
information on relevant issues and problems militating against youths interests in 
construction related skills acquisition. The interviews were also aimed at 
corroborating the data elicited through the quantitative survey. Other 
considerations for interview participants' selection include: scope of professional 
practice, years of experience, youth and training institutions' representations.  
Detailed analysis was carried out using the qualitative data analysis software 
NVivo version 8, the software assisted in the data coding process and facilitated 
the identification of patterns and comprehensive exploration during the data 
analysis process. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
Reasons why Nigerian youths are not showing interest in acquiring 
construction related skills  
Table 1 shows the submission of the survey participants on reasons why most 
Nigerian youths are not showing interest in acquiring construction related skills.  
Top on the list of apparent reasons why the youth generation are not considering 
acquisition of skills was due to lack of adequate guidance and counselling as to 
the importance and relevance of skills as a career.  84.8% of the respondents 
(strongly Agreed 36.2%, Agreed 48.6%, mean 4.1889, and median score 4*; 
V=.22) supported the point. Similar to the above mentioned and second on the 
list was the lack of adequate forum for mobilising youth for skills acquisition 
with 79.8% agreement (strongly Agreed 36.5%, Agreed 43.6%, mean score 
4.1185, median 4*; V=.17).  78.7% of the survey participants (strongly Agreed 
34.0%, Agreed 44.7%, mean 4.0517, with a median score of 4*; V=.24) viewed 
poor rate of pay for construction site workers as one of the major reasons why 
Nigerian youths are indifferent towards acquiring construction related skills. A 
good percentage of the respondents (70.4%) also pin-pointed the social problem 
of the get rich quick orientation in the nation as another relevant reason why 
youths are showing apathy towards acquiring construction related skills (strongly 
Agreed 39.4%, Agreed 31.6%, mean 4.0111, median score 4*; V=.19).  75.5% 
(strongly Agreed 35.1%, Agreed 40.4%, mean score 3.9779, median 4*; V=.22) 
were of the opinion that the reason the youth are not attracted to acquisition of 
construction related skills is because the Nigerian government do not encourage 
skills acquisition.  74.1% of the responses (strongly Agreed 27.3%, Agreed 
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46.8%, mean score 3.9366; median 4*; V=.16) favoured the problem of lack of 
clear-cut career path for craftsmen as a reason youths are not showing interest in 
skills acquisition. Other propositions with significant mean scores in this scale 
include the lack of job security in the construction industry 73.8% agreement 
(strongly Agreed 31.2%, Agreed 42.6%, mean 3.9041; median 4*; V=.21), lack 
of respect or dignity for Artisans 73.0% agreement (strongly Agreed 31.9%, 
Agreed 41.1%, mean 3.9037; median 4*; V=.22), too much emphasis on 
general/secular education (mean score 3.8852; median 4*; V=.22), and lack of 
recognition for Artisans (mean 3.8118; median score 4*; V=.23).  All other 
propositions had a median score of 4* except for the problem of excessive cost of 
vocational training which had a median score of 3* and V=.22.  The lowest 
value of .15 and highest value of .24 for the Crammer's V test indicated that 
there is a weak association between the opinions of the respondents and their 
age-group; it also shows that they are united in their perception of the reasons 
why the youth generation seem not showing interest in skills acquisition and 
implied the validity of the scale.  The Cronbach's alpha value for the scale's 
reliability was 0.788.  The analysis in this section will assist immensely in 
achieving the research objective to unravel the reasons the younger generation in 
Nigeria seems not showing interest in acquiring construction related skills. 
 
Findings from the interview enquiry corroborated the questionnaire survey 
findings with not less than 5 of the 7 participants highlighting poor 
remuneration, lack of respect for crafts people and the relegation of 
craftsmanship to the domain of the drop-outs from secular education; as been 
responsible for the lack of interest of the youths in considering the acquisition of 
construction related crafts as lucrative career options.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Reasons Nigerian youths are not showing interest in skills acquisition 
The objective of this study is to investigate reason(s) why the younger generation 
in Nigeria is not showing interest in Construction related Vocational 
Training/Skill acquisition and propose strategies for motivating and mobilizing 
them.  The reasons why the majority of the younger generation seems not 
showing interest in acquiring construction related skills; as identified by the 
quantitative and qualitative data analyses include: 
 
Lack of adequate guidance and counselling as to the importance, prospects and 
relevance of skills as a viable career, lack of adequate forum for mobilising 
youth for skills acquisition, poor remuneration or rate of pay for construction site 
workers, the social vice of 'get rich quick' syndrome or orientation prevalent in 
the nation and lack of encouragement and motivation from the political class and 
government hierarchy for the youth to take to crafts as careers.  Other factors 
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identified include the lack of a clear-cut career path for craftsmen, problem of 
lack of job security and employment continuity in the Nigerian construction  
Table 1: % Scores, Mean, Median, Cramer's V test value and Cronbach's reliability 
rating for variables on the assessment of reasons why Nigerian youths are not showing 
interest in acquiring construction related skills 
 
                  
                 Propositions 
      Response Scores %  
Mean 
 
Median 
Cramer's  
      V 
Cronbach's  
Alpha  
 
SA 
       
A              DN 
          
 D 
          
SD 
    
hazardous nature of  
construction site works  
19.9 29.1 12.1 21.6 13.5   3.2103   4.00 .229 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        0.788 
poor rate of pay for site  
workers     
34.0 44.7   6.7   9.6    1.1      4.0517     4.00   .238 
lack of recognition for  
Artisans       
29.8 41.1   7.8 12.1  5.3 3.8118 4.00 .232 
lack of respect/dignity for 
Artisans  
31.9 41.1   6.0 14.9  1.8 3.9037  4.00   .218 
government do not encourage 
skills acquisition 
35.1 40.4   7.1 11.3  2.5 3.9779 4.00 .221 
no clear-cut career path for 
craftsmen  
27.3 46.8   9.2 11.0   0.7 3.9366 4.00 .153 
the youth lack adequate 
guidance and counselling                                                                                                                                                        
to take to skills acquisition 
36.2 
48.6 
 
5.3   4.3 1.4 4.1889 4.00 .224
there is no adequate forum for         
mobilising youth for skills 
acquisition 
36.5 43.6  7.8   6.0  1.8 4.1185 4.00 .171 
construction site work is 
viewed by the  youth as too 
difficult a task                                                                                                   
26.6 36.5 12.8 12.1 7.1 3.6679 4.00 .192 
construction site work is 
viewed by the youth as too 
degrading  
26.2 40.4   7.8 17.4  3.5 3.7222 4.00 .193 
the youth generation are lazy 
and      hence unwilling to 
acquire                                                                                                                    
skills  
24.5 29.8 13.8 19.9   7.8 3.4519 4.00 .191 
too much emphasis  on 
general/secular education    
36.5 31.6 11.0 13.5   3.2 3.8852 4.00 .221 
 
it is too expensive to receive      
vocational training     
12.8 32.3 12.1 28.0 10.3 3.0967 3.00 .221 
 
the get rich quick orientation 
in the nation 
 
39.4 31.6 13.1   9.9   1.8 4.0111 4.00 .185 
 
lack of adequate provision for   
protection and safety of site 
workers                                                            
26.6 34.8 14.5 17.4   2.8 3.6753 4.00 .182 
 
lack of encouragement or 
incentive    from  political 
leaders 
37.6 34.8     8.9 10.3   2.8 3.6692 4.00 .239 
 
absence of health and safety 
training from the vocational 
education   curriculum                                                                                           
23.8 35.5  17.0 16.7   3.2 3.6236 4.00 .156 
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lack of job security in the 
construction industry 
31.2 42.6    8.2 10.3   3.9 3.9041 4.00 .211 
 
sector, lack of adequate provision for the protection and safety of construction 
site workers, lack of respect, recognition and dignity for Artisans; too much 
emphasis on secular/general education.  The views by the youth the construction 
crafts career is too degrading and the belief that construction site work is too 
difficult. 
 
Some of the highlighted reasons as indicated above are focused for further 
discussion under the following captions. 
 
Lack of adequate guidance and counselling as to the importance, 
prospects and relevance of skills as a viable career 
The absence of appropriate career guidance and counselling for the youth to 
consider construction related skills acquisition ranked first from the quantitative 
analysis as one of the major reasons why the younger generation in Nigeria are 
not showing interest in choosing craftsmanship as a career, findings from the 
qualitative enquiry also corroborated this opinion.  The greater percentage of the 
youth population are ignorance and un-informed about the relevance, economic 
prospects, and importance of acquiring a skill. Durosaro and Adeoye (2007) has 
decried the neglect of effective guidance and counselling in Nigerian schools, 
pointing out the commitment to guidance and counselling as indicated in the 
NPE is not receiving adequate attention.  There is also lack of adequate formal 
forum for effective motivation and mobilization of youth for crafts-skills 
training. 
 
Poor Image of Construction site Craft Workers 
The problem of negative or poor image of construction site work featured in both 
the quantitative and qualitative analysis as one of the factors deterring the 
Nigerian youths from acquiring construction related crafts skills.  The wide-
spread erroneous notion that VET is only for those who cannot do well in secular 
education discourages many who would have consider skills as a career. Those 
undergoing secular education are seen as superior and clever in comparison to 
those in VE, artisans are viewed as second rated citizens and construction site 
works viewed by the public as dirty jobs.  Various past studies have identified 
the poor image of the industry as an issue which adversely affects the popularity 
of construction related crafts as a career choice (Green et al, 2004; Dainty et al, 
2005; Dainty et al, 2007; Ness, 2009).  Salami (2011) described this malaise 
more vividly by saying that ‗there is the general perception that artisans and 
technicians are ―never-do-wells‖, dropouts, societal rejects or even failures who 
should perpetually remain at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder‘.  A 
corollary of image problem is the view by most youths that construction craft 
55 
 
careers are downgrading and demeaning.  The poor remuneration of the 
construction craft workers even aggravates and further tightens the ability of the 
sector to attract the youth into its crafts categories.  The poor image syndrome is 
a malaise that the construction industry and other stakeholders need to 
adequately address in order to attract and sustain the interests of new entrants 
into the industry; especially at the crafts level. 
 
Lack of encouragement and motivation from the political class and 
government hierarchy for the youth to take to crafts as careers. 
The necessary good leadership example from many in the political circle 
seems to leave much to be desired, crave for quick-wealth at the expense of 
hard work is another social menace pointing the youth in the wrong direction.  
The social vice of 'get rich quick' syndrome or orientation prevalent in the 
nation seems not to be pointing the youth generation in the right direction.  
Salami (2011) ascribed the trend to two cultural related factors of societal 
misconception about the economic and social status of artisanship and 
secondly to the fast eroding value system. Instead of signing-up for an 
apprenticeship to acquire a profitable skill, myriads of Nigerian youths 
jettisoned skills acquisition and opt for motor-bike transportation business 
(nick-named Okada or keke NAPEP); with the view to making ‗quick cash‘.  
Awe et al (2010) in a previous study has also identified lack of 
encouragement or incentive for youth to acquire technical skill as an issue for 
the evident lack of interest of the youth population in Nigeria. 
 
 Too much emphasis on secular/general education. 
The current preoccupation with university education in Nigerian reduces 
economic opportunities of those who are more oriented toward work than 
academia.  Not everyone needs a university education, but everyone needs a 
vocation at least for self sustenance.  A relevant question is; if everyone became 
a university graduate, who will do the manual operation for the actualisation of 
the construction industry's products?  Vocational education surely produces 
graduates who are highly skilled entrepreneurs; VE leads to the acquisition of 
practical and applied skills as well as basic scientific knowledge. The policy 
makers seem to have endorsed the crave for further education and acquisition of 
paper qualifications without the corresponding employable skills; this is evident 
in a change of policy converting the old TCs to STCs and equating NABTEB 
certificate with those of WAEC and NECO to compete for FHE.  Awe et al 
(2009) had earlier posited that if the orientation for the pursuit of paper 
qualification at the expense of practical skills acquisition is left unchecked, the 
Nigeria construction industry will be moving towards a situation where it will 
have many graduates of construction related fields; but insufficient number of 
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skilled craftspeople who can effectively and efficiently deliver the sector‘s 
products.  A situation which they insist will be catastrophic for the industry and 
the nation‘s economy and development as a whole.  Any phenomenon that 
jeopardize youth interest in acquiring construction related crafts skills will also 
stall successful PPP implementation in the nation. 
 
Lack of a clear-cut career path for craftsmen  
Craftsmanship career as it is practised in Nigerian seems to be a dead end 
without adequate provision for career progression or advancement.  The artisans 
are in most cases not educated to the point that will sustain floating a SME 
venture.  Only few, highly skilled are in permanent employment of large multi-
national or indigenous construction firms; while the majority depend on daily-
paid engagement.  They congregate daily at popular junctions or public areas in 
major cities with their working tools stacked in sacs waiting for a labour only 
petty  contractor in their trades to come and engage them for the day; and if they 
are lucky enough, for few days or weeks.  After which they are back at their 
‗junction-office‘ to join another long queue waiting for the next engagement.  
Those in regular employment in the good old days could at least advance to 
become General Foreman (GF) or trade supervisors in their trades, but the 
modern agenda in the construction industry seems to have transferred such roles 
to the fresh construction graduates with little or no practical knowledge in the 
trade.  Ness (2009) noted that the construction process is now often managed by 
degree-trained construction managers without hands-on-experience.  Even in the 
public sector in Nigeria, graduates of vocational related institutions are 
discriminated against in terms of wages and career progression (Salami 2011).  
Just as the highly skilled construction workers that participate in PPP projects 
have the privilege of career progression, the skilled construction craftsmen and 
women should also be able to advance in their chosen career. 
  
CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings from the study as discussed under the various headings 
above; it could be concluded that there are many salient factors militating against 
the interests of the youth population in Nigeria to choose construction crafts as 
careers and this certainly has implication for PPP initiatives in Nigeria.  PPP is a 
viable option for construction project procurement but the initiative cannot be 
successfully implemented without agile, competent, confident and skilled 
construction crafts workforce. 
 
The study recommends that in order for successful delivery of PPP projects in 
Nigeria, there is need for the construction sector to address the various militating 
factors and device strategies for securing and sustaining youths interest, initiate 
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strategies for mobilising, recruiting and constantly training the youths with the 
view to raising sufficient numbers of skilled craftspeople to meet up with labour 
demand for PPP initiatives.  
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There are perceived housing inequalities in the urban centres of Nigeria 
like any developing countries due to social, political and economic reasons. 
The features of such urban neighbourhoods are deprivation and segregation 
which gives a feeling of the need for intervention. This paper seeks to 
examine the application of PPPs approach as an involvement of different 
actors in eliminating urban housing inequalities. Four sets of argument in 
favour of PPPs – synergy, transformation, budget enlargement and capacity 
enlargement are employed for the examination of its performance in 
Nigeria as a less-developed state. The approach has capacity for the 
provision of quantity and quality housing at affordable costs and ensures 
equitable distribution of infrastructural facilities within residential 
neighbourhoods. Consequently, the approach is beneficial to the bodies of 
public and private actors as well as making the urban dwellers enjoy 
dynamic urban governance. 
 
Keywords: housing inequalities, public-private partnerships, urban 
housing. 
INTRODUCTION 
Housing is an elemental condition for basic human functioning and 
flourishing which can be described as shelter (physical structure) together 
with all social services and utilities such as road, drainage, electricity, health, 
clean water, sewerage, and waste management and security services among 
others that make a locality live-able (Quigley, 1999; King, 2003; Coolen, 
2006; Powel 2010, p. 9). Housing acts as a focus of economic activity, a 
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symbol of achievement, social acceptance and an element of urban growth 
(Bujang et al 2010). Idrus and Siong (2008, p. 1) opine that housing is a 
major concern for all people in every corner of the world as the well-being of 
a country is reflected in its people enjoying a certain standard of living.  
 
Despite the importance of housing, there are perceived housing inequalities 
in the urban centres of Nigeria like any developing countries due to social, 
political and economic reasons. The features of such urban neighbourhoods 
are deprivation and segregation which gives a feeling of the need for 
intervention. 
 
Public-private partnership gives equal access to decent and affordable 
housing to the less-privileged in urban centres especially in developing 
countries through qualitative and qualitative provision (Boxmeer and 
Beckhoven 2006). PPP in housing also helps in the provision of basic 
services, lower cost through mass production, access to mortgage finance, 
faster delivery times, mobilisation of resources, incentives participating 
members, etc (Shelter-Afrique, 2010) . 
 
This paper therefore seeks to examine the application of PPP as an 
involvement of different actors in urban housing provision. It also aims to 
provide insight into how the public-private partnership (PPP) initiative can 
help promote sustainable housing and eliminate urban housing inequalities in 
Nigeria. Four sets of argument in support of PPP - synergy, transformation, 
budget enlargement and capacity enlargement are used to examine its 
performance and make suggestions for improvement. This study uses an in-
depth literature review as part of an on-going PhD research in its early stage 
on ―A Public-Private Partnerships Agenda for Sustainable Social Housing 
Provision in Developing Countries: Nigeria as Case Study‖. The core areas of 
this paper – PPPs approach as a panacea to urban housing inequalities happen 
to form some major aspects of the on-going PhD research. This paper, the on-
going PhD research and the theme of the Doctoral Workshop are in 
consonance.    
 
URBAN HOUSING IN NIGERIA   
Nigeria has a land area of about 930,000 square kilometres or 359,073 square 
miles with a population of about 151 million (World Bank, 2010 in Abdullahi 
and Aziz, 2010, p. 3). Some major cities in Nigeria are Abuja (Capital City) 
with a population of about 6 million, Lagos (8 million people), Kano, Ibadan, 
Port Harcourt and about six other cities with a population of over 1 million 
each. Since becoming an independent nation in October 1
st
, 1960, there has 
been political instability, lack of the rule of law, high crime rate, violence, 
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inequalities, poor economy and corruption among others in the country 
(Kadiri, 2006; Abdullahi and Aziz, 2010; Ibem, 2011). 
 
Evidences of segregation and deprivation depicting urban housing 
inequalities in Nigeria can be summarised as follows (Beng-Huat 1996, p. 1; 
UN, 2001; Kadiri, 2006; Abdullahi & Aziz, 2010; Ibem, 2011): 
 Geographical separation of housing into class structure;  
 Uneven distribution of basic amenities in favour of some preferred 
areas; 
 Poor housing quality in terms of environmental condition, design, size 
and finishing adorning a larger portion of the urban centres; and  
 Inability of the larger populace to contribute to the development of 
their areas and non-benefiting from the gains therein. 
In relation to the above, four main factors are responsible for urban housing 
inequalities in Nigeria. These are (i) activities of the past colonial masters 
and (ii) urbanisation growth (Renaud, 1999; Nwaka, 2005; Olotuah and 
Adesiji, 2005, pp.2-3), (iii) lack of proper economic and physical planning 
(Aribigbola, 2008) and (iv) poverty (Lawanson, 2006, p. 5; Abdullahi and 
Aziz, 2010, p. 3).  
 
Activities of the Past Colonial Masters 
According to Nwaka (2005) a large number of Nigerian cities – Lagos, 
Sokoto, Ibadan, Zaria, Abeokuta etc  pre-date British colonial rule. These 
were native towns, with large indigenous populations, which subsequently 
had European reservation areas and migrant quarters grafted onto them 
during the period. Those native towns were made to retain their traditional 
characteristics — like traditional compound houses; customary attitudes and 
practices regarding food handling, waste disposal, and personal hygiene; 
urban agriculture; and livestock keeping (Nwaka, 2005).  
 
In the contrary, the European quarters known as Government Reservation 
Areas (GRAs) were mainly for the colonial masters (District Officers) and 
members of their work-force with provision made for electricity, good road 
network, pipe-borne water supply and security. The houses were better 
designed similar with housing quality in their home country. This marked the 
beginning of housing inequalities as two distinct residential neighbourhoods 
were created within each of the existing towns. The development created a 
breathing ground for inequality, injustice, lack of equity, and above all, 
residential segregation and deprivation. According to Lawrence (2002), 
equity implies fairness in the relationship between individual and the state, 
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including a just distribution of benefits and services in a society while 
equality means equal circumstances, treatment and outcomes for all. 
 
Urbanisation 
Nigeria is the largest country in Africa, and the largest concentration of black 
people in the world. Estimates at the turn of the 21st
 
century suggest that 
43.5% of the population were living in urban areas, up from 39% in 1985, 
with projections that the urban population will reach 50% by the year 2010, 
and 65% by 2020. The rate of urban population growth is thought to be 5.5% 
annually, roughly twice the national population growth rate of 2.9%. Increase 
in the urban population in Nigeria can be attributed to rural-urban migration, 
high birth rate, low death rate and relative peace due to non inter-tribal wars 
(Nwaka, 2005). 
 
High urban population has therefore resulted in the proliferation of slums and 
informal sub-urban settlements otherwise known as shanty towns (Lawanson, 
2006, p.5). The shantytowns are deprived settlements characterised by 
excessive residential densities, largely uninhabitable housing and the absence 
of sanitation, basic infrastructure and social services (Aina, 1990 in 
Lawanson, 2006, p. 5). Despite the intentions of many policies and 
programmes in recent decades, there is a growing amount of evidence 
showing that inequalities in the cities of many developing countries have 
increased in tandem with a growing incidence of homelessness, 
unemployment, social deprivation and health problems (Lawrence, 2002).  
 
Lack of Proper Economic and Physical Planning  
Using criteria such as income, economic, social structure, physical quality of 
life and freedom (economic and political freedom) as determining factors 
Nigeria is categorised as developing country (Abdullahi and Aziz, 2010). 
Again, Nigeria is classified as low-middle income country with a gross 
national income (GNI) of US$175.6 billions, GDP growth rate of 3.0 %, per 
capital income of US$1,160 and about 84% of the population earning below 
US$2 a day (World Bank, 2008 in Abdullahi and Aziz, 2010). 
 
Lack of economic planning dated back to the era of colonial rule in Nigeria, 
(Nwaka, 2005) when cities and towns were not conceived or promoted as 
centres of industrial production for job creation and self-sustaining growth,  
rather as small enclaves for administration, colonial trade, and transportation. 
In addition, informal financing is common with urban housing development 
in Nigeria and explains why housing neighbourhoods look like endless, 
almost permanent, construction sites and housing construction sometimes 
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spanning well over 15 years, creating substandard homes and slum 
settlements (Renaud, 1999; Nubi, 2006, in Nubi, 2010, p. 22; Omirin, 2007) 
in Nubi, (2010, p. 22).  
 
Nwaka (2005) argues that the policies and institutions for urban 
development, where they existed, were very restrictive and myopic, 
especially in the critical areas of land-use control, planning, and the provision 
of infrastructure and services. The laws, codes, regulations, and institutions 
designed for the small populations envisaged in colonial cities with 
consequential segregation and deprivation were inherited with little 
rethinking by post-colonial administrations, and have been quickly overtaken 
and overwhelmed by the process of rapid urban growth and post-colonial 
transformation (Nwaka, 2005).  
 
Similar to the argument of Burningham and Thrush (2003) the post-colonial 
administrations engaged in a rather different aspect of housing 
neighbourhood inequality in the way the environmental and social policies 
were pursued without social and economic considerations by the colonial 
masters which exacerbate the hardship been faced by the poor. 
 
Formal land use planning and management in Nigeria began in 1863 with the 
enactment of the Town Improvement Ordinance by the colonial government 
(Aribigbola, 2008). Subsequent notable planning laws are the Land Use 
Decree of 1978, Urban Development Policy of 1992, Urban and Regional 
Planning Act 1992, the Housing and Urban Development Policy of 2002, etc. 
Despite the existence of these laws and policies, urban land use management 
problems (Aribigbola, 2008) which further propagate urban housing 
inequalities, segregation and deprivation still persist.  
 
A number of factors (Kadiri, 2006) can be advanced for this such as: (i) Lack 
of long term vision to guide the development of planning objectives; (ii) 
conflicts between short and long term economic objectives; (iii) geographical 
and functional fragmentation in many institutions; (iv) legal and technical 
frameworks that limit the harmonisation of planning activities; and (v) a 
mismatch between the political and planning framework. Other constraints 
according to Aribigbola (2008) are (i) use of outdated and outmoded land use 
Planning Policies, Laws and Regulations; (ii) inadequate manpower; and (iii) 
poor and inadequate funding. 
 
Poverty 
This is the state of being poor; want of the necessities of life, scarcity or lack 
and inferiority (Advanced Learner Dictionary). The poverty level of most 
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Nigerians living in urban centres made it difficult for them to own houses as 
most of them with lowest incomes do not have sufficient funds to exercise an 
effective demand in the formal housing market (Daramola et al, 2004, p. 3). 
It has been observed that 8 out of every 10 urban households are poor with 
this constituting a major factor in urban congestion and environmental 
degradation (Jimoh, 19997) in Lawanson (2006, p.5). Poverty in Nigerian 
cities is endemic, according to The Human Development Report (2004) in 
Lawanson (2006, p. 5), 70.2% Nigerians survive on less than US$1 daily, 
while about 84% of the population lives on less than US$2 daily. Over 100 
slum areas of poor housing and living conditions have emerged in Lagos 
between 1985 and 2006 the residents of which are low-income people 
(Akinmoladun and Oluwoye, 2007, p. 10) in Ibem (2011).  
 
ISSUES IN URBAN HOUSING PROVISION IN NIGERIA 
Issues requiring attention in urban housing provision in Nigeria can be 
described in the following areas (Adamchak, et al., 1999; Wei and Wu, 2001; 
Fan and Grossman, 2001; Johnson, 2001) in Gong and Bingqin (2003): 
 
 Failure of the market economy 
 Deprivation, segregation and discrimination 
 Inequality in neighbourhood amenities and 
 Affordability  
 
Failure of the market economy 
Housing is one of the basic social needs of man, but is mostly ―unaffordable‖ 
for low-income earners (Franz 2009, p.12; Rizvi 2010). This is because 
market economy usually fails to provide adequate housing to the masses as 
inequalities in affordability, distribution and consumption of housing are 
intrinsic therein which give rise to the class structure in the urban centres 
(Beng-Huat 1996, p. 1). In Nigeria, market has created class structure in 
terms of different qualities of housing environment – low, medium, high 
density areas for high, medium and low income earners respectively and 
government reservation area for top government officials and successful 
business people with varying housing standard and amenities based on 
demand and supply forces.   
 
Deprivation, segregation and discrimination 
Housing inequality within urban neighbourhoods refers to the differences in 
the quality of housing the results of which are deprivation and segregation. 
According to Pryce and Sprigings (2009) housing inequality is directly 
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related to concepts of racial, social, income and wealth inequalities aided by 
factors such as natural market forces, housing discrimination and housing 
segregation. Housing inequality can be viewed or conceptualised as the 
dispersion of a distribution in terms of location, ownership, consumption or 
any other quality or attribute that shows or tells the welfare status of a 
residential neighbourhood (Oluwatayo, 2008).  
 
Inequality in neighbourhood amenities 
The most direct effect of residential inequality is an inequality of 
neighbourhood amenities in terms of the conditions of surrounding houses, 
the availability of social networks, the amount of air pollution, the crime rate, 
and the quality of local schools (Yinger, 2001, p. 362). In fact, there has been 
a long established link between poor housing and poor health dating back to 
Edwin Chadwick‘s ‗Report into the Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring 
Population of Great Britain‘ in 1842 (Pevalin, et al., 2008).  
 
Affordability 
There exist wide wealth gaps between the rich and poor in Nigeria. Non-
affordability of good housing by the poor promotes the negative effects of 
housing inequality by restricting access to household wealth and greatly 
affect the freedoms available to an individual (Krivo and Kaufman, 2004). 
Apart from the intrinsic value of neighbourhood amenities like the 
satisfaction derived from living in a nice area which the poor is deprived of 
due to lack of affordability, many studies reveal that growing up in a high 
poverty neighbourhood may have adverse social and economic outcomes 
later in life (Yinger, 2001, p. 368). 
 
THE NEED FOR PPPs IN URBAN HOUSING  
Over the years in developing countries, the government play the sole or 
dominant role in all spheres of economy including housing provision and 
public service delivery (Njoh, 2006) in Abdullahi and Aziz (2010, p.4). The 
effect has been that at all levels of economic development, there is a far 
greater financial need for urban development projects than can be provided 
by the traditional public purse alone. Problems of deprivation and segregation 
are arising making housing inequalities a known feature of many urban 
neighbourhoods especially in developing countries. Boxmeer and Beckhoven 
(2005) therefore, argue that these neighbourhoods are in need of intervention 
through a proactive measure of urban regeneration projects aiming at 
decreasing social, economic and/or physical problems.  
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PPP approach has been a trend fast developing in a number of developed 
countries such as UK and United States as an avenue towards increasing 
involvement of the private sector in the provision of goods and services 
traditionally provided by, and earlier seen as a function of, the public sector 
(Webb and Pulle, 2002; Ching ONG and Lenard, 2002). Specifically, since 
1990s the establishment of public-private partnerships have become a key 
tool of public policy in many developed countries (Osborne, 2000, p. 20; 
Boxmeer and Beckhoven, 2005). Li and Akinyoye (2003) argue that one of 
the common approaches that have emerged over the past three decades is the 
use of the public-private partnership in the provision of public goods and 
services.  
 
PPPs IMPLEMENTATION IN HOUSING PROVISION IN 
NIGERIA 
In response to the wave of development across the world, and convinced by 
the apparent benefits, the government of Nigeria notably adopted PPP around 
2000 in a bid to increase housing and reduce housing inequalities to a 
manageable proportion (Gana, 2002, in Ibem, 2011). PPP in housing 
provision thereby becomes prominent in Lagos and Abuja, the Federal 
Capital Territory of Nigeria. Public-Private Partnerships housing schemes in 
Abuja are for the development of the capital city while the ones in the Mega 
City of Lagos, notably the Lekki scheme, Ikeja GRA scheme and OGD - 
Sparklight Housing Estate, Ibafo, Ogun State are for mass housing provision 
in the area.  
 
Public-Private Partnerships in housing provision in Nigeria comprises mostly 
multi-national housing finance institutions, Federal and State government 
housing agencies and finance institutions, private commercial housing 
developers, and commercial banks as well as primary mortgage institutions 
(PMIs) (Daramola et al, 2004; Ibem, 2011). The attractive package attached 
to the scheme by the government, led to tremendous responses of the 
Organised Private Sector (OPS). (Abdullahi and Aziz, 2010, p. 11) as shown 
in Table 1 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Participating Developers in PPP Housing in Abuja 
 
S/N         Developer                                       Number               % 
1        Organised Private Sector (OPS)      122                          93.1 
2        Public Corporation                              6                          4.6 
3        Staff Cooperatives                               3                          1.5 
4        International Company                        1                          0.8 
          Total                                                 131                         100                  
  
Source: FCTA (2007, 2008) in Abdullahi and Aziz (2010, p. 11). 
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The roles of the participants of PPP in housing are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Roles of the Participants of PPP in Housing Provision in Abuja 
Government                                                          Organised Private Sector (OPS) 
1. Gives land at no cost to OPS              1.  Gets land at no cost except meagre processing fee 
2. To provide primary infrastructure      2.  Given 3 years and 18 months to complete                                                                                      
                                                                         development 
3. Set the goals                                        3.  Comply with city regulations, standards and  
                                                                 speculations in the construction 
4. Supervision and monitoring                4.  Physical construction of houses 
5. Determine the standard and                 5.  Funding of the housing projects 
ensure compliance                               6.  Management of the disposal (in some cases)   
6. Provision of legal, institutional  
and economic policy frameworks  
 
Source: Adapted from Abdullahi and Aziz (2010, pp.14-15). 
 
The general arrangement for the PPP in housing provision in Lagos 
(Megacity) simply involves the signing of a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) and development lease agreement (DLA) between government 
agencies and private sector housing developers for the purpose (Ibem, 2011).  
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
It is hereby suggested that the use of PPPs in housing provision in Nigeria be 
adopted as in developed countries such as UK. In making this suggestion, 
four sets of argument are used in support – synergy, transformation, budget 
enlargement and capacity enlargement. These sets of argument are the 
ingredients embedded in PPP initiative that makes it a useful tool to address 
the issues earlier raised in urban housing provision in Nigeria as follows:  
 
Synergy 
In PPP, the coming together of the public and private sectors in housing 
provision will make them produce a greater effect than the sum of their 
individual effort. There will be an improvement in the housing sector in 
terms of quality and quantity production at affordable prices. Where supply 
of housing equals of more than demand, prices will stabilised. Affordability 
will not only be enhanced, deprivation and housing inequalities as issues are 
going to be addressed.  Hastings (1996) in Boxmeer and Beckhoven (2006), 
sees PPP  arrangement as a policy synergy; a process by which new insights 
or solutions are produced out of the differences between the partners, thereby 
advancing the social goals of the public sector.  
 
However, the PPPs in housing provision as presently structured in Nigeria 
could not advance the social goals of the public sector because according to 
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Abdullahi and Aziz (2010), the participating organised private sector (OPS) 
are mostly ―land grabbing merchants‖ or ―brief case companies/firms‖ owned 
by politicians, proxy civil servants and dubious business men. The interest of 
the masses and low-income earners are not protected considering the total 
housing units completed (1, 267 units) under the scheme in Lagos Megacity 
between 2002 and 2009 – low-income, 200 units or 16%; middle-income, 
379 units or 30% and high-income, 688 units or 54% (Table 3). Comparing 
this with the estimate of 40,000 housing units required annually in the city, 
one can conclude that PPP housing schemes have contributed less than 1% of 
the yearly housing need in the city (Ibem, 2011).  
 
Table 3: PPP Turnkey Housing Estates Identified In the Lagos Megacity Region (2002 – 
2009). 
 
                                                                                                                Housing units per income group 
Housing Estates              Location        Govt agencies involved     Low           Middle                High 
Lekki Apartment         Victoria Island    Shelter Afrique                  -                    -                        126  
Havilah Villas                Isheri                   GCDCL*                         -                  60                       100 
OGD – Sparklight         Ibafo                     GCDCL*                         50              100                      150 
Paradise City                Mowe                    GCDCL *                         -                100                      200 
Ewu Elepe Estate        Lagos                      LSDPC*                          50              119                        50 
Ikeja GRA                      Ikeja                     LSDPC*                           -                  -                           36 
Ilupeju Estate              Ilupeju                     LSDPC*                           -                  -                           26 
Total                                                                                                     200             379                       688 
Percentages                                                                                           16                30                         54 
 
*GCDCL –Gateway City Development Company Limited 
*LSDPC – Lagos State Development and Property Corporation  
 
Source: Ibem (2011) 
 
Transformation  
This argument, according to Boxmeer and Beckhoven (2006) is formed by 
Mackintoch‘s model of transformation expecting the public-private 
partnerships to be seen as vehicles through which participants can ‗shake up‘ 
each other for a more entrepreneurial way of working. PPP is capable of 
transforming the housing sector as it is a result oriented mechanism through 
which the public sector can challenge the private sector to adopt more 
‗social‘ objectives, less driven by short-term gains. Transformation 
entrenched in PPP makes it a right approach for addressing issues in urban 
housing such as segregation, deprivation, inequalities and affordability. 
 
However, housing prices shown in Table 4 provide support for the argument 
that PPP in housing provision in Lagos for instance has not shown any 
transformation nor provided equal opportunity to all categories of income 
earners to gain access to decent housing as expected (Ibem, 2011), 
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Table 4: Cost of Housing Provided in the OGD-Sarklight Housing Estate, Ibafo 
 
Housing Typology                                                                Unit Cost (Million Naira) 
2-bedroom terrace bungalow                                               3.450 (US$23, 000) 
Semi-detached 2-bedroom bungalow                                  3.191(US$21, 273) 
Detached 2-bedroom bungalow                                           4.380 (US$29,200) 
Semi-detached 3-bedroom bungalow                                  5.520 (US$36, 800) 
Detached 3-bedroom bungalow                                           6.500 (US$43, 333) 
  
Source: Ibem (2011) 
 
Budget Enlargement 
PPP will enable the public and private sectors collaborating and to co-operate 
with the objective of executing mass housing for the masses with an enlarged 
budget unlike a situation where each of them would have acted in isolation 
(Mackintosh, 1992) in Boxmeer and Beckhoven (2006). . They can in the 
process gain additional financial support from a third party like international 
financial organisations or foreign governments (Elander, 2002) in Boxmeer 
and Beckhoven (2006). It is a means of pulling resources together with a 
view to adequately address societal issues and in this regard they are housing 
related issues. 
 
Capacity Enlargement 
In a developing country like Nigeria, Government has more responsibilities 
but little financial and political capacities to cope. Government capacities will 
be enhanced if it forms partnership with other bodies for the purpose of 
housing provision. Public-private partnership makes every responsibility to 
be spread among various intergovernmental, voluntary and private sectors 
thereby making major development projects such as mass affordable housing 
provision a reality (Friedrichs and Vranken, 2001) in Boxmeer and 
Beckhoven (2006). 
 
CONCLUSION  
This paper focused on public-private partnerships approach as a panacea to 
urban housing inequalities in developing countries with Nigeria as case 
study. Though, findings reveal that PPPs in housing provision in Nigeria is 
poorly structured and without defined policy guidelines, it remains a scheme 
that can be employed to address urban housing inequalities in the country. 
The four sets of arguments – synergy, transformation, budget enlargement 
and capacity enlargement in support of PPPs approach are capable of 
generating enough resources – financial, technical, materials etc for adequate 
housing provision (quantitative and qualitative) for people at all income 
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levels. It is the right channel through which urban housing inequality 
eradication objectives can be achieved.  
 
In conclusion, PPP in urban housing provision in Nigeria needs proper 
restructuring and should comprise not-for-profit private sector to collaborate 
with the public sector for the desired goal.  
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In contemporary human society, transportation is crucial to the economic 
life of every nation. Road transport happens to be the most common mode 
of transportation in Nigeria, and accounts for about 90% of the movement 
of persons, farm produce, merchandise, animals and mobile services such 
as clinics, libraries and banks. Most of the federal highways in Nigeria 
were procured decades ago by the traditional contracting system. A good 
number of the road-networks in many Nigerian cities are unpaved, poorly 
maintained, overused and impassable, thereby cutting off many rural areas 
from larger settlements during the rainy season, which has a corresponding 
negative impact on the cost of production. This paper critically reviews the 
management of road transport infrastructure in Nigeria, a nation with about 
140 million people. It identifies six key issues that hinder or do not allow 
the active involvement of the private sector in road transport infrastructure 
delivery. These issues include: inadequate maintenance, misuse of roads, 
over dependence on roads, poor inter-modal transport systems, institutional 
issues, and inadequate funding. It is therefore positioned that, in order to 
provide high quality, cost-effective, all-weather, safe, reliable and 
environmentally sensitive road transport infrastructure of world-class status 
(underpinned by ‗value for money‘ drivers), there is a need for an adequate, 
enforceable and enabling legal/ regulatory collaborative engagement 
framework for road transport infrastructure management in Nigeria.  
Keywords: highway, infrastructure, maintenance, public-private 
partnerships, road transport.  
INTRODUCTION 
Transport is often a means of conveying people, goods and services from one 
place to another, and across several communities through road, rail, air, 
water, tunnel and pipeline. Transportation plays a crucial role in shaping the 
destiny of many nations because modern industry and commercial activities 
seem to rest on appropriate, well developed and efficient transport system. It 
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performs a critical role by allowing raw materials to be moved from farm to 
factory, and finished goods from factory to market, thereby enabling products 
to be made available at locations desired by the consumers (Potter and 
Lalwani, 2008). Other activities which require the movement of people 
include farming, agriculture, education, recreation and social contacts, 
employment opportunities, health services, economic activities, general 
development of the community, and maintenance of law and order. 
Emergency services rendered by most agencies also depend on street and 
highway system for optimal efficiency (Brockenbrough and Boedecker, 
2009). Thus, the extent to which a nation‘s land mass is covered by road 
network is often an index of the degree of mobility of people, goods and 
services within the country, and the quality of the network measures the ease 
and cost of that mobility (Adesanya, 1998). 
 
A road can be described as a thoroughfare, route, or way between two places, 
which typically has been improved to allow travel by some conveyance, 
including a horse, cart or motorised vehicle. Traditional roads were simply 
recognisable routes without any formal construction or maintenance while 
modern roads are normally smoothed, paved, or otherwise prepared to allow 
easy travel on land via carriageway. Road transport has trip origin and 
destination through terminals where passengers can embark, or where goods 
and services can be loaded or off-loaded in urban areas (Kendrick et al, 
2004). 
 
Road transportation has been the most popular means of movement in 
Nigeria, a country with an area of 923,768.64 km
2
, population of about 140 
million comprising 11 cities with population above one million and 23 cities 
with population of over 200,000 (Federal Government of Nigeria, FGN 
2010). It accounts for about 90% of all inter and intra city movements of 
persons, farm produce, merchandise, animals and mobile services such as 
clinics, libraries and banks across the country (Akpogomeh, 2002). The 
optional use of motor cars for pleasure tend to contribute tremendously to the 
importance of road transport in Nigeria given the deteriorated state of 
alternative modes of transportation (rail system, inland waterways) and also 
the psychological satisfaction offered by the possession of a car (Adesanya, 
1998). The major cities, including the 36 state capitals and the Federal capital 
are connected to each other by a network of highways. The road network in 
the South-Western and South-Eastern Nigeria seem to be much denser than 
others in the rest of the country due to higher population densities (Ubogu et 
al, 2011). 
 
Nigeria appears to have the largest road network in West Africa and the 
second largest South of Sahara. The current national network of roads is 
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estimated at about 196,000 kilometres with the Federal roads network 
carrying about 70% of freight in Nigeria (Oni and Okanlawon, 2006). Details 
of the distribution are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Distribution of the National Road Network in Nigeria 
 
Type of               Federal (Km)  State (Km)    Local                Total (Km)        Percentage 
Pavement                                                        Government 
                                                                       (Km) 
Paved Trunk        28,741            10,400         _____                39,141               20% 
Roads. 
Unpaved              05,600            20,100         _____               25,700               13% 
Trunk Roads. 
Urban Roads.       _____             _____         21,900               21,900               11% 
Main Rural           _____             _____         72,800               72,800               37% 
Roads. 
Village Access      _____             _____        35,900               35,900               19% 
Roads. 
Total (Km).         34,341             30,500       130,600             195,441              100%  
Percentage.          17%                16%           67%                   100% 
 
Source: Oni and Okanlawon, 92006    
 
Reports have it that the present condition of some of these roads require 
urgent attention in most parts of the country, thereby impacting negatively on 
the cost of production and representing a major trigger of cost-push inflation 
in Nigeria (Ubogu et al, 2011; Oni, 2008; Oni and Okanlawon, 2006). 
Transport appears critical to economic development, both in low volume/ 
rural roads and major arterials, since there seems to be a direct relationship 
between a country‘s economic prosperity and the length (kilometres) of 
paved roads (Queiroz and Gautam, 1992). This paper articulates the 
economic importance of road infrastructure, road classification in Nigeria, 
and the roles of various agencies responsible for road infrastructure 
management in Nigeria. Furthermore, it identifies a series of cogent problems 
and challenges that hinder the effective management of roads in Nigeria; and 
presents a number of initiatives as a potential way forward.  
  
ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF ROAD 
INFRASTRUCTURE  
Transport often plays a key role in the economic and social development of 
every nation. Land transport involves movement of people and goods on land 
from one location to another. In this respect, it appears to be the dominant 
form of transportation in the world and includes road, rail and pipeline. 
Heggie and Vickers (1998) described public road network as the largest 
public infrastructure asset. The predominance of road transport as the means 
of passenger and freight movements further underlines the economic 
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importance of roads. The value of road asset and cost implications of delayed 
maintenance to a nation‘s economy and the road user often underscore the 
invaluable role of maintenance. For example, in Sub-Saharan African 
countries, the costs of degraded road network to road users are often very 
high and consequently hinder national economic development potential. In 
other words, poor road condition often translates into higher vehicle 
operating costs and lengthier travel times (Brushett, 2005). In this regard, 
road network may be considered as an asset which often needs to be 
maintained and improved in order to ensure the best performance, value-for-
money and the maximum service-life. Effective management enables the 
road network to withstand the damage caused by wear and tear, prevents 
substandard conditions from developing, and ensures the flow of traffic in a 
safe, efficient and reliable manner with little or no damage to the 
environment. Thus, well maintained road networks that provide the level of 
service needed by road users are often critical and important element of 
development (Transport Research Laboratory, 1998).  
 
The users of effective highway facilities tend to benefit from enhanced ease 
of travel, safety and economy of time. The owners of abutting property also 
benefit from better access and increased property value. Good highway 
system often makes for effective emergency service and better street parking. 
Concentration of people in urban areas might be greatly reduced, as an 
efficient transportation encourages the people to live in places away from 
their work centres. Thus, it may help in decreasing the growth of slums in 
urban area. Highway system may also have impact on the overall economy 
by lowering the cost of producing and distributing products which make up 
the economy and directly feeds the Gross National Product (GNP). 
Furthermore, it tends to generate employment since a considerable number of 
jobs may be highway related and expenditure on highway seems to form a 
big portion of the GNP (Queiroz and Gautam, 1992). The provision of 
highway probably makes easier the defence of a territory against aggression 
and the task of guarding the borders.   
 
ROAD CLASSIFICATION IN NIGERIA  
The important factors often considered in classification of roads seem to be 
the authority responsible for the roads, accessibility to the abutting property, 
location and functions of the road. In this respect, the Nigerian road system is 
classified into three broad categories. 
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Trunk ’A’ Road 
The trunk ‗A‘ roads form the major network around which other categories of 
roads are built. They run through the length and breadth of the country, 
connect ports, capitals of various states and also provide international links 
with neighbouring countries. Notable examples are Lagos-Ibadan 
Expressway, Sagamu-Ijebu Ode-Benin Expressway, Abuja-Kaduna 
Expressway, Akure-Ilesa road, Lagos-Badagry-Republic of Benin road etc. 
This category of roads are constructed, managed and owned by the Federal 
Government. The distribution and length of the federal highway network in 
the six geo-political zones of Nigeria is shown in Table 2. 
 
Trunk ‘B’ Road 
The trunk ‗B‘ roads are the highways within the states which connect 
important towns and cities of the states, connect the cities of the states to 
federal highways and serve as the main arteries of traffic to and fro the 
district roads. This category of roads are developed, maintained and owned 
by the component states. 
  
Trunk ‘C’ Road 
The trunk ‗C‘ roads serve the interior rural population of the district and 
connect areas of production and market with state highways, major district 
roads and railways. This category of roads are under the ownership and 
management of the local government, hence they are commonly referred to 
as local government roads. 
 
Table 2 Federal Highway Network in the Six Geo-Political Zones of Nigeria   
 
Zone                    States                                                                                  Road Network (Km) 
South-East           Anambra, Enugu, Imo, Ebonyi, Abia                                    3,121.70km 
South-West          Lagos, Oyo, Osun, Ondo, Ekiti, Ogun                                  4,161.06km              
South-South         Akwa Ibom, Delta, Cross River, Bayelsa, Rivers, Edo        4,150.89km 
North-East           Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, Yobe                6,787.90km 
North-West          Kaduna, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara   6,363.40km 
North-Central      Niger, Kwara, Plateau, Benue, Nasarawa, Kogi, Federal     9,756.00km 
                            Capital Territory Abuja  
Total                                                                                                                   34,34 0.95km 
 
Source: Authors‘ Fieldwork, 2011 
 
Each tier of government has the responsibility for planning, designing, 
construction, rehabilitation, operation and maintenance of the network of 
roads under its jurisdiction (Ubogu et al, 2011). In other words, federal roads 
are managed by the Federal Ministry of Works, state roads are managed by 
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the State Ministries of Works, while the local roads are managed by the 
Works Department of local government authorities (774) in Nigeria.  
 
ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA 
Road infrastructure management often covers the use, operation, maintenance 
and development through improvement or construction of new roads. It has 
been defined as the process of maintaining, improving and optimising the 
overall performance of the road network and all its elements (pavement, 
bridges, street lights, signs, drains, lines, street furniture, verges etc.) over 
time (Transport Research Laboratory, 1998). A highway is a general term 
which defines a conduit or public way provided for use of vehicular traffic 
including the entire area within the strip of land reserved by mutual consent 
or acquired by statutory regulations. A typical highway is constructed in such 
a way that will enable the operators of vehicles to have a clear view ahead of 
lines, curves, horizontal and vertical alignment that merged (O‘Flaherty, 
2007). Well-maintained roads are expected to be well lit especially to aid 
night-travel, hence, road lighting is put in place on roads to ensure the safe 
movements of both vehicles and pedestrians at all times (Slinn et al, 2005). 
Similarly, road surface often affects the stability of vehicles by the nature of 
the contact between the wheels and surface, and it further affects the driver in 
controlling his vehicle by the amount of irregularities present. Sudden bumps 
are known to cause loss of control if speeds are not adjusted to the road 
conditions (Kendrick et al, 2004). The quality of any work is often a factor of 
material, methodology used and competence of personnel or supervisor. In 
this regard, Arumala (1987) and Akpododje (1986) discovered little or no 
adherence to highway design standards, poor supervision by government 
officials, and lowering of the design specifications during construction as 
major factors responsible for road failure in Nigeria. Similarly, Ibrahim 
(1980) and Ola (1978) attributed road failure mainly to overloading, use of 
sub-standard construction materials, and inadequate knowledge of the 
geotechnical properties of the soils over which roads are built. 
 
The administration of highway in Nigeria does not differ considerably from 
the standard practice. The Federal Ministry of Works, an agency designated 
to administer the highway programme of the Federal Government of Nigeria 
is responsible for managing all the road system that form the core of the 
national grid. 
 
Federal Ministry of Works  
The Federal Ministry of Works, (FMW) is charged with several statutory 
responsibilities among which are federal highways and bridges (planning, 
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design, construction and rehabilitation); supervision of the monitoring and 
maintenance of federal roads nationwide; provision of highway engineering 
infrastructure; and surveying and mapping of Nigeria‘s internal and 
international boundaries. The agency is presently structured into four 
operational departments namely: Highways (Planning and Design); 
Highways (Construction and Rehabilitation); Engineering Services; and 
Federal Surveys. Other service departments include Public Procurement; 
Human Resources; Planning, Research and Statistics; Legal Services; and 
Finance and Accounts.  
 
The ministry also supervises the activities of the Federal Roads Maintenance 
Agency (FERMA); Federal School of Surveys, Oyo; and Regional Centre for 
Training in Aerospace Surveys, Ile-Ife. The ministry operates through its 
field headquarters located in the 36 states of Nigeria and the Federal Capital 
Territory, Abuja. The vision of the ministry is to elevate Nigerian roads to a 
standard where they become national economic and socio-political assets, 
contributing to her rapid growth and development. The agency intends to 
make federal roads functional, pleasurable and an avenue of re-inventing 
Nigerians‘ trust and confidence in government.  
 
Federal Roads Maintenance Agency 
Highway maintenance often has to do with preserving and keeping road 
structures as near as possible in their original state. It consists of correcting 
deficiencies that have developed as a result of age, use and the effects of the 
elements, and taking steps to prevent or delay the development of other 
deficiencies. Road maintenance is vital in order to prolong its life, just as 
well-maintained roads often reduce the cost of operating vehicles by 
providing good running surface. Proper maintenance also keeps the roads 
open and ensures greater regularity, punctuality and safety of transport 
services (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2003). 
 
In 1995, Civil Engineering experts and concerned stakeholders including the 
Nigerian Society of Engineers (NSE), Council for the Regulation of 
Engineering in Nigeria (COREN), the organised private sector, experts from 
the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), experts from the World Bank and the 
International Road Federation, Nigerian Association of Road Transport 
Owners (NARTO) and the National Union of Road Transport Workers 
(NURTW), after hectic brainstorming sessions, came up with what is now 
known as the Road Vision 2020.The Vision advised government to de-link 
road-maintenance from planning, design, construction and rehabilitation, 
which are the traditional Federal Highways Department‘s role domiciled in 
the Federal Ministry of Works. Thus, the Federal Roads Maintenance 
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Agency, (FERMA) was established on 20
th
 November 2002, with the 
enactment of the Establishment Act 2002 to monitor and maintain all federal 
roads in Nigeria. FERMA is an agency under the Federal Ministry of 
Transport, Nigeria, whose principal role is to carry out regular routine 
maintenance on the federal road network. The agency came into being as a 
10-13 year stop gap pending the time a full-fledged reform is put in place to 
incorporate the Nigerian roads with a comprehensive infrastructure 
management system. 
 
FERMA, along with the Highways Department of the Federal Ministry of 
Works are responsible for looking after the federal roads network. The 
Highway Department is charged with the construction of new highways, and 
the reconstruction and rehabilitation of badly damaged highways, while 
FERMA is responsible for maintaining the highways at acceptable levels of 
usability.  
 
Road Traffic Administration and Safety Management 
In 1976, there were 53,897 road traffic accidents resulting in 7,717 deaths in 
Nigeria. In the  year 1981, the number of accident reduced to 35,114, but the 
fatality increased to 10,236. On the average, there were 96 accidents and 28 
deaths every day of that year. The situation in subsequent years was not 
significantly different, although fatality rate reduced to 9,707 in the year 
1993 and 6,521 in the year 2000 (FGN 2010). Road safety engineering 
according to Akinyemi, (1986), is often a set of activities designed to reduce 
the number and / or severity of accidents on specific road sections by 
exchanging or modifying some road environment characteristics. Such 
activities generally consist of planning (identification of safety problems, 
road locations and feasible road counter measures); implementation 
(installation or construction of the counter measures); and evaluation (the 
determination of the degree of effectiveness of the counter measures). In this 
respect, Odeleye, (2000) reported that the road traffic environment in Nigeria 
is characterised by over-speeding, blocked drains, narrow pedestrian 
walkways, bushy road environment, rough and undulating surfaces, black 
spots (accident prone locations), unfit road intersections, narrow bridges, 
defaced signs, non-functional traffic lights, irregular road marking, road 
median not crash worthy (concrete), poor guard railing arrangement, high 
disregard for traffic law and regulations, and flooded road surfaces. 
 
This description suggests a system that is devoid of modern technology. As a 
key tool which can be used to improve the movement of people and goods in 
order to meet the evolving needs of modern economy and society, Intelligent 
Transport Systems (ITS), a technology toolkit involving a systems approach 
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to transport often facilitates effective infrastructure management 
encompassing improved road safety (European Transport Safety Council 
1999).     
 
The Federal Road Safety Commission 
The Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC), a government agency with 
statutory responsibilities for policy making, organisation and administration 
of road safety in Nigeria was established in February 1988, through Decree 
No. 45 of 1988 as amended by Decree 35 of 1992 referred to in the statute 
books as the FRSC Act cap 141 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, passed by 
the National Assembly as Federal Road Safety Commission (Establishment) 
Act 2007.  
 
The functions of the Commission generally relate to: 
1. Making the highway safe for motorists and other road users. 
2. Recommending works and devices designed to eliminate or minimise 
accidents on the highways and advising the Federal and State 
Governments including the Federal Capital Territory Administration 
and relevant governmental agencies on the localities where such 
works and devices are required, and  
3. Educating motorists and members of the public on the importance of 
discipline on the highway. 
 
CHALLENGES TO PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION 
IN ROAD TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA 
From the foregoing, the key issues which seem to hinder private sector 
participation in road transport infrastructure management in Nigeria may 
include: 
 
Inadequate maintenance 
In 1985, about 23% of national roads were in a bad state in Nigeria. This 
situation rose to 30% in 1991, 50% in 2001 and about 60% in 2010 (FGN 
2010). The findings of a survey conducted by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(2003) revealed that some roads which were constructed over 30 years ago 
have not had any rehabilitation interventions, thereby resulting in major 
longitudinal and transverse cracking, depressions, broken bridges and 
numerous potholes that make road transport both very slow, costly and 
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unsafe. The survey reported that most of the roads in the Southern and 
Northern Nigeria were in very poor conditions, and therefore require 
complete/ total rehabilitation and asphalt overlay, re-instalment of the 
shoulders, filling of potholes and re-building of collapsed bridges. This 
implies that road infrastructure in Nigeria probably suffers from inadequate 
routine maintenance, neglect of periodic maintenance and the absence of 
emergency maintenance in areas affected by flood, storms and other natural 
calamities. Absence of adequate road maintenance often reduces the useful 
life of the roads, thus, resulting in premature and costly road reconstruction, 
while poor surface increases the operating cost of vehicles and has significant 
effects on road safety (Campbell, 2009). Furthermore, decisions regarding 
which roads to improve may depend more upon political factors rather than 
the economic potential of the proposed route (Porter, 2007).  
 
Misuse of roads 
Nigerian roads appear to be heavily motorised. Goods that ought to have 
passed through the railways and waterways seem to be moved through the 
road network. The Nigerian road traffic environment is apparently composed 
of heavy-duty trucks, lorries, trailers, tankers, cars, motorcycles/ tricycles, 
pedestrians, and cart pushers. Though almost all roads in the federal road 
network were designed to carry a maximum axle load of about 30 tonnes, 
many trucks seem to carry up to about 50 tonnes axle loading (Akpokodje 
1986). The result of this excess axle loading ―overloading‖ of articulated 
vehicles is probably the visible ruts and cracks that cause failures and damage 
to Nigerian roads. Furthermore, the federal roads in Nigeria appear to lack 
adequate transit park and rest areas, hence, heavy-duty trucks are often 
parked on highways. Excessively-high axle loads on paved and gravel roads 
especially during the raining season often contribute substantially to reducing 
the life expectancy of roads. Thus, a major cause of the declining roads 
infrastructure might be the misuse of roads due to overloaded trucks 
(Arumala and Akpokodje 1987). 
 
Over dependence on roads 
The dependence on roads in Nigeria presently is almost total simply because 
the Nigerian railway is almost grounded and air traffic appears low in the 
country. It is estimated that between 90-95% of the total transport movements 
is on the road network. Thus, the transport of goods seems not optimised 
towards the most appropriate mode as the railway and inland waterways 
modes appear neglected. In this respect, freight and bulk goods are carried 
over long distances by heavy-duty trucks and tractor-trailers, whose activities 
are probably responsible for some of the fatal accidents on Nigerian roads. 
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For example, they are known for overloading, over-speeding and flagrant 
disregard for traffic laws (Odeleye, 2000).    
 
Poor inter-modal transport system 
An integrated transport system often has to do with effective connectivity 
between ports, rail, road, inland waterways and air, thereby making use of the 
advantages of different modes to ensure seamless movement of goods and 
people and better utilisation of resources. For instance, goods arriving by sea 
appear best transported from the port by rail or inland waterways. However, 
Nigerian ports, except Port Harcourt and Apapa are not connected by rail and 
the waterways (FGN 2010). This implies that a comprehensive transportation 
system which interconnects the various transport modes to make the most use 
of their individual advantages does not seem to exist at present in Nigeria. 
Hence, freight transports are probably not carried by the most appropriate 
transport mode. Bulk cargoes/ goods are carried over long distances by trucks 
and tractor-trailers.   
 
Institutional issues 
Road transport infrastructure management appears to be a complex issue in 
Nigeria. This is so, because the supply of road facilities cuts across various 
categories of public agencies. For example, the Federal Ministry of Works 
constructs and rehabilitates the federal road, the state ministries of works 
build and maintain state road, while the remaining roads are under the 
jurisdiction of the local government authorities. FERMA is expected to 
undertake regular routine maintenance, while the FRSC is responsible for 
road traffic administration and safety management. Furthermore, the Vehicle 
Inspection Officers ascertain the roadworthiness of vehicles, the Traffic 
Police/ Warden controls road traffic, while the Traffic Department of the 
Nigerian Police Force prosecutes erring road users. Some State Governments 
also have their own state transport maintenance agencies. Aside from the 
problem of overlapping objectives and responsibility, there seems to be no 
attempt to coordinate the activities/ effort of these agencies. In this respect, 
Malmberg-Calvo (1998) emphasised the need to develop an institutional 
framework for managing and financing road infrastructure. 
   
Inadequate Funding 
Project financing can be described as a business plan for a profitable 
investment, with a long-term view, and the combination of time and money 
put together in a dynamic contract with a delegation of responsibility over 
time (Heather, 2000). The highways and streets on which motor vehicles 
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travel are often provided, maintained and operated by government as one of 
its primary function. Highway financing may have to do with sourcing and 
the usage of capital for the construction and improvement of highways. 
According to Mabogunje (1998), there are few available avenues in most 
African countries for raising sufficient revenue to fund urban infrastructure. 
Moreover, these countries are often restricted by their national governments 
to a narrow range of revenue. This may be the true state of road development 
funding in Nigeria, where government solitarily finances all road 
development projects. In this regard, The Central Bank of Nigeria (2003) 
reported that since the economic reform in 1999, less than 10% of the 
funding request made by the Federal Ministry of Works was appropriated, 
while only about 54% of the appropriation was released. This suggests the 
fact that funding of road infrastructure projects in Nigeria might have been 
grossly inadequate. FERMA appears to have an enormous task of 
maintaining nearly 35,000 kilometres of road network (see table 2), with 
about 60% of the roads in very serious state of disrepair. Therefore, there 
seems to be an urgent need for alternative source(s) of finance other than 
government for road improvement programmes, so as to make the national 
gridlock more safe, vibrant and viable. 
 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: THE WAY 
FORWARD  
Throughout the world, Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) have become 
increasingly popular as a vehicle  to deliver large transportation projects, 
such as roads, bridges, tunnels, railways, seaports, and airports. The National 
Council for Public Private Partnership, USA (2009) defined PPP as a 
contractual agreement between a public sector agency (government) and a 
private sector entity, through which the skills and assets of each sector are 
shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public. 
Globally between 1985 and 2009, more than 950 transportation facilities 
worth over US$550 billion were newly built, upgraded, or operated through 
PPP (Public Works Financing 2009). The UK has been widely recognised as 
the pioneer and leading nation in delivering transportation through PPP, 
alongside such countries as Australia, Spain, South Korea, Canada, Ireland, 
France, China and Brazil (Deloitte 2007). The various forms of Public-
Private Collaboration include Private Finance Initiative (PFI), Build-Operate-
Transfer, Build-Own-Operate-Transfer, Build-Own-Operate, and Design-
Build-Finance-Operate/ Maintain. Since 1992 to date, over 67 transportation 
projects costing more than US$42 billion have been delivered through PFIs, 
and an additional 12 projects are in the planning pipeline in UK (Her Majesty 
Treasury 2009). The merits of Public-Private Collaboration are summarised 
by Li and Akintoye (2003) as: enhancing the government‘s capacity to 
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develop integrated solutions; facilitating creative and innovative approaches; 
reducing the cost to implement the project; reducing the time to implement 
the project; transferring certain risks to the private sector partner; attracting 
larger, potentially more sophisticated bidders to the project; and providing 
avenue to access skills, experience and technology.      
 
DISCUSSION 
An effective network of roads and highways often fosters safe, efficient 
movement of people, goods and services, and contributes to economic 
growth. Roads and highways directly connect to other transportation modes, 
hence, are vital to moving raw materials to factories and finished products to 
markets. 
 
The road network in Nigeria is currently estimated at about 196000 
kilometres, with the Federal Government being responsible for managing 
about 17%, State Governments 16% and Local Governments 67%. However, 
these roads appear to have been plagued by a number of problems, the major 
ones being faulty designs, poor drainage system; excess axle loading of 
articulated vehicles; dumping of refuse on the shoulders, drains and 
manholes; wrong and harmful parking on the highways; and poor 
maintenance. Given the long years of neglect of maintenance and severe 
pressures being exerted on them, many of these roads seem to have 
deteriorated beyond maintenance and consequently require complete 
rehabilitation and reconstruction. These problems might have significantly 
reduced the utility of the roads, negatively impacted on the cost of production 
and represent a major trigger of cost-push inflation. 
 
In the past, the government had concentrated effort on road construction, but 
probably much has not been done in the areas of establishing a regulatory 
framework and introducing measures that would promote effective road 
transport infrastructure management in Nigeria. The Federal Government had 
set up some Commissions in the past to address the problem of road 
maintenance. For instance, The Wey Commission of 1971 examined the 
organisational structure of highway development and management in five 
selected countries, and therefore recommended the formation of a Federal 
Highway Authority for the administration of all federal roads in Nigeria. The 
1979 Panel also recommended the setting-up of a parastatal (The Federal 
Highway Authority) under the then Federal Minister of Works and Housing, 
for planning, designing, constructing, maintenance and surveillance of 
federal highways. Similarly, the 1996 workshop launched the ‗Road Vision‘ 
2000 and recommended the establishment of an autonomous road agency that 
would be responsible for road maintenance. Furthermore, the 1999 
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Presidential Policy Advisory Committee recommended the establishment of a 
central body to ensure high standards in highways development and 
maintenance. This Committee also recommended that funding of highways 
maintenance should be improved by establishing a ‗Road Fund‘, which 
would derive its funds from highway tolls, vehicle taxes, trucks, petroleum 
taxes, weigh bridges and parking fees. 
 
In recognition of the challenges of infrastructure development, the Federal 
Government of Nigeria set up the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory 
Commission (ICRC, Establishment) Act, 2005. This Act provides for the 
participation of the private sector in financing, construction, development, 
operation or maintenance of public infrastructure or development projects of 
the Federal Government through concessions or other contractual 
arrangements. The ICRC 2005 is expected to regulate, monitor and supervise 
the contracts on infrastructure or development projects. The Board of the 
ICRC was inaugurated in November 2008. However, since its establishment 
and inauguration, it appears not much has been done to implement the 
policies contained in the Act.     
 
The problems associated with poor road maintenance policies may therefore 
have to do with weak or unstable institutional arrangements for managing 
and financing roads. Fund for road infrastructure projects has been from the 
Federal Government allocation to the FMW, as well as state and local 
government allocations for maintenance purposes. The proliferation of 
agencies appears to have created problems of overlapping objectives, 
responsibility, conflicts in the provision and management of road transport 
infrastructure and services, and in the enforcement of traffic laws and 
regulations. Considering the impact of effective road transport infrastructure 
services on the economy/ welfare of the society, and the huge amount of 
money required for its development, it behoves on Nigerian Government to 
partner with the private sector in order to achieve the desired efficiency and 
effectiveness in road transport infrastructure services. This is supported by 
Akintoye and Beck (2009) who identified transportation as one of the major 
physical infrastructure mainly needed by developing countries to support 
economic activities, but noted that many developing countries cannot afford 
this facility without affecting other economic activities because of the cost 
considerations (initial capital outlay and cost of operation/ maintenance) and 
lack of appropriate technology. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The movement of passengers‘ and freight has been an integral part of 
everyday activities, an engine of economic growth, and an important 
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component of the well-being of the society. Over the years, investment in 
public infrastructure has been the exclusive responsibility of government. But 
now, there is an increased trend world-wide, where government collaborates 
with the private sector in order to bridge the country‘s infrastructure gap. 
Nigeria has become increasingly dependent on the road system to meet 
virtually all its inland transport needs as the rail, pipeline and inland 
waterway systems have deteriorated. At the same time, the road network 
itself has suffered from continuing lack of maintenance and investment by 
the three levels of government, federal, state and local. Thus, this study 
carefully identifies inadequate maintenance, misuse of roads, over 
dependence on roads, poor inter-modal transport system, institutional issues, 
and inadequate funding as key issues which do not allow the active 
involvement of the private sector in road transport infrastructure delivery in 
Nigeria. 
 
Therefore, in order to provide high quality, cost effective, all-weather, safe, 
reliable and environmentally sensitive road infrastructure of world-class 
status that guarantees ‗value for money‘ benefit to all road users, this study 
strongly recognises the need for an adequate, enforceable and enabling legal/ 
regulatory collaborative engagement framework for road transport 
infrastructure management in Nigeria. The framework would encourage and 
remove all barriers towards the private sector participation in the 
development, provision, maintenance, operation, and upgrading of road 
transport infrastructure and services. This would guarantee regular attention 
as well as adequate finances for construction, rehabilitation, routine repairs, 
and integration through which the road traffic environment will enjoy the 
benefits of modern technology like Intelligent Transport System/ telematics 
component installation along Nigerian road network. Furthermore, it would 
also integrate modes of transport infrastructure services for convenient and 
seamless travel, using modern systems like electronic ticketing and payment.       
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Ever since it was first conceptualised in late 1970s and early 1980s, Public 
Private Partnerships (PPP) has recently become a cutting-edge tool in 
delivering infrastructures and public services. This is largely because its 
promises for a better level of services delivery and better value for money 
(VFM). As such the previous researches have focused their attentions on 
how Public Private Partnerships can be better governed in order to achieve 
the inspiration of VFM. Thus technical and managerial issues such as; 
management of risks and finance, structuring an arrangement, performance 
management and measurement have been put forward with the attempts to 
advance this field of study. Nevertheless this seems to be a lopsided of 
research into Public Private Partnerships, given the fact that it is a measure 
for government to implement their public services policy. That means the 
existing literatures are very much concerned with inter-organizational 
relationships between the two settings in relations to the above aspirations. 
But they appear to take a wider surrounding context Public Private 
Partnerships operate in for granted. With this in mind the paper is intended 
to broaden the current focus of the research to include that oblivion context 
of the study. Public services reform agenda as an important element in 
deciding: which areas, what extent and how the services should be 
delivered, is therefore proposed to complement the current stage of Public 
Private Partnerships study. Their natures and roles in influencing 
collaboration between public and private sector are investigated with the 
aim for a better understanding of Public Private Partnerships in a more 
practical and real context. 
Key words: public private partnerships (PPP), collaboration, public 
services reform, reform agendas.  
INTRODUCTION  
Over the last two decades Public Private Partnerships, as a cross economic 
sector collaboration, has been widely used across the continents for 
delivering public infrastructures and public services. This is because first of 
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all its ability in helping the governments to reduce public spending during the 
period of budget constraints. Secondly by bringing in private sector into the 
public works, it is argued by the proponents as a way of revitalising sluggish 
areas in public sectors (Robinson et al., 2010). This point is often considered 
as a complementary of skills set across boundaries where the public sector 
leaning towards, for instance, responsible and accountable to society, whilst 
the private sector is likely to be more competitive and efficient in economic 
term (Jamali, 2004). In other words that means by coming to the term 
partnerships, it provides an opportunity for resources and skills to be more 
effectively utilised for delivering a better services. However, the problem is 
that how to capitalise on this opportunity and how strengths from both sides 
can be properly leveraged. 
 
Developing upon these fundamental reasons the existing researches into 
Public Private Partnerships therefore have been central in managerial and 
operational aspects for enhancing collaboration between two sectors. For 
example Jones and Noble (2005) in sustainability in inter-organizational 
collaboration; Robinson and Scott (2009) in services delivery and 
performance monitoring in PFI/PPP; Sobhiyah et al. (2009) in increasing 
VFM in power station project; Li et al (2005) appropriate risk allocation 
model and Appuhami et a.l (2011) risk management in inter-organizational 
level of PPP. This streamline of research is observed by Tang et al. (2010). 
They review the literatures in Public Private Partnerships in the construction 
industry over the last ten years and point out that the past research appears to 
be focused on very limited areas: risks, financing, relationships, development 
of partnerships model, project success factors and concession period.  To this 
end it could be argued that the key concern in this field of study is tended 
towards overcoming any technical and managerial obstacles in implementing 
Public Private Partnerships so that its expected advantages and promises 
could be demonstrated.  
 
However as noticed by Phillips et al. (2000) in the study of inter-
organizational collaboration and the dynamics of institutional fields that 
collaboration does not occur in a vacuum or external to surrounding context. 
In fact there is the connection between collaborations and institutional field 
that they operate in the sense that it provides a backdrop of resources and 
practice that are crucial in collaboration process. This implies that Public 
Private Partnerships is not only a matter of collaboration between the two 
settings. In fact it can be enhanced or disrupted by a wider institutional 
context they operate in (Marchington and Vincent, 2004). In order to have a 
more understanding in Public Private Partnerships in a real and practical 
context, this dimension should not be ignored, as though the partnerships are 
isolated and would never been influenced by the institutional dimension.  
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The aim of this paper is to inject a fresh perspective into Public Private 
Partnership research by calling for an investigation into changes in reform 
agenda over collaboration between public and private sector in delivery of 
public services.  It is organised in three main sections. Firstly a brief 
overview of current stage of knowledge in Public Private Partnerships 
research is presented. By doing this it helps us to think and rethink through 
the present territory of the research and crucially what appears to be a 
missing context for advancing this field of study. Second of all a proposed 
methodology for conducting research in a specific direction is subsequently 
discussed. Due to the study investigates past and present phenomenon 
(changing of reform agenda over collaboration between public and private 
since 1980s), a multi-qualitative strategy is developed to get access to the 
past events and their changes (an archival strategy) as well as deeply 
investigate recent and current phenomenon (a case study strategy). Lastly as 
this paper is produced on the ground of preliminary step in Ph.D study 
therefore it is unable to draw up the research findings. Notwithstanding its 
early stage and findings yet to be found, the expected practical implication on 
Public Private Partnerships and its value are discussed as a conclusion in this 
paper.  
 
CURRENT STAGE OF KNOWLEDGE AND MISSING 
DIMENSION 
Unlike the conventional way of working which is almost all activities in 
delivering public services fall into the public sector‘s hands, Public Private 
Partnerships helps to relive those overwhelmed tasks through an involvement 
from private sector. Basically it spans from involving in decision-making to 
delivering process of infrastructures and services (Hodge and Greve, 2007). 
From the view of researchers such as; Kwak et al. (2009) and Jamali (2004) 
this could be argued that Public Private Partnerships  is an umbrella term 
encompassing a variety of arrangements between public and private sector 
depending upon a degree of involvement from private sector (e.g. designing, 
financing, operating and owning/returning the asset backs). As such Public 
Private Partnerships could be considered as a type of inter-organizational 
relationships (IOR) which is intended to increase efficiency, quality and 
competitiveness of public sector services (Appuhami et al., 2011 and Lane, 
2000). 
 
According to Cropper et al. (2010) the IOR is largely concerned with forms, 
structures, process, management and outcomes of relationships between two 
organizations. These characteristics of IOR study have obviously presented in 
many researches into Public Private Partnerships. For example Gross and 
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Gavin (2011) in structuring PPP toll-road that has to deliver ―public 
objective‖ (e.g. affordable rate, managing congestion and minimising state 
subsidizing) and able to provide a vital financial return to make the project 
approval. Or relationships management in PFI/PPP projects by (Smyth and 
Edkins, 2007) and stakeholder management for Public Private Partnerships 
(El-Gohary et al., 2006). This trend of researches is certainly central in how 
to enhancing the use of public private arrangement. That means it attempts to 
capitalise on opportunities provided by the partnerships and wherever the 
problems are or the obstacles arise, then the research would be placed to 
tackle. Developing upon this argument the key issues in Public Private 
Partnerships seem to be broadly investigated in two main concerns. Firstly it 
is about gaining more benefits from committing to partnerships or advantages 
focus, while another concern attempts to overcome obstacles in using this 
partnerships. Table 1 shows example of issues in two concerns of Public 
Private Partnerships research.  
 
Table 1: The two concerns in conducting Public Private Partnerships research 
 
Advantages focus Overcoming obstacles 
Author(s) Research focus Author(s) Research focus 
Gibson and Davies 
(2008) 
 
Barlow and Koberle-
Gaiser (2008) 
 
 
Clifton and Duffield 
(2006) 
 
Investigating impact of 
PPP on education 
 
Delivering innovation 
and better performance 
in PFI/PPP hospital 
project 
 
Improving services 
outcome and 
performance 
measurement 
Jost et al. (2005) 
 
 
Jones and Noble 
(2005) 
 
 
 
Appuhami et al. 
(2011); Zheng et al. 
(2008) 
 
Sustainability of 
collaboration across 
economic sector 
Boundary-spanner in 
helping to co-ordinate 
works across 
organizations 
Behavioural risks and 
opportunistic 
behaviours 
 
Advantages focus Overcoming obstacles 
Author (s) Research focus Author (s) Research focus 
Sobhiyah et al. (2009) 
 
 
Li et al. (2005) 
 
 
Zhang (2005) 
Increasing VFM for 
power station project 
 
Risk allocation model 
in PFI/PPP 
 
Financing PPP projects 
Zheng et al. (2008)  
 
 
Roehrich et al. (2010)  
Dynamic of contractual 
and relational 
governance in PPP 
A model in complex 
inter-organizational 
system 
 
The example of existing studies seems to imply that in one hand it tends to 
advance the use of partnerships by working on managerial and technical 
aspects that are brought in by the partnerships arrangement. On the other 
hands the research attempts to deal with issues arising from differences in 
business, strategies and value driven between the two sectors (Jones and 
Noble, 2005). That said the current streamline of Public Private Partnerships 
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research is largely dealing with inter-organizational collaboration matter: 
leveraging strengths from both sides, capitalising on opportunities provided 
by partnerships and overcoming obstacles arisen from those differences, with 
the aim to make a better and more efficiency of public services.  
 
In addition to a promise for better level of services delivery, Public Private 
Partnerships research also appears to be driven by an inspiration for a better 
value for money (VFM). This is because in deciding whether or not Public 
Private Partnerships is adopted it has to demonstrate that comparing to the 
traditional way of delivering, Public Private Partnerships can deliver a better 
value for money (Robinson et al., 2010). According to HM Treasury (2004) 
Value for Money (VFM) is defined as an optimum combination of whole life 
cost (capital cost and operational cost) and quality of services delivery to 
meet public sector requirement. Clifton and Duffield (2006) noticed that it is 
featured by: risk transfer, whole life costing, innovation (e.g. financial, 
structure, services and technical), asset utilisation, output based specification, 
performance measurement and incentive. Together with the above discussion, 
it is not surprising why most of the research tends toward managerial and 
operational issues that are associated with managerial and operational aspects 
in using PPP. 
 
Nevertheless by focusing up VFM inspiration and performance improvement 
for services delivery, it seems to be a lopsided of Public Private Partnerships 
research. This is because ever since it was first conceptualised in late 1970s 
or early 1980s, Public Private Partnerships has been used as a tool in 
implementing public services and public infrastructure policy. Therefore it 
could be said that the collaboration between public and private does not take 
place external to a wider surrounding context. In fact it has always been 
influenced by for instance direction, certain areas introduced by the 
government policy which is known as ―public services reform agenda‖.  
 
For example comparing between the recent New Labour government (1997-
2010) and the current Conservative government, there is a clear distinction 
between their reform agenda for better public services. In the attempts to 
modernizing those services in the line of users need the New Labour 
government were committed to ―widening choice‖ and ―personalization of 
services‖. At this point it was implemented through the involvement from the 
Third Sector (TS) in many contexts: developing mainstream policy, 
commissioning, shaping and delivering the services for public (Kelly, 2007). 
However after the regime was changed in the general election 2010, the 
agenda in reforming public services appears to be in the different direction. 
As it was proposed in the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) in autumn 
2010 as a significant part of the government plan in deficit reduction, the 
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reform agenda is tended towards the government‘s flagships ―Big Society‖ 
where the emphasis is on sharing responsibility by changing the role of the 
state and how services are provided (HM Treasury, 2010). In a broad context 
while the previous government seemed to reform public services by focusing 
on diversity and users need, the incumbent on the other hands is committed to 
effectively utilise resources, localising power and decision making as well as 
bringing in involvement from community in shaping services.  
 
This changing of reform agenda has continuously happened in the UK public 
services as Kelly (2007) pointed out ―In the UK, the government continues 
its project to reform public services. Earlier projects have focused on the 
modernization of public sector organizations; in the latest round of reform, 
New Labour has focused on widening choice and the personalisation of 
services‖. From this perspective both of public and private sector which are 
they key participants in delivering the services are inevitably influenced or 
subjected to the matters of reform agenda. In other word the Public Private 
Partnerships is not only confined to a collaboration between the two settings. 
In fact it is also inextricably linked to institutional field, here ―reform 
agenda‖ they operate in. Figure 1 below shows the key concerns brought into 
public services by each government reform agenda.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
   1979                  1990                      1997                       2007                         2010 
Lady Thatcher    Sir John Major      Tony Blair            Gordon Brown         David Cameron 
 
                                               TS and Partnerships Credit crunch   Big Society/ Cutting               
                                                                                                                                         deficit 
Coming of Free market Economy/ Privatization 
 
Figure 1: The emphasis and condition of each government in reforming public services 
 
The important of a concern in connection between inter-organizational 
collaboration and institutional field was observed by many scholars. For 
example Phillips et al. (2000) they pointed out that collaboration does not 
occur in a vacuum or external to surrounding context. In fact there is the 
connection between collaboration and institutional field that they operate in 
the sense that it provides a backdrop of resources and practise that are crucial 
in collaboration process. However it is suspected by Marchington and 
Vincent (2004) that ―Much of the research in inter-organizational relations 
assumes that firms operate as relatively autonomous and cohesive units that 
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are....[...] unimpeded by wider institutional context governing the industry as 
a whole‖. This seems to be relevant with the current streamline of research 
into Public Private Partnerships which is largely driven by VFM inspiration 
and performance improvement aspect. 
 
Consequently by taking the institutional dimension for granted, research 
findings might have been misinterpreted in the sense that 1) excluding how 
institutional structures shape relation between organizations or 2) not 
capturing the fact that inter-organizational relations vary depending on a 
variety of circumstances. In the context of Public Private Partnerships as a 
type of inter-organizational relationships (IOR), this concern might have a 
significant implication on reliability of findings, for instance; whether or not 
they reflect the full pictures of study.  
 
With this in mind this paper aims to inject a fresh perspective on Public 
Private Partnerships research by calling for research into the nature and role 
of public services reform on the way collaboration between public and 
private sector stakeholders are conceptualised, talked about and practised. To 
do so the research will be conducted under two primary contexts. Firstly it is 
concerned with tracing back changing agenda of public services reform since 
the conceptualisation of Public Private Partnerships in the 1980s. Secondly 
the paper also seek to investigate on how those reform agendas have shaped 
the way in which public and private working together in delivery of public 
services.  
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Due to the study attempts to investigate phenomenon and changes of reform 
agenda since Public Private Partnerships was first conceptualised in 1980s as 
well as at the current and present time. A multi-qualitative strategy is adopted 
to address the research concerns. This includes an archival strategy for 
dealing with the past distant phenomenon and a case study approach is 
targeted for current and present phenomenon. By employing both of archival 
and case study strategy, it will be able to facilitate a process for in-depth 
exploration in what had happened to collaboration between public and private 
sector according to public services reform. And essentially a full picture of 
this concern (streamline of phenomenon since the past) could be obtained. 
Figure 2 below illustrates on how both an archival and a case study are used 
to investigate influences of reform agenda over collaboration between the 
public and private sector.  
 
 
 
102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 1979                                                  200X 
                                                                                                                    2010 
                                      
An archival strategy                                                    A case study strategy 
 
Figure 2: Multi-qualitative strategy (Archival and Case study) 
 
According to the figure 2 an archival strategy is designed to use for accessing 
the past phenomenon (reforms agenda and their changing) since 1979 to the 
recent time , for instance, 2005 or 2007 which was the last days  of the 
Labour government. The investigation will then be complemented by the use 
of a case study for a dept understanding of reform agenda in the current and 
recent time.  
 
For conducting an archival research data will be collected through the 
National Archive material which is unpublished. In a broad context the 
investigation will be held for the three consecutive periods: Lady Thatcher‘s 
year (privatization), Sir John Major (Chaterism) and Mr Blair (Partnerships 
and Third sector). This is largely because although the public service reform 
agenda is continuous process from one government to another, each of them 
tended to carry different agenda and features in reforming. Thus it is 
worthwhile for getting access directly to these past events and see their 
changes and transition from one focused agenda to another. 
 
In the context of case study, data will be collected through two channels. 
First one is documents and second one is interviews. Using of documents is 
mainly concerned with reviewing the independent reviews conducted by 
appointed committees such as; Lyon Reviews (2004) in relocation of public 
sectors activities and Gershon review (2004) in public services efficiency. By 
doing this it could enable us to understand what have happened and are likely 
to happen in recent and current round of reform. In addition the implications 
of government policy or reform agenda could be found in this sort of reviews.  
This series of reviews could credibly help to form the current stream of how 
reform agendas have been changed. And crucially it could also provide the 
perspective on how they influence the way in the two sectors working in a 
delivery of public services. 
 
Current and 
Present time 
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Second technique is a semi-structured interview. While reviewing documents 
can give the broad picture and stream line of reform agenda as well as 
implications, the semi-structured interview is employed with the attempts to 
capture a variety of views and establish insight into how PPP is perceived, 
talked about and practiced under a changing in reform agenda.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Unlike the past research which was largely focused on VFM and 
performance improvement, this paper takes a different position in looking 
Public Private Partnerships. To do so instead of only focusing on inter-
organizational relationships (IOR) aspect of the partnerships, the paper 
adopts institutional lens as a fundamental concern in researching into Public 
Private Partnerships. This is mainly seeking to investigate how changing of 
reform agenda influencing the collaboration between public and private 
sector in delivery of public services. By doing this it will benefit in two ways. 
First of all as mentioned earlier in injecting a fresh perspective in PPP by 
filling the gap left by taking for granted a reform agenda.  
 
Second of all adding to that it will make an original contribution to this field 
of study by new rigorous information from an archival material. Based on the 
extensive literature review the past research is rarely conducted by this 
research strategy. That means they appear to be scant in capturing and 
understanding what had happened in past distant in influencing/shaping 
collaboration between the two sectors for delivering public services. By 
taking the extraordinary methodology in Public Private Partnership research, 
at the end of the day it is expected to reveal extraordinary findings to this 
field of study. 
 
Last but not least after the study is fully conducted, it is expected to have 
implications for those who are involved in PPPs or those who are considering 
the adoption of PPP. It will raise awareness in whether they are capitalizing 
on reform agenda or against the direction of reform. Moreover they might 
have to rethink through the way in which public and private sectors have 
worked in the context of suitability and relevance to the reform. And 
essentially what they should do and could do much more according to those 
agendas.   
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Underinvestment happens when an investor abstain from investing in an 
asset, even if the investment is beneficial for the customer, because it does 
not perceive a profitable return on the specific investment. The risk for 
underinvestment is high in projects which rely on high asset specificity and 
towards the end of contract lifespan. This paper builds upon a qualitative 
analysis of documentation around a multimillion dollar construction 
project, where contractual mechanisms are investigated to determine if they 
could prevent underinvestment due to high asset specificity. The study 
shows that underinvestment in the project is prevented by unilateral options 
for the public authority to buy the property at different milestones during 
the contractual lifespan. In addition there are joint project groups to 
implement a concept of partnering to reduce asymmetric information 
during investment decisions. In conclusion, the contract gives the 
impression of dealing with underinvestment. Nevertheless, there are some 
draw backs due to the financial setup of the public authority and it exposes 
the private party to some contractual risks due to high asset specificity 
which could risk underinvestment.  
Keywords: Procurement, Economic analysis of law, Contracting, Public-
private partnership 
INTRODUCTION 
Public-private partnership, PPP, is a term as diversified as the number of 
articles written about it. Within the construction industry it can include a 
build, operate and transfer, BOT, setup but it can also include a design, build, 
finance and operate, DBFO delivery method (Leiringer 2003, for an 
overview).  One divider between different PPP projects are joint ventures 
made by the public authorities in order to capitalize on a public asset such as 
land (Kwok-Chun and Walker 2000) and PPP projects aiming to provide a 
public service (Arrowsmith 2000). It could be construction of hospitals 
(Mckee, Edwards and Atun 2006), roads (De Palma and Lindsey 2000) or 
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railway infrastructure (Koppenjan 2005); the latter description has also been 
called institutionalised public-private partnerships, IPPP, (Tvarno 2009). For 
the purpose of this paper PPP will be defined as a project instigated to 
provide a public service and where a private party is responsible for the 
provision and operation of the project and also responsible for the initial 
financing of it. The cost and profit of the project is collected through the 
public authority (Arrowsmith 2000, Tvarno 2009). To further narrow the 
scope of this paper, aspects connected to construction projects only will be 
taken into account. Nevertheless, the reasoning in this paper would probably 
be applicable to other sectors.  
 
In order to attract a private entity to commit to finance a PPP project, the 
private entity has to be, to a certain extent, sure of being able to get a return 
on its investments. At every degree of uncertainty it can be assumed that the 
private party will introduce different levels of risk premiums in order to 
compensate for uncertain outcome (Laryea and Hughes 2008). In spite of the 
use of risk premiums by the private party there still might be risk left not 
accounted for in those risk premiums. A private party could be forced to 
reduce their risk premium to a level which they are uncomfortable with 
because of high competitive pressure. It is also possible that risk is hard to 
estimate due to the lack of complete project definition or due to uncertainty 
about the future state of the world. As a project develops over time, the state 
of the world will become known to each party, and the expected outcome of 
the partnership will be more accurately estimated. If the private party, in 
those later stages of the contract, perceives a lack of return on its investment 
this might cause shading behaviour (Hart and Moore 2008). Shading 
behaviour may include a number of things, all which are a disadvantage for 
the public authority and typically includes either moral hazardous behaviour 
or underinvestment. Moral hazard is particular present in PPP situations 
where there is high asset specificity, for example where the investment goes 
into a project which cannot be used for any other propose than what it is 
provisioned for (Klein 2000). In those cases it might give one of the parties 
the opportunity to hold up the other party. There are two sides of this 
concept; either the public authority can hold up the private party by 
threatening to purchase the services elsewhere thus enforcing a lower than 
market price, or the private party can hold up the public authority by 
threatening to sell its service to a third party thus enforcing a higher than 
market price. Underinvestment (Hart 1995) is related to the investments the 
private party has to make in order to meet its obligations. If the private party, 
for some reason, do not perceive a possibility to recover its costs and profits 
it might resort to underinvest in the project and as a consequence lower 
quality. The focus of this paper is to identify contract mechanisms preventing 
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underinvestment in a case study of a highly complex research facility which 
exhibits PPP characteristics. 
 
THEORIES ON THE BOUNDARIES OF THE FIRM 
Underinvestment is a phenomenon, as mentioned above, where a seller 
invests less than necessary to achieve the quality desired by the buyer. 
Quality may, in this respect, be defined not only as the quality of a product, 
but also including the entire process covered by the contract in question.  
Many causes for the occurrence of underinvestment have been put forward in 
the literature, some of which will be considered below. There is, however, a 
unifying dimension in all causes of underinvestment: the presence of 
unobservable quality in the project. Unobservable quality can manifest itself 
ex ante; in an innovative process, when the needs of the buyer are 
unpredictable or when the scope of the project is too expensive to describe 
exhaustively. Quality can also be unobservable ex post due to 
immeasurability or owing to high transaction costs to actually establish or 
measure quality (Bajari and Tadelis 2001, 2006).  
 
A situation where quality is unobservable ex ante but observable ex post 
started to attract tension in the early 20th century within the context of trying 
to define boundaries of the firm (Coase 1937). The theory recognized that 
creation of a firm took place when the new firm could manufacture a product 
to a lower price than the cost of a firm buying the product had when 
manufacturing the same product itself. The theory did however get more 
complicated when there was a need for specialised assets, high asset 
specificity, to produce products to satisfy a specific buyer. Coase argued 
(1988) that asset specificity can be dealt with through long-term contracting. 
This introduced an unobservable level of quality into the contract, because 
the states of the world throughout the contract was unknown, thus preventing 
the buyer to define the specification in the contract during the entire contract 
lifespan. This situation can be resolved through cost-plus contracting where 
the buyer pays for actual incurred costs with an addition of a profit margin. 
By signing a cost-plus long-term contract, the seller can secure return on 
necessary specific investments, while still being able to make adjustments 
due to changes in the state of the world, as a result securing quality for the 
buyer. The critique of this is based upon a situation where there is a need for 
a large reinvestment in order to keep quality up, occurring due to changes in 
the state of the world. In those cases there is a possibility for the seller to 
refuse to make investments which would increase quality, or decrease cost, 
and thereby price, thus holding up the buyer with the cost-plus agreement 
(Klein 1988). The solution is suggested to be that it would be more feasible 
to use vertical integration in those circumstances, in other words, it would be 
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beneficial for the buyer to integrate the production in its own organisation 
and assume total control (Klein 1988). If the production is undertaken in-
house then the risk of moral hazard would decrease significantly. It has been 
argued that a vertical integration would be to take the solution too far, and it 
would be more beneficial to renegotiate, or prolong, the contract when needs 
for new investments arise (Coase 2000), thus keeping the boundaries 
specialised. The backside of Coase‘s solution is that it probably would 
increase costs, both for the seller and the buyer, in the form of increased 
transactions costs due to repeated contracting (Williamson 1988). 
  
Another objection to the long-term cost-plus contract is based upon the 
property rights approach (Demsetz 1967). Property rights builds upon a 
theory of ownership. If a contract is complete, that would say if the contract 
specifies exact quantity, quality and the exact price, the ownership of the 
assets needed to produce the product is just a form of contractual relationship 
between the buyer and the seller (Hart 1988). Effectively the buyer leases the 
assets for the production of a specific number of units, or for a definite period 
of time. If the contract is incomplete the ownership of the asset plays another 
role. Since the contract is incomplete, it would not be possible to transfer all 
rights exhaustively, if it were, the contract would not have been incomplete. 
Those rights left behind and thus not included in the contract is the residual 
rights of control (Hart 1995). If A rent his bike to friend B, this would 
probably include the right for B to install a speedometer on the bike. But if B 
wants to mount a hybrid electric motor on the bike, B probably would have to 
ask permission from A first, if this were not included in the lease agreement. 
A has, as the owner, the residual rights of control, and accordingly has the 
right to approve any changes not included in the contract. The only way to 
fully transfer those rights is to change the ownership of the asset. According 
to this view, if the contract has unverifiable quality ex ante, and the state of 
the world changes during the contract lifespan, the seller has the residual 
rights to the assets needed for the production. The seller can, by using those 
rights, hold up the buyer, by threatening not to use the residual rights in 
benefit of the production. The seller can also refuse to develop those residual 
rights in a manner that would be beneficial to the buyer. The buyer can 
compensate for this, by limiting the residual rights of control left to the seller. 
However, at some point the buyer would have assumed enough control to be 
able to hold up the seller. The seller no longer has enough residual control to 
secure a return on its investments. This will provoke shading behaviour, often 
in the form of underinvestment in the quality of the project. Consequently, if 
the buyer relies on a specific asset, in order to get a return on its investments, 
the buyer should own the asset (Hart 1988). The main objection to this 
approach is that it seems to rely on physical assets. If the assets needed for 
production, at least partly, are formed out of human capital, assuming 
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ownership would not necessarily remove risk of moral hazard or a hold up. If 
certain groups of employees have certain skills or know-how those 
employees can hold up the buyer even after the buyer purchased the selling 
firm simply because the employees can threat to quit (Freeland 2000). 
Nonetheless it would seem that the buyer still is in a better position if it 
assumes ownership with regard to moral hazard (Hart and Moore 1990), due 
to transfer of a physical asset and because there is a probability that an 
employee might not gain on moral hazard in all situations.  
 
Game theoretic modelling has shown that this view of property rights can be 
too simplistic. A joint-ownership contract is a contract where both parties 
own the property rights to the asset, and where the parties cannot use the 
property without the permission of the other party. If a bilateral exit clause is 
entered into such a contract, with addition of a tax, it would make some of 
the disadvantages of a joint contract to disappear. This is because of the  
power of a bargaining game (Nash 1950a) joined with an extra tax, or extra 
cost to use the exit (Maskin and Triole 1999). The tax is presumed to be 
collected by the community, thus not beneficial to any party within the 
contract. The contract would reduce both parties profit of unilaterally using 
the exit strategy. It would be hard to make a theoretic judgment on which of 
the single- and joint-ownership contracts is most advantageous (Maskin and 
Triole 1999). This inference would allow for a joint-ownership in spite of 
Harts conclusions.  
 
METHOD 
Even though the theories about the boundaries of the firm, initially was based 
on a series of case studies (Coase 1937, 2000) the main body of work has 
been done through theoretical approaches (Demsetz 1968, Hart and Moore 
1988, Klein 1996, Williamson 1988). This approach has, together with 
theories intrinsic nature of generalisation and simplification, led to an ideal 
discussion on the theory of contracts. In order to apply the theories 
transparently there was a need to study an extreme case: where the contract 
was very incomplete, had a high number of unobservable quality variables, 
relied on high asset specificity and stretched over a long period of time
1
. 
Under such circumstances the choice of boundaries within the project would 
be particularly distinguishable. Building upon this the choice was made to 
study the procurement of a highly complex research facility
2
. The facility is a 
synchrotron light facility which is used to x-ray objects in a non-destructive 
                                                 
1
 The project also had to be procured by a public authority for reasons not discussed in this 
paper. 
2
 A more complete account of the case is being prepared for publication elsewhere, thus this 
account is limited to the aspects needed for the purpose of this paper.  
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manner. It can be medical compounds in order to view the molecule shape, or 
archaeological artefacts trying to determine how phosphate travels through 
different layers in the artefact. The facility will consist of a storage ring 
approximately 500 meter in circumference, attached to it is a 250 m linear 
electron accelerator. The facility will also contain office space and areas to 
house research equipment. The facility will be built on land consisting of 17 
m of soil of varying density before hitting the bed rock. The significant 
detail, making it a highly complex construction project, is that the accelerator 
and the storage ring are only allowed to vibrate in the magnitude of 20-30 
nanometres. Those specifications were however not included into the tender 
notice nor into the contract, since they were not finalised. The only references 
to the magnitude of vibration specifications were from the media and from a 
conceptual report, and it was concluded that given current technology it were 
possible to achieve a 40-50 nm stability. The construction of the facility is 
expected to last for five years and the level of investment in the construction 
will reach over 100 million euros, with another 200 million in equipment.  
 
In order to understand the contractual relationship between the contracting 
authority and the contractor all documentation and contracts included in the 
procurement process were collected, together with the formal communication 
between the authority and the tenderers during the procurement. Interviews 
were conducted with the responsible procurement officer. The contract 
signed after contract award was gathered, but later signed documentation has 
not yet been collected. Thus, there can be later signed documentation 
affecting the relationship between the parties.  
 
All documentation were initially put through a systematic document analysis 
similar to what has been suggested by Corbin and Strauss (1990). The coding 
process will not be described exhaustively in this paper, but a rough 
description will be given. The first step contained a review of all shift in 
ownership, control and liability for a certain result were coded into concepts 
and the direction of the shift were also taken into account. Out of those 
concepts categories were created out of the effect of the specific concepts. 
For example, categories were created out of codes that, in some sense, left 
control with the contracting authority, or if a decision were to be made 
unilaterally as opposed to jointly. From this, three broad themes arose; issues 
regarding unobservable results or quality, topics concerning high asset 
specificity and there were areas with relationship to long contract lifespan.  
 
The analysis of the coding results were quite extensive, and were built upon 
analysing relationships between categories and themes, the nature of linkages 
and of course entailed a broader view of external factors. One of the aspects 
arising out of the analysis was processes and linkages which were coupled 
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with the control, in a broad sense, of the facility. It is suggested that this 
battle of control could beneficially be analysed out of a property rights 
approach.  
 
THE CASE 
The contracting authority decided to procure the construction project as a 
PPP project with contract design based upon a design-build-operate delivery 
method. There were several reasons for this, for example, the contracting 
authority is prevented, by government regulation, to own property. To submit 
a request for exemption would probably delay the time schedule. The lease 
agreement was set for 25 years, which is the longest allowed lease period in 
Sweden. Further, the contractor should finance the project and the contracting 
authority would pay annuity interest calculated on actual incurred cost during 
construction, the interest should also cover all running costs except for 
facility management (which is paid per square meter). This setup allows for 
the contracting authority to budget running costs, and it did not need to raise 
funding for a large initial investment. The interest is indexed by a specific 
published index every month, making the price stable over time from external 
financial factors. After the design is set, the contractor is obliged to, in 
competition, request quotes from subcontractor. The contracting authority 
and the contractor then set a reference price based on those quotes. The 
reference price is subsequently used as calculation of an incentive clause. The 
clause allows for an increase of the contractors profit margin if actual costs 
runs below the reference price and it decreases profit margins if costs rise 
above the reference price.  
 
Starting at year 5, the contracting authority has the option to assume facility 
management them self and to procure it from another supplier. If the 
contracting authority does take responsibility for the facility management, the 
authority has to follow the maintenance guidelines from the contractor. At 
year 15, 20 and 25 there is an exit clause for the contracting authority, giving 
it the right to purchase the facility. The price is set as the current residual 
value with the addition of a 'fair' profit margin. It is not defined what 
constitutes a 'fair' profit, but it is clear from the documentation it is not equal 
to the difference between the residual value and the current market value. The 
contractor can exit the contract by selling the facility to another firm, though 
this transfer has to be approved by the contracting authority. 
 
During the design and construction stages of the project, it is mandated that 
the project will run under a partnering regiment (Eriksson 2010). The scope 
of the partnering collaboration is only set on a strategic level, no provisions 
on its implementation exists. The contracting authority also has the right to 
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reject other tenants, extensions and developments extending the use of the 
facility if it affects the operation of the facility. However, there is a 
stipulation that the parties should, during the operation, in collaboration 
develop the use of the facility in the interest of the parties. 
 
ANALYSIS 
The contract do not exhaustively transfer control from the contractor to the 
contracting authority. The contracting authority does not have a right to make 
major changes to the facility. This would prevent the contracting authority to 
construct extensions and it probably also preclude the contracting authority 
from undertaking major renovation work. Further the authority has not the 
right to sublet parts of the facilities without the consent of the contractor. 
Accordingly, other tenants would at least have to be accepted by the 
contractor, and quite possibly have to negotiate a lease directly with the 
contractor. This could be a matter of concern if the contracting authority, for 
instance, would like to collaborate with another organization. On the other 
hand the contracting authority has the right to stop the contractor to lease 
parts of the facility to other tenants if the lease would affect the operations of 
the contracting authority. Even though the right to make major alterations or 
extending the facility is put on contractor, the authority still has the right to 
reject the plans if it would disrupt the day-to-day operations. The facility 
management can be transferred to the contracting authority, thus allocate 
some control to the authority, although, even under such conditions, the 
overall maintenance of the structure would still be left to the contractor. In 
consequence, there seem to be a considerable degree of residual rights left to 
the contractor. But most rights are partly dependent upon the contracting 
authority accepting the usage of those rights. The arrangement could open up 
for the contractor to benefit of moral hazard, or underinvestment, towards the 
contracting authority, and it does not seem to restrict the contracting 
authority's behaviour.  
 
Counteracting the possibility for moral hazard is the exit points unilaterally 
allocated to the contracting authority. If the contracting authority would 
perceive a moral hazardous behaviour on the part of the contractor, it could 
simply assume all property rights from the other party by using those clauses. 
The cost for using this clause is not exhaustively defined, but it has some 
components worth considering. First, because 'fair' profit is not clearly 
defined, this cost will not include the actual established 'fair' profit only, but 
also cover the negotiation costs while establishing the level of the profit. 
Second, since the contracting authority would have to pay the current residual 
value, the cost of securing the funds needed would also have to be taken into 
account. Third, the raising of funds for the purchase of the facility will be 
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done within a political process, which‘s intrinsic nature of uncertainty would 
incur costs in the form of increased risk. It is clear that the cost for the 
contracting authority using an exit clause would be higher than simply 
calculate the residual value and a reasonable profit. In accordance with the 
theories of Maskin & Triole (1999) and Nash (1950b, 1951) cited above, the 
cost of using the exit clause will serve as equilibrium in the choice of using 
the clause. This construct should be accentuated. If the 'fair' profit is defined 
as the profit the contractor would make if everything held status quo until 
year 25, then there will be a possibility for the contractor to underinvest 
without any risk for retribution since the cost of using the exit clause would 
be higher than accepting the underinvestment. If the 'fair' profit would be 
detached from the projected profit, and instead be a 'fair' profit on a single 
transaction, then the contractor would be enticed to not underinvest. But if 
the profit would be below the total cost of employing the exit clause, then the 
contracting authority would actually gain by using the exit clause. As a result 
it seems to be important, for the contract in hand, that 'fair' profit is defined 
somewhere around a 'fair' profit on a single transaction, in order to prevent 
shading from the contracting authority or underinvestment from the 
contractor.  
 
The contractor is locked into the contract until year 25 with the exception of 
it selling its rights of the property to another firm; this possibility is on the 
other hand depending on approval from the contracting authority. This 
situation limits the usability of the contractor‘s options. Nonetheless, the 
applicability of the authority‘s veto right may be less than it is prima facie. If 
the contracting authority would refuse an exit by transferring the rights to 
another firm, it might actually provoke underinvestment by the contractor. 
The underinvestment would be limited to the exit equilibrium because the 
transfer of rights could be done at a market price exceeding 'fair' profit of the 
exit clause. Even so, underinvestment could still be significant to the 
contracting authority and thus limit the applicability of the veto. In spite of 
this, there is still a, rather small, degree of opportunity for the contractor to 
escape the contract. This situation would, according to the theories of 
property rights, open up for underinvestment because the contractor cannot 
secure return on its investments given the lack of control
3
. In order to 
counteract this tendency the contracting authority would need to be rather 
liberal with allowing for development of the property and in such way allow 
for the contractor to get return on its investments. 
 
                                                 
3
 One aspect is lacking from this reasoning and is not included in the analysis of this paper. If 
the contractor ex ante, perceive this risk of lack of control, and the risk coming out of the 
unilateral exit clauses, it can add risk premiums to its bids. Such practice would allow for 
compensation of risk by transfer the cost to the contracting authority, ex ante.  
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The equilibrium also deserves some consideration. If the point is reasonably 
high for the contracting authority, thus leaving a non-trivial opening for 
underinvestment on the part of the contracting authority, the contract can 
reach an interesting state. If the contractor underinvests too much, the 
contracting authority would use the exit clause. If the contracting authority is 
too restrictive with allowing for the development of the facility, it would 
force the contractor to underinvest, assuming that the information of each 
party's strategy is unknown to the other. Those assumptions would therefore 
presume a non-cooperative relationship between the parties. It is also argued 
that the structure of the equilibrium in this case, serves as Maskin and Trioles 
(1999) tax addition when using the exit clause. The cost of the political 
process and the cost of selling a property with extreme asset specificity 
would not benefit either party. In such circumstances it is possible that the 
equilibrium would reach a state where the parties would not gain on a non-
cooperative relationship (Nash 1950a, b, 1951). Thus, this state would serve 
as an incentive on using a cooperative relationship, where the parties in a 
collaborative manner can find an optimal strategy. The contract facilitates 
partnering as a tool to run the project, while the forms of the process is not 
defined it could serve as a medium to facilitate a cooperate relationship 
between the parties. It would certainly allow for communication, and for 
transfer of information on the contracting authority‘s strategies and the 
contractors strategies. Provided this is done successfully in an optimal 
fashion, the contract could eliminate underinvestment completely. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The contract situation in the case study seems to exhibit an environment 
which could provoke underinvestment. The facility in the case study has a 
high degree of asset specificity, further it will require large investments in the 
initial stages. Due to the long construction stage, the facility's quality will not 
be observable until a dominant part of the investments has already been 
made. This explains the contracting authority choice of a long-term contract 
on a cost-plus-like basis. However since the states of the world during the 
contract life over 25 year is unknown, the contracting authority has put in 
some provisions into the contract. In something that can be seen as an effort 
to counteract underinvestment, there are exit clauses in the contract allowing 
for the contracting authority to purchase the facility. Nevertheless, it has been 
shown that this practice can actually provoke underinvestment in some 
circumstances by reducing the contractor's possibility to earn return on its 
investments. It is suggested, that this situation can be counteracted by a non-
trivial cost for the procuring authority of using those exit points together with 
a loss of profit for the contractor when the exit is used. This would cause a 
state between the parties where they would actually gain on cooperating 
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instead of maximising their own gain, without consideration of the other 
party. This is a thin line and since the contract is heavily weighted in control 
towards the contracting authority, it is probable that shifts in the state of the 
world outside this analysis would result in underinvestment.  
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Private Finance Initiative (PFI) procurement was introduced by the UK 
Government in the early 90s. Since its inception, PFIs have been received 
positively throughout the globe. It‘s fundamental principal of public service 
delivery through private sector expertise and private finance have been the 
driving forces in PFI gaining momentum. However limitations in public 
sector capital funding; an increase in socio-economic necessity demands; 
and the race towards global competitiveness have equally contributed to 
this rise. All of these expose PFIs to external and internal shocks caused by 
exogenous and endogenous factors which largely influence the 
performance of the procurement model. Furthermore the nature of PFIs 
having long term concession period increases the vulnerability of the 
project towards these uncertainties. A conceptual view that the element of 
Robustness is essential and that it needs to be built into operational PFIs is 
presented. Robustness is further argued to reduce adversarial actions when 
faced with uncertainties, hence creating a sustainable environment in which 
these PFI projects continue to perform. Consequently a proposed 
Robustness model is presented to primarily achieve two objectives. Firstly 
to gather feedback and comments on the model itself as a form of 
validation of the model and secondly to ascertain the conceptualisation of 
the Robustness model as being part of the PFI procurement model. The 
model will be further tested using case studies consisting of operational PFI 
projects. It is envisaged the Robustness model will provide an insight to the 
dynamics that occurs within a PFI project as well as identify the co-
dependency factors towards robustness. 
Keywords: Granting Authority, PFI, Procurement, Robustness, 
Sustainability 
INTRODUCTION  
The objective of the study is to determine the significance and co-dependency 
of Robustness within a PFI project environment. The engineering definition 
of robustness is described as the ability for a particular system to maintain its 
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performance when subjected to internal and external uncertainty parameters 
(Carlson and Doyle, 2002). Furthermore robustness accentuates the close 
relationship between cost benefit trade-offs and system design to cope with 
uncertainties (Anderies et al., 2004). By means of convergence from the 
context of a PFI initiative, it can be inferred that firstly, there are endogenous 
and exogenous factors that create a level of uncertainty by which PFIs are 
implemented. Withstanding these uncertainties, the ability to absorb the 
uncertainty whilst the project continues to achieve the objectives reflects the 
robustness of PFI. Secondly there exists a permissible level of trade-offs 
between and among the endogenous and exogenous factors. This permissible 
level can be referred to as the flexibility that needs to exist within the PFI 
model to create the element of robustness. Thus in the context of this study, 
Robustness is defined as the permissible level to which a PFI project 
continues to operate in the presence of uncertainties caused by the 
endogenous or exogenous factors.  
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
Ghobadian (2004a) put forth a fundamental question which contributes to the 
cornerstone of this research, ‗whether there is a robust structure in place to 
enable Government to attain its objectives of delivering improved and 
sustainable public services?’. The robust structure in this context refers to the 
processes and evaluation mechanism in place to justify the PFI route and one 
that leads to a more effective and efficient public service provision. It is 
further suggested that the ‗robust structure for the delivery of high quality 
sustainable public services can be created through the best of both public 
and private sectors through partnering’ (ibid) meaning that the way forward 
towards a sustainable delivery of public services is through the public private 
partnership mechanism and in the context of this paper points to PFI.  
 
The performance of PFI have been closely monitored by the independent 
‗watch dog‘ role played by the National Audit Office (NAO) and the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC), whereby both had given positive and 
encouraging feedback on the implementation of PFI (Ghobadian et al., 
2004b). A review by O‘Dowd (2011) of the NAO report published on 28 
April stipulated that the VfM in PFI projects requires robust evaluation by 
government departments to demonstrate its presence. While the validity of 
VfM remains questionable, the learning curve from PFI projects can be 
extended into various forms of procurement. He further adds that the report 
emphasises: data collection; competent personnel; robust evaluation process; 
and market competition. Hence there is a great need for a more robust 
evaluation and monitoring system within PFIs. 
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On the contrary, the justifications put forth by the Government in projecting 
the achievement of the PFI have been criticised by Pollock et al. (2007) due 
to the methodology used in arriving at the conclusion reported in various 
Government publications. The evidence cited by Pollock (ibid) no doubt 
statistically justifies the author‘s claims; however, the evidence equally leads 
to the conclusion that there are gaps that require further probing into the 
robustness of the processes carried out in arriving at the Value for Money 
criteria and the Risk Transfer assessments. Pollock et al. (2011) indicated 
that the main deficiencies within PFIs in NHS projects are contract 
monitoring, compliance and contract enforcement. A lack of such control 
mechanisms would affect VfM causing serious implications in the quality 
and service levels of NHS care. 
 
This emphasis towards a more robust PFI procurement has been drummed 
tirelessly by the Government. The Treasury (HM Treasury, 2008, 2010a, 
2010b; NAO, 2010) has been the key instrument in demanding that 
procurement within the authorities are robust in terms of planning, costing, 
deliverables and value for money. Asenova et al. (2003) inferred that a lack 
of a robust process affects badly the VfM component of the PFI project as 
echoed by HM Treasury. Thus it can be inferred that a highly competitive 
atmosphere is compulsory for PFIs and the mechanism in which the bidding 
is evaluated needs to emphasise robustness with regards to VfM, Risk 
Transfer and Affordability assessments. 
 
Shaoul et al. (2011) inferred that the contractual arrangements within NHS 
PFIs reduce the Trusts‘ flexibility due to fixed unitary payments over the 
lifecycle of the project. The study also raised issues pertaining to corporate 
structure; risk transfer; service delivery and performance monitoring and 
partnership relationship. Ball (2011) questioned the validity of the Public 
Sector Comparator (PSC) used to indicate VfM based on the level of 
transparency embedded within the assessment process. Thus there is a need 
to review the existing evaluation and monitoring mechanisms that are in 
place and to explore the rigour within these systems.  
 
Wilson et al. (2010) demonstrated governance as an essential component of 
PPPs. The form of governance due to the complexities within PPPs varies 
from that of traditional procurements likewise in the case of PFIs. 
Furthermore the level of complexity within PFIs is evident, based on the 
governance structure that comprise of various stakeholders coupled with 
layers of contractual mechanisms to safeguard the interest of each entity. 
Wilson (ibid) points out the key characteristic in a successful PPP is 
communication among the stakeholders. Rufin and Santos (2010) on the 
other hand found PPP contracts less complete and more complex. The 
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complexity is viewed as a tool to complement uncertainties that exists in 
contracts. This approach may seem rather adversarial, pushing back the trust 
level within the partnership.  
 
Grimsey and Graham (1997) had identified the underlying principles within a 
PFI to be VfM and Risk Transfer while stressing the need to look into a 
robust Affordability scheme due to the duration of PFI ventures when 
examining PFI in the NHS. Grimsey and Lewis (2002) further argued that a 
robust mechanism is vital to provide a sound and affordable financial plan to 
give sustainability to the PFI throughout its concession period. The 
complexity of PFI projects is without question a matter to be reckoned with, 
however with risks there are rewards coupled with effectiveness and 
efficiencies that the PFI has introduced in the delivery of public provisions 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2007).  
 
Kakabadse (2007) suggested that PFI does provide some advantages, 
including the risks that PFI projects contain such as political pressure, 
complexity in preferred bidder selection, bid size, alterations, contractual 
relationships, affordability and others. Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2011) 
agreed that PPPs offer advantages, subject to suitability, as well as the need 
to have the right composition between interests and incentives surrounding 
the partnership. 
 
The mode in which robustness is present within PFI procurement is 
inconclusive and remains subjective. However the demand for a robust 
medium, be it a procurement process, evaluation, monitoring or structure 
leads to the conclusion that robustness is a significant characteristic of PFI. In 
order to appreciate robustness it is important to establish what reflects the 
definition of Robustness (ROB) within the PFI context. 
 
SYSTEMS THINKING 
Systems thinking have been actively used in various scientific disciplines 
since the 1940s. The focus of this approach is to consider a system as a whole 
rather than the sub-systems which are parts of the whole (Daellenbach, 
1994).  A systems thinking approach is adopted as part of this research to 
identify the interdependency and co-dependency relationships (Mansouri et 
al., 2009) that exist within the subsystems of Value for Money (VfM), Risk 
Transfer Assessment (RTA) and Affordability (Aff) in a PFI project 
environment. As systems thinking addresses the system from a holistic 
viewpoint (Rubenstein-Montano et al., 2001), the relationships can be 
determined, however it is equally important to set the boundaries of which 
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the system operates and are influenced by (Rubenstein-Montano et al., 2001), 
in other words the exogenous and endogenous factors.  
 
ENDOGENOUS FACTORS - PFI PENTAGRAM  
The endogenous factors focuses on the processes used to evaluate the 
feasibility of a project being implemented via the PFI route by the Granting 
Authority (GA). The main processes identified are VfM, RTA and Aff.  The 
two remaining factors are robustness (ROB) and resilience (RES). These five 
factors are envisaged to provide a significant impact on creating an 
environment that is conducive for a successful delivery of the PFI project. 
Furthermore these factors have been identified based on literature and expert 
group interviews conducted consisting of 14 people representing the public 
sector, private sector and academia. The format of the interviews was semi 
structured. The interviews were used to establish the core processes 
pertaining to PFI projects from the Granting Authority‘s view point 
(Sundaraj, 2011). Hence the endogenous factors and its co-dependencies is 
visualised in Figure 1.0.   
 
 
Figure 1.0 PFI Pentagram 
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EXOGENOUS FACTORS - SLEEPT   
The SLEEPT mnemonic consists of six factors which comprise of: Social; 
Legal; Economic; Environment; Political; and Technological. The factors 
provide a comprehensive exogenous environment in which the PFI operates. 
Initial work on SLEEPT was carried The Centre for Risk Management 
Research (CRMR) at the University of Salford as a device for categorising 
‗drivers‘ of a process or object (Eaton et al., 2007). The mapping of SLEEPT 
on to PFIs was established using a quasi-Delphic approach which involved 
25 case studies over a period of six years (ibid). The mnemonic has been 
adopted by various researchers to represent the exogenous factors in studies 
related to PFIs (Akbiyikli, 2005; Eaton, 2008; de Lemos, 2002; Gunnigan 
and Rajput, 2010; Gunnigan, 2007). The six components of SLEEPT are as 
follows (Eaton, 2007): 
  
 Social: Public acceptance of private sector involvement. 
 Legal framework: Standardised documentation. 
 Economic: Access to significant private sector borrowing. 
 Environment: Clearly defined sustainability and impact criteria. 
 Political framework: International, national and local will or 
commitment. 
 Technological: Access and availability of quality PPP practitioners 
and experienced project sponsors. 
 
ROBUSTNESS FRAMEWORK 
The framework in Figure 2 will be used to develop a Robustness model for 
PFI projects in the UK. The framework contains four main elements which 
impact the model. The endogenous factors are factors that influence how the 
model reacts due to the processes within a PFI project. The exogenous factors 
describe the external environment that PFI projects are subjected to over the 
life cycle of the project. With PFI projects subjected to long term concession 
periods, time scale location is an important aspect whereby the model is 
required to adapt to the procurement stages and throughout the life-cycle of 
the project once it becomes operational. The final element to the framework 
is the partnership members, with each party having their respective 
organisational objectives and goals, coupled with the partnership‘s mutual 
goal, Robustness will be largely influenced by the perspective in which it is 
being considered. The double head arrows that link the framework echo a 
systems thinking approach (Checkland, 1981) in developing the model. Thus 
the variation in one component would influence the outcome of the whole. 
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Figure 2: Framework to develop robustness model 
 
 
ROBUSTNESS MODEL 
The PFI procurement method is just like any other procurement method 
which is build on a well structured procedure. This procedure incorporates 
the assessment and evaluation of inter-alia, the key elements: Value for 
Money (VfM), Risk Transfer Assessment (RTA) and Affordability (Aff). 
These three elements consist of further layers of procedures in order to attain 
the aims and objectives of each individual element respectively. This 
demonstrates that the PFI procurement is built on systems and that these 
systems co-exist in the PFI project environment. The necessity for resilience 
within a particular system to increase the reliability of the system has been 
established. This supports the argument that there is a need to determine the 
level of Resilience within the PFI procurement method by investigating each 
individual process: Value for Money; Risk Transfer; and Affordability. It is 
equally important to note that there are trade-offs taking place among the 
systems in a PFI project environment. Thus to ascertain the interrelationship 
that exists, a systems thinking approach is used. 
 
Drawing from the PFI pentagram, a Robustness model is developed as shown 
in Figure 2.0. The model reflects the dynamic state constantly taking place in 
a PFI project environment. The three core elements, VfM, RTA and Aff from 
the pentagram forms the core pillars in the model. Since the model is 
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dynamic in nature, the length of Resilience (RES) varies based on the trade-
offs that occur during the life-cycle of the PFI project. This means that the 
length between any two core elements changes in accordance with the PFI 
project life-cycle. The variations in length reflects the degree of flexibility 
that corresponds directly to the trade-offs that occurs within the PFI project 
environment. The state of equilibrium is a reflection of the stability of the 
system (Gersick, 1991) for a particular point in time of the project life cycle 
which is represented through the stability of the triangle.   
 
 
Figure 2.0 Robustness Model 
In the event that the triangle formed by the three core elements becomes 
unstable, the equilibrium is affected, the PFI arrangement is no longer robust 
and the possibility of the PFI project becoming unsustainable is possible.  
 
The interrelationship between Value for Money - Risk Transfer - 
Affordability - Robustness - Resilience is a complex one. The complexity is 
further enhanced as the back drop in which this relationship operates can be 
defined through the acronym SLEEPT which encapsulates the dynamism of 
the relationship. Subsequently the significance of Robustness within a PFI 
project environment can be viewed when incorporating both the exogenous 
and endogenous factors surrounding a PFI project environment as shown in 
Figure 3.0. This indicates that there are two levels of interaction taking place, 
firstly the internal relationship which is the former and secondly the external 
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relationship which is the latter. In order for the PFI to continue to perform its 
aims and objectives, an equilibrium state between the two environments is 
needed and this will contribute to a sustainable PFI procurement initiative. 
Thus the Robustness and Resilience characteristics provide a mechanism to 
manage uncertainties that exists throughout the PFI project life-cycle.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.0 Robustness Model 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Robustness model is one of the outputs of the research. This model has 
been developed based on the following theoretical framework. 
 
Figure 4.0 depicts an ICOM diagram (IDEF, 1993) of a typical system. The 
system receives the necessary INPUT(s) in order to generate the desired 
OUTPUT(s). In order to achieve this, the system is supported by a specific 
set of CONTROL(s) which is implemented through a set MECHANISM(s). 
The system described here is a closed system (Checkland, 1981) whereby the 
external ENVIRONMENT is not in contact with the internal environment of 
the SYSTEM. 
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Figure 4.0 ICOM Diagram for a System 
 
In a real life setting the SYSTEM is subjected to the impact of the 
ENVIRONMENT which is defined as an open system (Checkland, 1981). 
This is indicated through the permeable lines as shown in Figure 5.0. The 
interaction with the ENVIRONMNET, allows the SYSTEM to be subjected 
to PERTURBATION due to changes that might occur in the external 
ENVIRONMENT caused by uncertainties. Whilst the CONTROL and 
MECHANISM remain the same, there have been changes to the INPUT due 
to the PERTURBATION. Hence this results in a different OUTPUT‘ being 
achieved as indicated in Figure 5.0. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.0 ICOM-P Diagram for a System 
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The ability of the open system to achieve the desired initial OUTPUT with 
the existing INPUT; CONTROL; MECHANISM; and PERTURBATION, 
the system would be required to be built with a certain characteristic or 
mechanism which will allow the SYSTEM to absorb the changes caused by 
the ENVIRONMENT. The ability of the SYSTEM to react in this manner 
would reflect the resilience and robustness of the SYSTEM when subjected 
to uncertainties. The incorporation of such an element or mechanism is 
shown in Figure 6.0 
 
 
 
Figure 6.0 Mechanism integrate into the system 
 
Therefore based on Figures, 4.0, 5.0 and 6.0, the reasoning is adopted onto a 
PFI project. The PFI procurement is viewed as a system which contains a set 
of inputs referred to as Output Specification. The specification is thus 
comprehensively detailed using a contract as the control and within this 
system the three main mechanisms are Value for Money, Risk Transfer 
Assessment and Affordability. These features are necessary to ensure that the 
PFI procurement is able to deliver the desired services through the specified 
asset. In Figure 7.0 the PFI procurement is subjected to PERTURBATION 
which might is caused by the SLEEPT exogenous factors used to represent 
the external environment. Furthermore in order to maintain the desired 
results, the Robustness Model is integrated into the system to provide the 
required resilience and robustness to achieve the objectives of the PFI 
procurement. 
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     Figure 7.0 Robustness Model integrated into PFI project environment 
 
This theoretical framework will be subjected to testing using multiple case 
studies to verify and validate the theory as well as the proposed Robustness 
model. 
 
RESEARCH PROGRESS 
The research is currently in the data collection stage. A total of four case 
studies will be used in which the model will be mapped across the case 
studies. Each case study represents an operational PFI project. The projects 
constitute of two schools and two hospitals. Data collection comprises of 
semi-structured interviews, project related documents and literature review. 
The identity of the project and respondents within the case studies are kept 
anonymous as requested by the participants.  
 
The theory behind the Robustness model will be tested using the case studies 
to ensure replication. Through this process, critical success factors (CSRs) for 
robustness within a PFI project environment will also be identified. This will 
contribute to establishing the environment in which robustness will be able to 
optimise its role for the benefit of the project. 
 
The different case studies will provide an insight to variations in terms of 
contract management and project management with Granting Authorities 
during the operational stage of the project. Arguably prior to financial close, 
the implementation is standardised based on the process and procedures 
determined by HM Treasury. Hence the case study will be able to clarify if 
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changes do occur and what are the elements that influence and impact on the 
changes. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Robustness is a significant and important characteristic in PFI projects. 
Nevertheless further research is required to completely understand how this 
element can improve the performance of the processes within the PFI 
procurement model in delivering services. This portion of the research will be 
explored using operational PFI projects in order to identify mechanisms used 
to manage uncertainty which is reflective of robustness. Subsequently the 
interdependency between robustness and the processes within PFI 
procurement will also be of primary interest. However significant findings 
have yet to be obtained to demonstrate the application of the proposed 
robustness model mentioned above. The model however is still at the initial 
stage and requires further testing using active projects as case studies. It is the 
objective of this PhD research to explore if the characteristic of robustness 
contributes to a sustainable PFI procurement.    
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